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C H A P T E R  1 
F O R M U L A T I N G  A N  
AMERICAN F O R E I G N  P O L I C Y  
The foreign policy of the American Revolution was not revolu- 
tionary. The ideas shaping it were those that informed European 
diplomatic thinking throughout the eighteenth century. Colo- 
nial Americans adopted those ideas as readily as they did the 
fashions, the books, and the other appurtenances of European 
culture that they imported so avidly. John Adams and his fellow 
statesmen of the Revolution absorbed the ideas as they grew up 
and, in 1776, applied them to the new American nation's rela- 
tions with foreign powers. 
Eighteenth-century European diplomacy, writes Felix Gilbert, 
was "entirely dominated by the concept of power." Its key ideas 
were the balance of power, which apologists promoted as an en- 
lightened mechanism to secure peace, and "the doctrine of the 
interest of states," according to which interest was the sole arbi- 
ter of political action.' The economic theory underpinning 
eighteenth-century diplomacy was mercantilism, which mea- 
sured national power by national wealth and considered com- 
merce as the source of both.2 The eighteenth century broadened 
the balance of power to include colonies and affimed that colo- 
nial commerce was the decisive counter in the balance. French 
Foreign Minister Choiseul summarized this outlook in 1759: 
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"The true balance of power really resides in commerce and 
America. "3 
A diplomacy based on power was congenial to eighteenth- 
century Americans because they subscribed to a theory of poli- 
tics, propounded by English Opposition writers, which stressed 
that "the ultimate explanation of every political controversy was 
the disposition of power." The sensitivity of colonial Americans 
to power was, according to a leading expositor of their ideas, 
"one of the most striking things" in their thinking.* Even had 
colonial Americans never heard of the English Opposition, they 
would have been attentive to power in politics because of their 
long conflict with the French. The object of the wars with France 
was dominion-power over the North American continent. 
Therefore, an appreciation of power in politics was natural for 
the colonists. 
In soliciting British assistance against the French, the colonists 
invoked religion and morality far less than self-interest and 
power, for they correctly assumed that British statesmen were 
more likely to be moved by calculations of power than by re- 
minders of religious affinity. At every crisis with the French, 
Americans stressed to the British that they could not afford to 
lose the colonies because they were the source of their national 
power and of their weight in the European balance. James 
Logan's "Of the State of the British Plantations in America" 
demonstrates that Americans had perfected this kind of appeal 
by 1732. Logan's paper was laced with references to the "true In- 
terest," the "present Interest," of Britain and her European 
competitors. And it insisted that Britain's power and her posi- 
tion in the European balance was derived from America. "The 
principal Security of Britain," wrote Logan, "consists in its 
Naval force and this is supported by its Trade and Navigation. 
[It is no] less certain that these are very much advanced by means 
of the British Dominions in America; the Preservation of which 
is therefore of the utmost importance to the Kingdom itself, for 
it is manifest that if France could possess itself of those Do- 
3 
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minions and thereby become Masters of all their Trade 
. . . they would soon be an Overmatch in Naval Strength to 
the rest of Europe, and then be in a Condition to prescribe 
Laws to the whole." "The American Plantations," Logan con- 
cluded, "are of such Importance to Britain, that the Loss of 
them to any other Power, especially to France might be its own 
ruin. " 5  
King George's War (the War of the Austrian Succession) pro- 
duced the customary American appeals to Britain: " 'All parts of 
the Empire were interdependent,' " wrote Massachusettensis in 
1746, " 'and if the Colonies were lost . . . Britain would lose its 
own independence too.' "6 American balance-of-power argu- 
ments reached a crescendo during the early years of the French 
and Indian War, when the apparently unprecedented gravity of 
the French threat produced scores of anxious affirmations of 
America's importance to Britain. Taking their cue, perhaps, 
from Dr. John Mitchell, who in 1757 declared that "interest 
rules all the world. Why should it not rule in the C~lonies,"~ 
Americans vied with one another in emphasizing interest as the 
motive force of politics and in asserting their importance to the 
European balance of power. In a sermon preached to the Massa- 
chusetts General Court on May 29, 1754, Jonathan Mayhew as- 
serted that the "liberties of Europe" depended on the outcome 
of the struggle with the French, "for of so great consequence is 
the empire of North America . . . that it must turn the scale of 
power greatly in the favour of the only Monarch, from whom 
those liberties are in danger; and against the Prince, who is the 
grand support and bulwark of them." The next year the Penn- 
sylvania cartographer Lewis Evans predicted that the possession 
of the Ohio Country "will make so great an addition to that Na- 
tion which wins it, where there is no third State to hold the Bal- 
lance of Power, that the Loser must inevitably sink under his 
Rival." According to Doctor William Clarke of Boston, writing 
in the same year, "These Colonies are of such Consequence to 
the Trade, Wealth and Naval Power of Great-Britain, and will in 
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future Time make so much larger Additions to it, that whilst she 
keep them entire, she will be able to maintain not only her Inde- 
pendency, but her Superiority as a Maritime Power. And on the 
other Hand, should she once lose them, and the French gain 
them, Great Britain herself must necessarily be reduced to an ab- 
solute Subjection to the French Crown, to nothing more than a 
Province of France."* Americans, it is apparent, endorsed the 
conviction of European diplomacy, that "they controlled the 
balance of power among the various colonizing nations" and 
"that whichever nation controlled North America would hold 
the hegemony of power over the rest of Europe. "9 
Most of the leaders of the American Revolution matured dur- 
ing the French and Indian War-John Adams graduated from 
college the month of Braddock's defeat-and they adopted as 
their own the attitude toward foreign affairs which prevailed 
during that period. Since few statements by leaders of the Revo- 
lution survive from the 1750s, the proof of this contention must 
principally rest on the similarity between the foreign-policy as- 
sumptions of the Revolution and of the French and Indian War. 
John Adams is unusual in that he left statements about his 
youthful attitude toward foreign affairs which show the conti- 
nuity of his views between the 1750s and the 1770s. 
From a tender age Adams was thrilled by the prospects of 
American power. At ten he thought the men of Massachusetts a 
race of heroes, who would have "cut to pieces at once the Duke 
D'Enville's umy" had it dared attack Boston. In 175 5 so great 
was his "confidence in the resolution of my countrymen, that I 
had no doubt we could defend ourselves against the French, and 
that better without England than with her." Adams's youthful 
cockiness fed upon a vision of American greatness which was 
widely held in the colonies and which was nothing less than a be- 
lief-decades before scholars usually locate it-in the country's 
manifest destiny. New Englanders believed-"with rapture, " 
Adams recalled later in life-that the Pilgrim Fathers had chis- 
eled into Plymouth Rock the prophecy: 
- - 
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The eastern nations sink, their glory ends 
An empire rises where the sun descends 
"There is nothing . . . more ancient in my memory," he wrote, 
"than the observation that arts, sciences, and empire had trav- 
elled westward; and in conversation it was always added, since I 
was a child, that the next leap would be over the Atlantic into 
America. " lo 
Benjamin Franklin documented this American dream in 17 5 1 
with his Observations concerning the Increase of Manhind, 
which showed that the population of the colonies was doubling 
every twenty years and would continue to do so into the indef- 
inite future. Here was scientific confirmation that America's vi- 
sion of imperial destiny could become a reality, for a people in- 
creasing at the rate Franklin predicted, over a land mass as large 
as the North American continent, would become a colossus. The 
impact of the Observations on Adams is demonstrated by his let- 
ter to Nathan Webb, October 12, 175 5: "Soon after the Refor- 
mation a few people came over into this new world for Con- 
science sake. Perhaps this (apparently) trivial incident, may 
transfer the great seat of Empire into America. It looks likely to 
me. For if we can remove the turbulent Gallicks, our People ac- 
cording to the exactest Computations, will in another Century, 
become more numerous than England itself. Should this be the 
Case, since we have (I may say) all the naval stores of the Nation 
in our hands, it will be easy to obtain the mastery of the seas, 
and then the united force of all Europe, will not be able to sub- 
due us."" His faith supported by Franklin's facts, Adams 
sounded a theme that echoed across the colonies in the next two 
decades and that helped dictate the shape of Revolutionary for- 
eign policy: the "mighty empire" theme. 
References to a mighty empire in America, sustained by a cor- 
nucopia of people and land, abound in the writings of the colo- 
nists from the mid-1750s onward. In 1759, for example, the 
Reverend Jonathan Mayhew preached of a "mighty em- 
pire . . . in numbers little inferior to perhaps the greatest in 
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Europe, and in felicity to none." Traveling through the colonies 
in the same year, the English clergyman Andrew Burnaby mar- 
veled that "an idea, strange as it is visionary, has entered into 
the minds of the generality of mankind, that empire is travelling 
westward"; the colonists, he noted, were "looking forward with 
eager and impatient expectation to that destined moment when 
America is to give law to the rest of the world." In 1767 Franklin 
predicted that "America, an immense territory, favoured by Na- 
ture with all advantages of climate, soil, great navigable rivers, 
and lakes, must become a great country, populous and mighty. " 
In 1772 Arthur Lee exulted that America "like a young phoenix 
. . . will rise plumed and glorious from her mother's ashes"; a 
"little time" must "lay the most permanent foundation of 
population and power. America, in her turn, will be the imperi- 
al mistress of the world." From 1774 until the Declaration of In- 
dependence the mighty empire theme played as often as a popu- 
lar song. "It requires but a small portion of the gift of discern- 
ment," wrote Samuel Adams on April 4,  1774, "for anyone to 
foresee, that providence will erect a mighty empire in America. " 
Benjamin Rush spoke of America's "future populousness and 
grandeur"; Alexander Hamilton, of its "dawning splendour"; 
Jacob DuchE, of its "rising glory"; and James Warren, of its "ris- 
ing Empire." With a patronizing benevolence, William Hooper 
hoped that when "that Change comes and come it must, that 
America must become the seat of Empire, may Britain gently 
verge down the decline of life, and sink away in the arms of her 
American Sons. "I2 
The consciousness of American power puffed up many mem- 
bers of the Continental Congress into a swaggering, "haughty 
Temperw-"I do verily believe that N. America will give law to 
that proud imperious Island," exclaimed Richard Henry Lee on 
April 1, 1776-and, for a time, gave congressional proceedings a 
jingoist tone. "We are too haughty to look to God," complained 
Zubly of Georgia on October 24, 1775, and "rather talk of pre- 
senting Law to a Conquered people than defending ourselves 
- - 
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under great disadvantages against one of the greatest forces of 
the universe." Zubly's strictures differed little from those of the 
Tories, who, as early as 1768, reproved the Whigs for growing 
"more imperious, haughty, nay insolent every day," "so intox- 
icated with their own importance," so full of "omnipotency and 
all-sufficientcy. "'3 
John Adams stood foremost among those whom General 
Gage criticized for "presumption [and] arrogance" in flaunting 
American power. At no time before or during the Revolutionary 
War did he waver from his 1755 conviction that America was a 
match for the "united force" of Eutope. His favorite metaphor 
for the rising American empire was "young Hercules," whose 
ability to strangle the British serpent in its cradle he never 
doubted. Everywhere his correspondence breathes the absolute 
conviction of America's "unconquerability." Using "Dr. Frank- 
lin's rule of progression" Adams calculated that "near twenty 
thousand fighting men [were] added to the numbers in America 
every year." The colonies were "at such distances from one 
another" and "such a multitude of posts" would be "necessary 
to be garrisoned and provided in order to command any one 
Colony" that he calculated that "an army of a hundred thou- 
sand men would soon find itself consumed in getting and keep- 
ing possession of one or two" of them. Consequently, he was 
certain that "the Thirteen Colonies . . . leagued together in a 
faithfull Confederacy might bid Defiance to all the Potentates of 
Europe if united against them" (March 23, 1776), might "sus- 
tain the War, for thirty years to come, better than France, Spain, 
or England" (April 26, 1780), might be confident that it was 
"impossible for any, the proudest of them, to conquer us" (May 
8, 1785). Adams, quite simply, was convinced that the United 
States would become the "greatest Power on Earth" and that 
"within the Life of Man." His conviction of American power was 
the key to his thinking about foreign policy.14 
As their fathers and grandfathers had done, the statesmen of 
the American Revolution considered the plenitude of American 
- - - -  
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power in the context of the European balance of power; Adams, 
for example, told a Dutch merchant in 1778 that he had been 
educated from his cradle in balance-of-power thinking. l 5  Revo- 
lutionary statesmen, however, were better equipped than James 
Logan or William Clarke to substantiate their claims that the 
colonies were the decisive factor in British power and, by exten- 
sion, in the European balance, for they had figures showing pre- 
cisely how the dynamics of American demography supported 
British commerce, that "modern source of wealth and power," 
as Jefferson expressed it in good mercantilistic fashion. Some 
Americans, like Arthur Lee, made what seemed to be the reason- 
able assumption that American population and British com- 
merce increased in proportion. "With the growth of the Colo- 
nies and in exact proportion," Lee lectured a British audience, 
"must your Trade, your Marine, your Revenue, your Riches 
grow." But Lee was wrong. Franklin produced figures in 1760 
showing that British uade to the colonies grew four times faster 
than American population; in 1774 the First Continental Con- 
gress had figures, derived from more detailed records, showing 
the increase to be three times the rate of population growth. 
These numbers never failed to work Americans up to a pitch of 
excitement, for they appeared to confirm that the colonies were 
the engine of British power. Franklin was transported by the sta- 
tistics: "What an Accession of Power to the British Empire by 
Sea as well as by Land! What Increase of Trade and Navigation! 
What Numbers of Ships and Seamen! " Obviously, "the foun- 
dation of the future grandeur and stability of the British empire 
lie in America." Other Americans picked up this refrain. "The 
Foundations of the Power and Glory of Great Britain are Based 
in America," claimed John Dickinson in 1765. America, de- 
clared George Wythe in 1774, "is one of the Wings upon which 
the British Eagle has soared to the Skies. " The union of Britain 
with America has raised her, the Second Continental Congress 
affirmed, "to a power the most extraordinary the world had ever 
known."16 
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Americans agreed, then, that they were the source of Britain's 
power and of her position in the European balance. Arguing in 
1773 that Britain was "worth preserving," Franklin pointed the 
moral of his statistics: "Her weight in the scale of Europe, and 
her safety in a great degree, may depend on our union with 
her." A year later, the Doctor's antagonist but former friend 
and fellow imperial strategist at the Albany Congress of 1754, 
Thomas Hutchinson, calculated the loss of America on Britain's 
position vis-2-vis France. Repeating the words of William Clarke 
in 1755, Hutchinson warned: "Give up the colonies to a foreign 
power and run the risk of making this kingdom a province of the 
same power."17 The balance of power was the framework in 
which Americans at all points on the political spectrum consid- 
ered foreign affairs. The Loyalist Daniel Leonard scoffed at Whig 
pretensions; in his view, the colonies were merely "the light dust 
of the balance." Whigs like Hugh Williamson speculated about 
the colonies being thrown "into the other scale." The Loyalist 
Charles Inglis, the literary adversary of Common Sense, pre- 
dicted that European powers would prevent France from inter- 
vening on America's behalf because they were "too jealous of 
her-too deeply interested in preserving a due ballance of 
power, which is a principal object in European politics." El- 
bridge Gerry, on the other hand, thought that the European 
balance would work in the United States' favor. "It is acknowl- 
edged on all hands, " wrote Gerry on November 11, 1776, "that 
now is the Time for France and Spain to destroy the Balance of 
power which has been heretofore said to be preserved in Europe, 
but considered as preponderating against them. " Summarizing 
the assumptions on which all foreign policy arguments were 
based, Samuel Adams wrote on February 4, 1777: "The War be- 
tween Britain and the United States of America will affect the 
Ballance of Power in Europe. Will not the different Powers take 
different sides to adjust the Ballance to their different Inter- 
ests?"18 
Americans of the Revolutionary generation thought of foreign 
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affairs in terms of the balance of power not simply because it was 
the inherited mode of analysis but because they genuinely be- 
lieved that it was a progressive principle in international affairs. 
The Reverend John Witherspoon articulated this view in a 
speech to Congress, July 30, 1776, in which he listed various 
signs of "progress . . . in the order and perfection of human so- 
ciety." Among these were religious freedom and the balance of 
power. "It is," said Witherspoon, "but little above two hundred 
years since that enlarged system called the balance of power took 
place; and I maintain, that it is a greater step from the former 
disunited and hostile situation of kingdoms and states, to their 
present condition, than it would be from their present condition 
to a state of more perfect and lasting union. " l9  
John Adams saw as clearly as any man in the colonies that the 
mighty empire rising in America had made Britain mighty, that 
"the English by means of their commerce and extensive settle- 
ments abroad, arose to a degree of opulence and naval power" 
which was awesome. It followed that a "Connection with Amer- 
ica must in the future decide the Ballance of Maritime Power in 
E u r ~ p e . " ~ ~  In fact, Adams believed that were Britain and Amer- 
ica to remain united, were Britain to retain control over Amer- 
ica's expanding population and commerce, the European bal- 
ance would be destroyed. "If Great Britain and America should 
ever be again united under one domination," he wrote in 1780, 
"there would be an end of the liberty of all other nations upon 
the seas. All commerce and navigation of the world would be 
swallowed up in one frightful despotism." France's "existence as 
a maritime and commercial power" would be destroyed, as 
would Spain's and the Netherlands'. The indivisible British Em- 
pire "would establish an absolute tyranny upon the ocean," 
would realize the ancient dream of despots by becoming a 
"universal M~narchy . "~~  On the other hand, Adams believed 
that were France and Spain to monopolize American commerce, 
the balance would be turned as apocalyptically against Britain. 
Such a development, Adams wrote as if he were a Briton, would 
"ruin our credit, destroy our manufactures, reduce to nothing 
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our influence in Europe, [and] depress our naval power to such 
an inferiority to France and Spain as we shall never recover." 
Such a loss would be "fatal" to Britain, a diagnosis in which 
Adarns's colleagues agreed.?' So, too, did the British ministry, 
which, in the words of a recent student, feared that the loss of 
America would lead to "the collapse of the power system which 
enabled the British nation to compete on equal if not superior 
terms in the international jungle." Or, as the Earl of Carlisle 
predicted in 1776, if Britain lost America she would "sink into 
obscurity and insignificance, falling at length a prey to the first 
powerful or ambitious state, which may meditate a conquest of 
this island. That Britons agreed with American perceptions of 
their conuibution to the Empire's strength illustrates the con- 
formity of American and European presumptions about the role 
of colonies in the balance of power. 
The letter from Adams to Webb, October 12 ,  175 5 ,  reveals an 
intellectual climate in which that other staple of power politics, 
an emphasis on interest, flourished. "The whole town [Wor- 
cester], " Adams wrote, "is immers'd in Politicks. The interests 
of Nations, and all the dira of War, make the subject of every 
Conver~ation."~~ Adams never relinquished the practice of re- 
solving domestic and foreign politics into considerations of inter- 
est. "Reason, justice and equity never had weight enough on the 
face of the earth," he lectured the Continental Congress in July 
1776, "to govern the councils of men, it is interest alone which 
does it, and it is interest alone which can be trusted." Four years 
later he wrote: "No attachment between Nations arising merely 
from a Similarity of Laws and Government is ever very strong or 
sufficient to bind Nations together who have opposite or even 
different In tere~ts ."~~ Adams found it difficult to imagine 
foreign-policy decisions being based on any other calculation 
than interest. His contemporaries shared his attitude. As Samuel 
Adams wrote James Warren on April 17, 1777: "When it suits 
the Interest of foreign Powers they will aid us substantially. That 
some of them will find it their Interest to aid us I can hardly 
doubt but there seems not to be Virtue enough left in the World 
John Adams 
from generous and disinterested Motives to interpose in support 
of the Common Rights of Mankind. "26 
There was, then, a consensus about foreign policy among 
Revolutionary Americans, a consensus formed around the classi- 
cal European diplomatic concepts of the balance of power and 
the interests of states, concepts that flourished in the colonies 
from the early years of the eighteenth century. The events of the 
Revolution interacted with these attitudes to create the foreign 
policy of the new American nation. Describing the creation of 
that foreign policy is not easy, however, because the documen- 
tary record is poor. Public advocacy of a foreign policy presup- 
poses a commitment to national independence. Until the begin- 
ning of 1776, however, most Americans wanted reconciliation 
with Great Britain. Therefore, although they may have rumi- 
nated about the shape of an independent foreign policy and may 
have shared their thoughts with their friends, they did not, in 
most cases, put them on the public record. Furthermore, the 
secrecy rule in the Continental Congress restrained most dele- 
gates from revealing what was said about foreign affairs there. 
The inhibiting effect of the congressional rule was explained by 
John Adams on March 18, 1777: "I am under such Injunctions 
and Engagements to communicate nothing relative to foreign af- 
fairs that I ought not to do it." The meagerness of the resulting 
record has led some scholars to conclude that Revolutionary 
statesmen were not interested in foreign policy or ignored the 
subject because they abhorred it: "The entire colonial experience 
made foreign policy alien and repulsive to Americans," wrote 
Felix Gilbert.*' This is not true. Evidence left by the Loyalists 
and incidental remarks by Whigs show that as early as the fall of 
1774 there was an informed dialogue in the colonies about for- 
eign policy. 
The actions of the First Continental Congress, although taken 
in good faith to produce a reconciliation with Britain, alarmed 
many men who subsequently became Loyalists. They believed 
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that the Congress had set the colonies on the high road to inde- 
pendence without any appreciation of the dangers involved. In- 
dependence, they claimed, posed unacceptable risks for the 
colonies by depriving them of British protection and throwing 
them into an arena of amoral, rapacious states. "If we declare for 
Independency," they argued, "Britain will not for time to come, 
protect us against other nations, and we shall in time, and prob- 
ably very soon, become a prey to the French and Spaniards, or 
some other enemy. " 2 8  The Loyalists vigorously pressed this asser- 
tion at every stage of the debate over independence and many 
moderates used it as well. It raised the fundamental question of 
whether national self-preservation was possible for a young re- 
public in a world of predatory monarchies. This was the central 
issue in all discussions of foreign affairs up to and beyond the 
Declaration of Independence. 
The Loyalist message was always the same: the world that 
an independent United States would inhabit was a jungle. 
"As matters are now circumstanced throughout Christendom," 
wrote Charles Inglis, "no state can preserve its independency 
without a standing army. The nation that would neglect to keep 
one, and a naval force, if it has any sea coast, must infallibly fall 
a prey to some of its ambitious and more vigilant neighbors." 
"Should it be known abroad that Great-Britain had withdrawn 
her protection," asserted Thomas Chandler in the fall of 1774, 
"within the compass of one year our sea-ports would be ravaged, 
and our vessels plundered as soon as they left our harbours. " The 
most lurid example of the savagery of international affairs, the 
Loyalists reminded their fellow Americans, was the partition of 
Poland in 1772. "The practice of conquering and dividing terri- 
tories and kingdoms is become fashionable in Europe," warned 
Joseph Galloway at the conclusion of the First Continental Con- 
gress. An independent America, cautioned Daniel Leonard on 
January 30, 1775, would become an "easy prey, and would be 
parcelled out, Poland like."29 None of the Loyalists expected 
that the "three crowned sinnersw-Russia, Prussia, and 
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Austria-who had despoiled Poland would pounce on the colo- 
nies. Rather they anticipated danger from the hereditary ene- 
mies of America, France and Spain, still smarting from the loss 
of territories "that were torn, reluctant and bleeding from them 
in the last war by the superior strength of Britain. "3O "The ambi- 
tion of France is still alive and active," asserted Galloway. 
"America is daily growing a more alluring object of her ambi- 
tion. Her fleets, and those of her natural ally, the King of Spain, 
are increasing. . . . Under this prospect of things, what can 
America expect, while she denies the authority of the mother- 
state; and by that denial incurs a forfeiture of her protec- 
tion . . . she must in all probability soon become the slave of ar- 
bitrary power-of Popish bigotry and superstition." Even if 
France and Spain did not conquer and divide the colonies by 
main force, the Loyalists predicted that these courts, so notorious 
for address and intrigue, would gain control by negotiations, for 
if an independent America treated with them, she would be 
overreached and subjugated. The protection of the Bourbons, 
declared Thomas Chandler in the fall of 1774, could be obtained 
only "on terms not of our proposing, but of theirs." "We can 
make them no return for protection but by trade," wrote 
Leonard on January 30, 1775, and "of that they can have no as- 
surance, unless we become subject to their laws."3l 
The Whigs felt the full force of the Loyalist arguments. They 
knew that international politics were brutal: "The passions of 
despotism," wrote John Dickinson in May 1774, "raging like a 
plague, about seven years past, have spread with unusual malig- 
nity through Europe. Corsica, Poland, and Sweden have sunk 
beneath it." The partition of Poland made a profound and last- 
ing impression on them-the Federalist dilated upon it, Adarns 
and Jefferson discussed it as late as 1816-and they yielded to no 
one in their distrust of France; Adams, for example, was never 
able to rid himself of prejudices imbibed as a youth against that 
"ambitious and faithless Nation," as he called her at age twenty- 
one. Therefore, the burden of proof was always on the Whigs to 
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prove that independence would not cause the country to be de- 
voured by a foreign enemy.32 
Their first line of defense against this fear was their confidence 
in the power of America, their faith in the strength of the 
"mighty empire." In ridiculing Whig pretensions in the fall of 
1774, Thomas Chandler revealed their scope: according to 
Chandler, the "ignorant and deluded American" contended 
that "notwithstanding all that can be said of the naval strength 
of Great Britain, it is asserted by our patriotic leaders, and we 
have reason to think, that the Colonies of themselves, are able to 
withstand all her force." Replying to Daniel Leonard on Feb- 
ruary 6, 1775, John Adams brimmed with his usual confidence 
in American power: "In a land war, this continent might defend 
itself against all the world. We have men enough, and those 
men have as good natural understandings and as much natural 
courage as any other men."33 The Whig rejoinder to Loyalist 
warnings was set by early 1775: America had adequate power to 
sustain herself as an independent nation. 
In the fall of 1774 Whigs displayed the characteristic Amer- 
ican insight into how the power of the colonies affected the 
European balance of power. Britain, declared Richard Henry Lee 
at the First Continental Congress, "could not exist" without the 
commercial connection with America, the dissolution of which, 
the Second Continental Congress informed the people of Brit- 
ain, would "deliver you, weak and defenceless, to your natural 
enemies. " To detach America from Britain would, therefore, be 
a paramount interest of her rivals and no Whig doubted that the 
Bourbons would perceive this. Replying to the Loyalist Samuel 
Seabury in February 1775, Alexander Hamilton wrote: "A more 
desireable object, to France and Spain, than the disunion of 
these colonies from Great Britain, cannot be imagined. Every 
dictate of policy and interest would prompt them to forward it, 
by every possible means. They could not take any so effectual 
method, to destroy the growing power of their great rival. "3* 
If the Bourbons destroyed Britain, would they turn on Amer- 
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ica next? The Whigs believed that, if they did, the others powers 
of Europe would intervene against them to preserve the balance 
of power. As early as the fall of 1774 the Whigs grasped what be- 
came the central feature of the foreign policy formulated by the 
independent United States two years later: that the European 
balance of power, if manipulated properly by America, would 
guarantee her national security. The proper way to manipulate 
the balance, it was perceived, was by establishing free trade be- 
tween America and Europe. The Whigs claimed, Daniel 
Leonard declared on January 30, 1775, "that the colonies would 
open a free trade with all the world, and all nations would join 
in protecting their common mart." Leonard was describing what 
was a Whig article of faith throughout the struggle with Britain, 
a "favorite Maxim," as Dickinson expressed it in June 1776, 
"that our commerce is so valuable, it will protect itself. "35 What 
the Whigs meant was that American commerce was such a su- 
perb source of power that European nations would not permit 
one of their number to attack America and monopolize it lest 
the aggressor destroy the balance of power. A document in the 
Adams Papers, dated September 1774, discusses the situation 
from the perspective of any three European powers: "Neither of 
these powers, would suffer either of them, to engross this Coun- 
try to themselves; for if they did, the Balance of Power would be 
so much against the other two, that they would not agree to 
it."36 In contemplating a foreign policy for an independent na- 
tion, the Whigs believed, then, that they had two assets for 
national self-preservation: their country's power and the Euro- 
pean balance of power. 
The examination of foreign policy, which the meeting of the 
First Continental Congress provoked, seems to have subsided 
somewhat in the spring and summer of 1775. This, however, 
may be a false impression, produced by the absence of evidence 
rather than by the absence of attention to foreign affairs. The 
Second Continental Congress certainly discussed international 
relations, for in its Declaration of the Causes and Necessity for 
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Taking Up Arms, July 6, 1775, it confidently asserted that for- 
eign assistance was available, if the colonies chose to seek it.'' 
Later in life Adams recalled that, at the beginning of the Second 
Congress, he had proposed a major foreign-policy initiative of 
which no evidence survives in contemporary documents. Adams 
recommended that British officials throughout the colonies be 
seized as hostages for the people of Boston, that new govern- 
ments be established in every colony, that independence be de- 
clared, and that negotiations then be initiated with Britain for a 
resolution of the problems dividing the two nations. "I was 
also," Adams stated, "for informing Great Britain very frankly 
that hitherto we were free but if the War should be continued, 
We were determined to seek Alliances with France, Spain, and 
any other Power of Europe." If negotiations with Britain were 
successful, the colonies would relinquish their independence 
and assume what Adams evidently conceived of as a position re- 
sembling the autonomy within the empire demanded by the 
First Continental C0ngress.3~ Britain, apparently, would be al- 
lowed to continue its monopoly of American trade. What discus- 
sions Adams's proposal produced is not known. 
Consideration of foreign affairs quickened in the fall of 1775, 
as Congress debated opening the ports of America to the world. 
George 111's refusal to respond to the Olive Branch Petition (July 
8, 1775),  considered by most delegates to be America's final of- 
fer of reconciliation, must have raised the question of indepen- 
dence and apparently caused some in Congress to warn that the 
partition Galloway and Leonard had predicted the preceding 
winter would be attempted, to assert that, rather than lose the 
colonies, Britain would purchase French and Spanish support by 
partitioning them with the Bourbon powers. George Wythe was 
evidently responding to such an argument on October 21 when 
he declared: "I know of no Instance where a Colony had revolted 
and a foreign Nation has interposed to subdue them. But many 
of the Contrary. If France and Spain should furnish Ships and 
Soldiers, England must pay them! Where are her Finances?"39 
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It may also have been in response to the threat of a partition 
treaty that in November Samuel Chase, seconded by John 
Adams, moved that Congress send "Embassadors to France, 
with conditional Instructions." All that is known of this motion 
is Adams's statement on July 9, 1776,  that it was "murdered, 
terminating in a Committee of secret correspondence, which 
came to nothing."40 In his Autobiography Adams recorded the 
arguments he used to support an embassy to France. "Interest 
could not lie," he declared, and "the Interest of France was so 
obvious . . . that nothing but a judicial Infatuation of her 
Councils could restrain her from embracing Us." "It was the un- 
questionable Interest of France that the British continental Colo- 
nies should be independent," he continued, because Britain's 
exclusive possession of their manpower and commerce had ex- 
alted her "to a height of Power and Preeminence that France 
. . . could not endure." France's "Rank, her Consideration in 
Europe, and even her Safety and Independence were at stake." 
Were America to declare independence and offer France a com- 
mercial treaty, her self-interest would compel her to accept it, 
because the "Opening of American Trade to her would be a vast 
resource for her Commerce and Naval Power" and would enable 
her to redress the balance of power which had swung so danger- 
ously in Britain's favor.41 The conviction that France would be 
governed by interests which would dictate that she sever America 
from Britain-rather than join her in a partition that would en- 
able Britain to retain a footing in the colonies-guided and com- 
forted the Whigs as the debates on foreign policy became more 
intense in the early months of 1776.  
Thomas Paine's sensational pamphlet Common Sense, pub- 
lished on January 10, 1776,  urged Americans to declare them- 
selves independent, because "it is the true interest of this conti- 
nent to be so." According to Paine, an independent America 
would enjoy better relations with the international community 
than she would as a colonial auxiliary of a belligerent Britain. 
The success of Common Sense roused the Tories to employ what 
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had become their familiar tactic of trying to frighten Americans 
out of independence by displaying the terrors of a Franco- 
Spanish partition treaty (which they could do with conviction 
since they genuinely believed that it might occur). At the begin- 
ning of February, Charles Inglis published his rebuttal to Com- 
mon Sense, The Tme Interest of America Impartially Stated, in 
which he issued the following warning: "For my part, I should 
not in the least be surprised, if on such a prospect as the Inde- 
pendence of America, she [Great Britain] would parcel out this 
continent to the different European Powers. Canada might be 
restored to France, Florida to Spain, with additions to each. 
. . . Let no man think this chimerical or improbable. The inde- 
pendency of America would be so fatal to Britain, that she 
would leave nothing in her power undone to prevent it. I believe 
as fumly as I do my own existence, that if every other method 
failed, she would uy some such expedient as this, to disconcert 
our scheme of independency; and let any man figure to himself 
the situation of these British colonies, if only Canada were re- 
stored to France." Later in the pamphlet, Inglis added: "Nay, 
further; I can whisper a secret to the author of Common Sense, 
provided he will let it go no further-which is-That France and 
Spain have actudly made an ofler of their assistance to Great 
Britain, in the present contest with the Colonies. This intelli- 
gence comes from such authority as would remove all doubt 
about the matter, even from our zealous Republican. "42 
Inglis's intelligence was apparently a mimoire concocted in 
London by a scheming French Jesuit, one Pierre Roubaud, who 
palmed it off on the British ministry as a demarche of the French 
ambassador, the Count de Guines. The mimoire purported to 
offer French assistance to Britain in crushing the American rebel- 
lion. Vergennes's agent, Garnier, informed him on March 1, 
1776, that he was "persuaded that the British ministry is really 
imbued with the idea that we have pretended to make them of- 
fers to join ourselves to them in their project of exterminating 
the Americans, or subjugating them to the Metropolis." British 
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officials sent Roubaud's me'moire to the colonies, "to convince 
the Americans that France, far from wishing to help them, was 
prepared to join itself to England to subjugate them. " It was evi- 
dently Roubaud's me'moire, or some account of it, which em- 
boldened Inglis to predict partition and other Tories like Wil- 
liam Smith to invite Americans to "behold the face of Poland 
and visit the scenes of havock and desolation which mark the late 
footprints of the contending foreign powers in that country. "43 
Tory scare tactics backfired; instead of frightening the Whigs out 
of independence, they hastened them toward it. 
The Whigs gave full credence to the possibility of a partition 
treaty. By February 1776  the colonies, despite their recent re- 
verse in Canada, appeared to be as strong militarily as their most 
ardent boosters had foretold. Therefore, if they were "impregna- 
ble" to British arms, as Thomas Lynch expressed it,44 and at the 
same time indispensable to British security, it seemed likely 
that, rather than relinquish them, George 111's ministers would 
share them with other foreign powers. No one doubted that the 
ministry was capable of offering such a deal or that the Bourbons 
were capable of accepting it. For years Americans had regarded 
the king's ministers as moral bankrupts, engaged in a sinister 
conspiracy to enslave them, and they had no trouble imagining 
them extending their operations to the Court of Versailles, 
which would doubtless "be influenced by the same vile motives 
with other European powers. "45 In fact, Lord Mansfield had un- 
dertaken a mysterious mission to Paris in the late summer of 
1774.  Although his ostensible purpose was to visit his nephew, 
the British ambassador at Versailles, many Englishmen assumed 
that he intended to negotiate some delicate political matter with 
the French government. Americans learned of the mission in 
1775 and, because of their suspicions of the malevolently con- 
spiratorial bent of the British ministers, saw themselves as its 
object.46 
Then there was the matter of French troops in the West In- 
dies. The first warning to the American public that France was 
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expanding its military presence there seems to have been con- 
tained in two reports published in the Pennsylvania Journal, De- 
cember 20, 1775: one, "that a camp for 20,000 French troops is 
marked out at Hispaniola, and that 7000 of them were hourly 
expected," and a second, that 2,500 French troops had arrived at 
Martinique and 1,800 at Guadaloupe, "part of a reinforcement 
of 10,000 men, ordered out for those islands." These reports, 
and similar ones, spread through America in the spring of 1776. 
By June it was believed that there were upwards of 30,000 
French troops, accompanied by a strong fleet, in the West In- 
dies. Actually, there were only one tenth that number. 
Americans surmised that these troops were sent to strike "a 
severe blow," but they were not certain upon whom it would 
fall. Having read in the newspapers of intensive British efforts to 
recruit Russian and German auxiliaries, many feared that the 
French might have come at George 111's bidding. Hardly reassur- 
ing was the king's speech at the opening of Parliament, October 
27, 1775, in which he claimed that he had received "the most 
friendly offers of foreign assistance" and that he could un- 
equivocally state "as well from the assurances I have received, as 
from the general appearance of affairs in Europe" that he could 
"see no probability that the measures which you may adopt, will 
be interrupted by disputes with any foreign power. " "How is the 
arrival of French troops in the West-Indies, and the hostile ap- 
pearance there, to be reconciled with that part of the King's 
speech?" wrote an anxious George Washington on January 4, 
1776. Did the French "mean to act for or against America," 
Congress queried its agent in the West Indies a few months 
later?47 
Information available in the colonies, then, seemed to give 
substance to Tory warnings about a partition treaty. On February 
9, 1776, General Charles Lee, who five days earlier had marched 
into New York City to organize its defenses, wrote Robert Morris 
in Philadelphia: "When I consider our present situation here 
and at home nothing gives me so much uneasiness as the uncer- 
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tainty we are in with regard to the intentions of the French in the 
W. Indies-it is amazing that so wise a body as the Congress 
should sleep over so alarming a circumstance but perhaps they 
have not-perhaps they have proper Instruments of Observa- 
tion-if the French have a powerful Fleet as well as a large army, 
we may suppose they intend to attack our Islands, but if they 
have simply Battalions, we must conclude that there is a conclu- 
sion betwixt the two Courts-probably [Lord Mansfield?] in his 
expedition to Paris has enter'd into a secret engagement to let 
Canada slip out of our hand into theirs, these Troops may be for 
this purpose, but be this as it may it certainly is your business to 
be ascertained of their intention." Hugh Hughes of Charles 
Lee's quartermaster corps wrote in the same vein at the same 
time. Addressing John and Samuel Adams over the pseudonym 
"the Intelligencer," he wrote that when he considered "Ld. 
Mansfield's Embassy to the Court of Versailles; That Court's sec- 
onding the Views of the Court of Great Britain, in preventing 
our getting Arms and Ammunition, and the general Combina- 
tion there is, between all the crown'd Villains, in Europe, to 
oppress Mankind, particularly the Neutrality observed by our 
Butcher, relative to the brave Corsicans, and the Arrival of such a 
Number of French Troops in the West Indies; I cannot, I con- 
fess, suppress my Jealousies of an Attempt being intended 
against Canada, in the Spring, by those Troops, and that it is al- 
ready ceded to them, on the Condition of their Recovering it 
from us. "48 
The Whigs in Congress conceded that, although a partition 
was possible, it was by no means inevitable, for it would not be 
in France's best interests. "How is the Interest of France and 
Spain affected, by the dispute between B[ritain] and the 
C[olonies]?" wrote John Adams on March 1, 1776. "Is it the In- 
terest of France to stand neuter, to join with B[ritain] or to join 
with the C[olonies]. Is it not her Interest, to dismember the 
B[ritish] Empire?" Or, as William Whipple wrote his brother 
Joseph: "Your apprehensions of Britain's forming an alliance 
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with France, I hope is without foundation, the latter knows her 
own interest too well, it would be vastly more for her interest to 
have a Commercial alliance with the American states. "*!'All the 
colonies needed to do to enlist France on their side, the Whigs 
believed, was to declare independence and offer her a commer- 
cial treaty. But they must not tarry, lest Britain win the French 
by default. Writing over the signature of Candidus in the Penn- 
sylvania Gazette of March 6, 1776, Samuel Adams urged his col- 
leagues to make the French ministers an offer: "A neglect to im- 
prove the openings given us . . . may inspire those statesmen 
with resentment, and incite them to accept overtures from our 
enemies, and then we may be indeed Provinces!" "Nothing, I 
confess, is more probable, than France's recovering Canada," if 
she "can have nothing to expect from us in an amiable and corn- 
mercial way. "'O
Washington's success in forcing the British from Boston on 
March 17, 1776, was seen by the Whigs as offering additional 
evidence of American military prowess and of the colonies' abili- 
ty to sustain themselves as independent states. For this very 
reason it increased fears that Britain would resort to a partition 
treaty and increased the urgency of beating her to the punch at 
the French Court. The fear of partition, in short, became a pow- 
erful motive driving Americans toward a declaration of inde- 
pendence. Newspapers and correspondence from April through 
June were full of predictions of partition and exhortations to the 
Whig leaders to forestall it. Letters of Patrick Henry of May 20 to 
Richard Henry Lee and John Adams were typical. Wrote Henry 
to Lee: "May not France, ignorant of the great advantages to her 
commerce we intend to offer, and of the permanency of that 
separation which is to take place, be allured by the partition you 
mention? To anticipate therefore the efforts of the enemy by 
sending instantly American Ambassadors to France, seems to me 
absolutely necessary." To Adams, Henry wrote "of what I think 
of immense importance; 'tis to anticipate the enemy at the 
French Court. The half of our Continent offered to France, may 
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induce her to aid our destruction, which she certainly has the 
power to accomplish. I know the free trade with all the States 
would be more beneficial to her than any territorial possessions 
she might acquire. But pressed, allured, as she will be-but, 
above all, ignorant of the great things we mean to offer, may we 
not lose her?" Responding to Henry on June 3 ,  John Adams 
agreed with his assessment: the "importance of an immediate 
application to the French court" was "clear," he averred.>' 
As sentiment for independence increased during the spring of 
1776, moderates like Robert R. Livingston, Rutledge, and Wil- 
son borrowed the Tory arguments that separation was too dan- 
gerous because it would lead to partition. Still hoping for a 
reconciliation with Britain in June 1776, these men argued in 
Congress "that France and Spain had reason to be jealous of that 
rising power which would one day certainly strip them of all 
their American possessions: that it was more likely they should 
form a connection with the British court, who, if they should 
find themselves unable otherwise to extricate themselves from 
their difficulties, would agree to a partition of our territories, re- 
storing Canada to France, and the Floridas to Spain, to accom- 
plish for themselves a recovery of these colonies." By this time 
the Whigs had their rejoinder down pat and replied, "That tho' 
France and Spain may be jealous of our rising power, they must 
think it will be much more formidable with the addition of 
Great Britain; and will therefore see it their interest to prevent a 
~oalition."'~ There would, therefore, be no partition, if Con- 
gress hastened to declare independence and approach the Bour- 
bons. 
How was the approach to France to be managed? Interested 
though she was in helping America, might she not take advan- 
tage of the new nation's needs to extort exorbitant concessions 
from her? In the guise of a helper might she not become a mas- 
ter? Ever fearful of France, Whigs worried about this question. 
Tories tried to exaggerate their apprehensions by striking up the 
anti-French propaganda of earlier colonial wars. William Smith, 
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writing as Cato in the Pennsylvania Gazette, March 27 ,  1776, 
went far beyond Galloway's anti-French screeds of a year earlier. 
Were the Whigs really proposing that "both branches of the 
Bourbon Family, so long the terror of Protestants and Freemen. 
should now join as their protectors"? Were Protestant America's 
ancient fears now to be dismissed as "prejudice"? Must the colo- 
nists divest themselves "of every opinion in which we have been 
educated . . . and throw down what our fathers and we have 
been building up for ages"? It would be superlative folly to 
negotiate with France, which was so little to be trusted that 
"Gallican Fides, or French Faith, is become as proverbial now, as 
Punica Fides, or Carthaginian Faith, of old. " "Bloody massacres, 
the revocation of sacred edicts, and the most unrelenting perse- 
cutions," continued Smith, "have certainly taught American 
protestants . . . what sort of faith we are to expect from Popish 
Princes." Any kind of diplomatic relations with Versailles 
would, in Smith's view, force America, sooner or later, to "sub- 
mit to the absolute dominion of France." Inglis took the same 
line, insisting that the colonies could procure assistance from 
France only if she "were sure of some extraordinary advantage by 
it, in having the colonies under her immediate jurisdiction. " 5 3  
Tory fear-mongering caused Whig leaders constantly to reas- 
sure their followers, who like Landon Carter apprehended 
"danger from our being aided by despotic States," that they 
were properly wary of France and Spain. "Great Care is certainly 
to be taken by the Colonies in forming such an Alliance," El- 
bridge Gerry wrote a friend on June 11 ,  1776; never would the 
colonies "exchange British for French tyranny," John Adams as- 
sured James Warren on April 16,  1776. The assistance to be re- 
quested from the Bourbons would not, in any case, give them a 
handle to oppress America. "Will the help we desire," wrote 
Richard Henry Lee to Landon Carter on June 2 ,  1776, "put it, by 
any means in the power of France to hurt us tho she were so in- 
clined. Supplies of Military Stores and Soldiers Clothing, ships 
of war to cover our Trade and open our Ports, which would be an 
26 
John Adams 
external assistance altogether, could never endanger our freedom 
by putting it in the power of our Ally to Master us." John 
Adams's views were similar. To those who feared that "France 
will take Advantage of us . . . and demand severe Terms of 
Us," he answered that America's military power was so great 
that she did not need the protection of French armies. Boasting 
about "young Hercules" on April 16, 1776, he asserted that 
Britain and France together would "have good luck to get" do- 
minion over America. He was not, therefore, for "soliciting any 
political Connection, or military assistance or indeed naval from 
France. I wish for nothing," he wrote John Winthrop on June 
23,  "but Commerce, a mere marine treaty with them."54 In this 
kind of relationship, how could France oppress America? 
In response to Richard Henry Lee's motion ofJune 7, propos- 
ing that the colonies declare independence, establish a confeder- 
ation, and "take the most effectual means for forming alli- 
ances," Congress on June 11 moved the appointment of a com- 
mittee to prepare a plan of treaties to be offered to foreign na- 
tions and the next day named five members: John Adams, Ben- 
jamin Franklin, John Dickinson, Benjamin Harrison, and Robert 
Morris. The intellectual atmosphere in which the committee 
worked and the problems that most concerned it can be grasped 
by focusing on the July 1 debate over independence, a debate 
that paid considerable attention to the foreign-policy implica- 
tions of independence and summarized much of the preceding 
months' discussion of the problem. John Adams was the prin- 
cipal Whig spokesman in the debate, in which he solidified his 
claim to the title "the Atlas of Independence." Adams's speech 
does not survive. According to his later account of it he said 
nothing new, nothing that had not been repeated several times 
before.55 He must, therefore, have stressed the power of Amer- 
ica, the power of Britain which it sustained, and the interest of 
France in separating the two countries lest their combined might 
reduce her to an international cypher. 
Presenting the case against independence and for reconcilia- 
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tion with Britain was John Dickinson, notes of whose speech do 
survive.~Wickinson addressed himself to the fear that Britain 
would partition the colonies with France and Spain if she could 
not conquer America. He agreed with Adams and others of his 
adversaries that America could prevent a partition by offering 
France a commercial treaty: "Gentlemen say the Trade of all 
America is more valuable to France than Canada. I grant it. " But 
Dickinson expected France to drive a hard bargain in commercial 
negotiations with America. He thought it foolish, therefore, to 
declare independence forthwith, because from such a step 
America could not recede and, as moderates like Rutledge had 
argued earlier, the colonies would be "placing ourselves in the 
Power of those with whom we mean to treat." Far better, it ap- 
peared to Dickinson and his supporters, to hold a declaration of 
independence in abeyance and to treat with France "before hand 
and settle the terms of any future alliance."" The moderate 
strategy was, in other words, to use a declaration of indepen- 
dence as a bargaining counter to extract reasonable terms from 
France. As it was, Dickinson feared that France would "intimi- 
date Us into a most disadvantageous Grant of our Trade." If 
France obtained control over American trade, Britain, deprived 
of the source of her power, would be ruined. Who, then, would 
protect America from France? Who would be the guarantor of 
the nation's security? "Suppose we shall ruin her," said an anx- 
ious Dickinson. "France must rise on her Ruins. Her Ambition. 
Her Religion. Our Danger from thence. We shall weep at our 
victories. " 
The principal concern in drawing the plan of treaties was na- 
tional security in a brutal, amoral world. If the treaty plan were 
not correctly calculated, a concert of nations might fall like brig- 
ands on America and partition her. Or, if this danger were 
avoided, France, perhaps Spain, and who could predict what 
other European predator, might attempt to subjugate the coun- 
try as soon as the ruin of Britain was confirmed. The task of 
drafting the plan of treaties fell to John Adams, who was recog- 
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nized, even by opponents, as one of Congress's keenest students 
of foreign affairs-James Duane, no friend of Adams, told him 
in the fall of 1775, "We all agree that you have more fully con- 
sidered and better digested the subject of foreign connections 
than any man we have ever heard speak on the subject."'s 
Adams's draft was reported to Congress on July 18, 1776. It was 
read that day and on July 20 eighty copies were printed for the 
members' perusal. Precedence was given, however, to considera- 
tion of the articles of confederation, which were, William Wil- 
liams wrote a friend on August 12, the "Standing Dish of Con- 
gress." On August 19 Rutledge complained that "we have not 
yet touched the treaty-and Independence has been declared 
upwards of six weeks! " 5 9  Three days later Congress resolved itself 
into a committee of the whole to consider the treaty. On August 
27 the treaty was considered again and congressmen were able to 
report that it "has passed in the Committee of the whole. "60 The 
dispatch with which the treaty plan passed, compared with the 
prolonged dissension over the articles of confederation, shows 
that there was a consensus in Congress on foreign affairs and that 
Adams expressed it in his draft. At the committee of the whole's 
direction, some alterations were made in the Model Treaty, as it 
is often called, which did not, however, significantly change its 
substance. The new version was approved by Congress on Sep- 
tember 17. 
The Model Treaty's goal was simple: to dissolve the British 
monopoly of American commerce and to invite all nations, 
Great Britain not excepted, to trade with the United States on 
equal terms. The purpose of the treaty plan was to provide for 
American security by using American commerce to maintain the 
European balance of power. On March 20, 1783, Adams in- 
formed James Warren of the intellectual context from which the 
Model Treaty emerged: 
Gentlemen can never too often [be] requested to recol- 
lect the Debates in Congress in the Years 1775 and 
1776, when the Treaty with France was first in Con- 
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templation. The Nature of those Connections, which 
ought to be formed between America and Europe, will 
never be better understood than they were at that time. 
It was then said, there is a Ballance of Power in Europe. 
Nature has formed it. Practice and Habit have con- 
firmed it, and it must exist forever. It may be disturbed 
for a time, by the accidental Removal of a Weight from 
one Scale to the other; but there will be a continual 
Effort to restore the Equilibrium. . . . if We give ex- 
clusive priviledges in Trade, or form perpetual Alliances 
offensive and defensive with the Powers in one Scale, 
we infallibly make enemies of those in the other . . . 
Congress adopted these Principles and this System 
in its p ~ r i t y . ~ '  
Adams and his colleagues knew the consequences of denying 
"exclusive privileges in Trade" to France, of putting Britain and 
her on an equal footing in American trade: Britain would obtain 
the lion's share of it. Thomas Paine pointed this out as early as 
February 14, 1776, in an appendix to Common Sense: "It is the 
commerce and not the conquest of America, by which England 
is to be benefited, and that would in a great measure continue, 
were the countries as independent of each other as France and 
Spain: because in many articles, neither can go to a better mar- 
ket." Franklin made the same observation in a letter to Lord 
Howe of July 20, 1776-with an equal trade with an indepen- 
dent America, Britain, the Doctor asserted, "might recover a 
great Share of our Regard and the greatest part of our growing 
Commerce, with all the Advantage of that additional Strength 
to be derived from a Friendship with us." And Rutledge re- 
peated this point to Howe at the Staten Island conference of 
September 11, 1776.62 Like Paine, Adams perceived that Britain 
would enjoy a competitive advantage in American commerce- 
she could sell her commodities "to them [the Americans] 
cheaper, and give them a better price for theirs than any other 
nation." As a result, he foresaw that Britain would obtain "more 
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of American Trade . . . than France" and would derive from it 
"more support" for her navy than the French would. She would, 
he was convinced, "recover . . . much of her Commerce, and 
perhaps equal Consideration and Profit and Power from [the 
Americans] as ever"; she would "find as much real advantage 
from them, and more too than [she] ever did."63 
Consequently, would a grateful Britain not befriend America 
again? By no means, Adams believed. The friendship of Britain, 
he was certain, was gone forever. On July I ,  1776, he predicted 
that war between Britain and America "would terminate in an 
incurable animosity between the two Countries. " Britain would 
be America's "natural Enemy for the future," who "would clean 
the wooden shoes of the French upon Condition that they would 
permit them to wreak their Vengeance on us. " The British "hate 
us, universally, from the throne to the footstool," he wrote John 
Jay on August 13, 1782, "and would annihilate us, if in their 
power." Why, then, draw a treaty to sustain Britain's strength? 
Because Adams believed that it was in the United States' interest 
to do so. The United States, he contended, "ought with the ut- 
most Firmness to Resist every thought of giving to France any 
unequal advantage in our Trade even over England, for it never 
could be our Interest to ruin England, or annihilate their mari- 
time Power, if we could possibly save our Liberty and indepen- 
dence without it." "In the years 1775 and 1776," Adams re- 
called later, he "laid it down as a first principle that . . . above 
all . . . it could never be our interest to ruin Great Britain, or in- 
jure or weaken her any further than should be necessary to our 
independence." Why? Because "neither England nor America 
could depend upon the Moderation of such absolute Monarchies 
and such ambitious Nations" as France and Spain, because, as 
Benjamin Rush recalled Adams saying in 1776, "the time might 
come when we should be obliged to call upon Britain to defend 
us against France. "64 
The Model Treaty was conceived to benefit France, too. 
Giving France equal access to American trade would, Adams 
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assumed, extend her "navigation and Trade, augment her 
resources of naval Power . . . and place her on a more equal 
footing with England." But no one expected the Model Treaty 
to raise France to an equality of power with Britain. As Adams 
wrote in 1780, although France "should profit by American 
commerce, she [Britain] and her friends would profit more. The 
balance will be preserved, and she will have nothing to fear.06' 
Neither would the United States have reason to fear, for the bal- 
ance that the Model Treaty was designed to create would leave 
Britain and France strong enough to prevent each other from de- 
stroying American independence, which each would do, Amer- 
icans believed, if they could. 
Adams and his colleagues did not place sole reliance on the 
operations of the balance of power to protect them. They firmly 
believed in what we today would call the doctrine of deterrence; 
that is, they believed that in the predatory world they inhabited 
the possession of power and the willingness to use it were guar- 
antors of peace. In other words, they subscribed to the ancient 
maxim: "si velis pacem, para bel1um"-if you want peace, pre- 
pare for war. This, John Adams claimed in 1808, had been his 
system throughout his life. It had been the system of his compa- 
triots, too. Jefferson: "Whatever enables us to go to war, secures 
our peace"; "Weakness provokes insult and injury, while a con- 
dition to punish it prevents it. " Washington: "If we desire to se- 
cure peace . . . it must be known that we are at all times ready 
for War"; "TO be prepared for War is the most effectual means 
of preserving peace." Franklin: "The Way to secure Peace is to 
be prepared for War." Jay: "We should remember that to be 
constantly prepared for war is the only way to have peace." 
Henry: "A preparation for Warr is necessary to obtain peace." 
Marshall: "If we be prepared to defend ourselves, there will be 
little inducement to attack." Gadsden: "The only way to pre- 
vent the sword from being used is to have it ready." And 
Richard Henry Lee: "Our leaders [should] engrave upon their 
minds the wisdom of the inscription upon the arsenal of Berne 
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in Switzerland-'that people happy are, who, during peace, are 
preparing the necessary stores for war.' " 6 6  
American leaders were not power hungry-at least not until 
Hamilton's military ambitions ran amok in the late 1790s. They 
believed that an impressive military establishment was easily 
within young Hercules' reach. Adams, for example, wrote to Jay 
in 1785 that if British commercial warfare forced the United 
States to adopt a navigation act in retaliation, America could, in 
ten years, have the third navy in the world. But why, he asked, 
would Britain force us "to try experiments against our own incli- 
nation~?"~' He and his colleagues did not want a surfeit of mili- 
tary power, because they feared it would be fatal to the republi- 
can government they wished so desperately to maintain. The 
power they wanted was modest: adequate military supplies, 
well-disciplined militias in each state, and a middling naval 
force. This power, coupled with America's vast land mass and 
booming population, would, they felt, deter any potential 
enemy, whom the operation of the balance of power failed to 
restrain. 
If eighteenth-century European diplomacy was, as Felix Gil- 
bert claimed, "entirely dominated by the concept of power,"68 
the same can be said of the foreign policy of Revolutionary 
America, as formulated by John Adams and his colleagues. That 
the conventional European doctrines of the balance of power 
and of the interest of states should have dominated their think- 
ing is not surprising. These were the modes of analysis on which 
they, as citizens of the British Empire, had been born and raised. 
When the time came to craft a foreign policy for the new Amer- 
ican nation, they quite naturally employed them. 
C H A P T E R  2 
F R A N C E ,  1778-1779 
Although Adams's grasp of foreign affairs impressed his friends 
and political associates and made him a prime candidate, in 
their eyes, to represent the United States abroad, he did not, in 
1776,  regard himself as a potential diplomat. His forte, he be- 
lieved, was domestic polity. "Every Colony," he wrote William 
Cushing on June 9, "must be induced to institute a perfect Gov- 
ernment. All the Colonies must confederate together, in some 
Solemn Compact." Independence must be declared and the 
treaty plan drafted. "When these Things shall be once well fin- 
ished, or in a Way of being so, I shall think that I have answered 
the End of my Creation." To Mercy Otis Warren, who in the 
spring of 1776 expected that Adams would soon be writing her 
about "noble and Royal Characters," he replied on April 16 
with a recitation of his deficiencies for diplomacy. "Your Corre- 
spondent has neither Principles, nor Address, nor Abilities, for 
such Scenes. And others are as Sensible of it, I assure you as he 
is. They must be Persons of more Complaisance and Ductility of 
Temper as well as better Accomplishments for such great 
Things." In the fall of 1776 Adams rebuffed Elbridge Gerry's at- 
tempt to nominate him as one of the United States' commission- 
ers to France. "R. H. Lee told me," Gerry wrote later, "You had 
informed him, that You would not accept the appointment if 
made. " On November 7 ,  1777,  after three years of grueling ser- 
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vice in Congress, Adams left Philadelphia and returned to Mas- 
sachusetts to repair his health and finances. Three weeks later 
Congress elected him to replace Silas Deane as one of its com- 
missioners at the Court of Louis XVI. Adams was flabbergasted 
when he received the news; he later confided to a correspondent 
that "he had as many thoughts of a Voyage to the Moon as to 
France." But after wrestling with his conscience, he decided to 
accept the trust and on February 13, 1778, departed for Europe 
aboard the American frigate Boston. After running a gauntlet of 
North Atlantic storms and British warships, he arrived safely at 
Bordeaux on April 1, 1778 .' 
For the next ten years, with a break of a few months in 1779, 
Adams represented the United States at various European 
courts. He never deviated from his balance of power thinking, 
but conceptualizing foreign policy yielded precedence in Europe 
to personal interaction with other diplomats-to what Adams 
liked to call his "negotiationsu-and in these he was governed 
by another set of attitudes-by no means inconsistent, as will be 
later shown, with his balance of power thinking-which devel- 
oped during the Revolutionary struggle with Britain, specifi- 
cally, by the suspicion, almost the expectation, that a malign 
conspiracy was furing its sights on virtuous Americans with the 
intention of oppressing them. In a series of books on the ideo- 
logical origins of the American Revolution, Bernard Bailyn has 
argued that Americans were "propelled" into revolution by the 
pervasive fear of a British ministerial conspiracy to enslave 
them.2 Adams was an early and ardent believer in the existence 
of a ministerial conspiracy: "There seems to be a direct and for- 
mal design on foot to enslave all America," he wrote in 1765.3 
The conspiracy theory gained potency from a conviction that 
grew in America in the 1760s that suspicion itself was a positive 
good. Revolutionary Americans used the term jealousy to mean 
suspicion and, unlike their twentieth-century descendents, care- 
fully distinguished jealousy from envy, which, then as now, 
meant resentment of a rival's suc~ess.~ "A perpetual jealously re- 
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specting liberty," asserted John Dickinson in his authoritative 
Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania (1768), "is absolutely req- 
uisite in all free states. "'Jealousy was extolled as a "moral" and 
"political virtue" from one end of the country to another and it 
was legitimitized in the independent United States by receiving 
the imprimatur of republicanism, the designation which, after 
1776, made all things a~ceptable.~ 
As with the conspiracy theory, Adams was an early apostle of 
jealousy, commending a "jealous Watchful Spiritv7 in 1765 and 
practicing what he preached throughout the conflict with 
Britain. Alexander Hamilton was repelled by Adams's suspi- 
ciousness during his presidency. He possessed "a jealousy cap- 
able of discoloring every object," wrote the New Yorker, an as- 
sessment in which Mercy Otis Warren concurred a few years later 
when she claimed that Adams's mind was "replete with jeal- 
ousy." But what Hamilton and Warren took to be a surfeit of 
suspicion in Adams was merely a continuation of, or, according 
to one observer, a moderation of, his jealousy during the Revolu- 
tionary years. Adams, wrote Theodore Sedgwick in 1788, "was 
formerly infinitely more democratical than at present and pos- 
sessing that jealousy which always accompanies such a character 
was averse to repose . . . unlimited confidence" in a n y ~ n e . ~  
Jealousy-suspicion flourished, indeed luxuriated, in Revolu- 
tionary America. "Jealousy was prevalent in Republicks," ob- 
served Silas Deane in December 1777, and "its greatest degree 
was now excited in America. "9 Fused with the fear of conspiracy, 
it quickened that fear to such an extent that the most innocuous 
political maneuvers were often interpreted as steps in a plot to 
persecute the innocent. The Revolutionary mentality, therefore, 
strikes modern scholars conversant with the literature of psycho- 
pathology as paranoiac. "The era of the American Revolution," 
it is asserted, "was a period of political paranoia."1° "The in- 
surgent whig ideology had a frenzied even paranoid cast to it," 
writes one scholar; another hears it sounding "a paranoiac 
note." A third stresses its "paranoiac obsession with a diabolical 
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Crown conspiracy. " l1 Some scholars have concluded that the ide- 
ology's pathological complexion rubbed off on those who es- 
poused it-the Revolutionary statesmen. "It is not uncommon," 
writes an essayist in 1976, "for whig publicists and leaders to be 
viewed as paranoid. "I2 John Adams was the first to admit that he 
was frequently buffeted by emotional turbulence: "There have 
been many times in my life," he wrote, "when I have been so 
agitated in my own mind as to have no consideration at all of the 
light in which my words, actions, and even writings would be 
considered by others. " I3  The most perceptive of Adams's recent 
biographers has, in fact, contended that he suffered no less than 
three nervous breakdowns between 1771 and 1783.14 Therefore, 
it is not surprising that he has attracted the attention of those 
seeking pathological strains in Revolutionary statesmen and that 
he has received his share of diagnoses as paranoid." It is not, 
however, the intention of this study to put Adams on the couch 
to confirm or refute the presence of a pathological component in 
his psyche. The term paranoid, when applied to him, will be 
used as Bailyn uses it in his magisterial ~tudies~~-simply as a de- 
scriptive phrase to convey the intensity of the suspiciousness and 
of the fears of malevolent conspiracy which infused the Revolu- 
tionary mentality and which appeared, with unusual force, in 
Adams's conduct as a diplomat. 
Apprehensions about European nations conspiring to parti- 
tion America were, of course, one product of the suspicious and 
fearful Revolutionary mind. Another was the conclusion Adams 
reached after some months' exposure to French diplomacy in 
Paris that the Court of Louis XVI was conspiring to dominate the 
United States, a duplication, in fact, of his earlier suspicion that 
Britain was conspiring to enslave America. When he arrived in 
Paris on April 1, 1778, Adams's suspicions were first aroused, 
however, by his own colleagues. The initial phase of his diplo- 
matic career was, therefore, a story of interpersonal relations, 
dominated not only by fear and suspicion but also by anger, 
mortification, envy, and egotism, practically the whole gamut of 
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the tempestuous passions. This period differs conspicuously 
from the preceding years in which he was the dominant figure in 
formulating American foreign policy. From 1774 to 1776 
Adams, insofar as he was concerned with foreign affairs, appears 
as a powerful intellect in full control of the intellectual universe 
of international relations. But from 1778 onward he often seems 
to be the sport of passions. The mastery of 1774-1776 yields, 
after 1778, to periods of drift; we see a man bobbing along on 
powerful emotional currents, which often threaten to wreck him 
but which finally bring him to a safe, if not altogether happy, 
haven. 
Even before alighting from the Boston at Bordeaux, Adams 
learned that the American commissioners at Versailles-Frank- 
lin, Deane, and Lee-had on February 6, 1778, signed treaties 
of alliance and commerce with Louis XVI. The objective of his 
mission, to assist in the negotiation of these treaties, had thus 
been accomplished before he set foot on French soil. His hopes 
of cutting a figure in Europe having been dashed at its doorstep, 
he was tempted to take the first ship home. On April 16 a British 
agent reported from Paris that '7. Adams is arrived very disap- 
pointed to find everything concluded, talks of returning. " l 7  
Talk of returning he might, for the United States had as little 
need of three ministers at Paris as of three commanders-in-chief 
of its armies. Had Adams been so inclined, he could have re- 
laxed and enjoyed the social and intellectual stimulation of the 
French capital. But he could not abide self-indulgence and des- 
perately needed to be doing something useful. Therefore, he 
made himself the custodian of the commission's papers, served 
as its paymaster, and became its penman as well, doing the work 
other men would have relegated to their clerks. He studied 
French "like a school Boy." After a short time he began to de- 
cline social invitations. He even chose to do without a carriage. 
"I am," he boasted to his wife, "the first public Minister that 
ever lived without a Carriage."'8 
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In trying so earnestly to serve his country, Adams resembled 
nothing so much as a dog chasing its tail. And he knew it, be- 
cause on July 26, 1778, he informed James Love11 that he was 
"fully persuaded" that the public's interests were "not at all 
concerned in my Residence here."" But he kept trying to justify 
his presence in France with diligent attention to the commis- 
sion's business; nothing less would allow him to keep peace with 
himself. 
Another disappointment for Adams was the discovery that the 
American community in France was riven with disputes. "I never 
heard in my Life, of any Misunderstanding among any of the 
Commissioners, that I can recollect, until1 my Arrival at Bor- 
deaux. I had not been on shore an hour before I learn'd it," he 
wrote in September 1779.*O Arrayed against each other were 
Franklin, Deane, Dr. Edward Bancroft, and their followers on 
one side and Arthur Lee. William Lee, Ralph Izard, and their 
supporters on the other. Americans and Frenchmen had taken 
sides in the quarrel and had magnified the differences to such a 
degree that they had become a matter of public notoriety 
throughout France. 
Adams had served in the Continental Congress with Franklin 
and Deane and admired them both. With Franklin, Adams en- 
joyed "that kind of Friendship, which is commonly felt between 
two members of the same public Assembly . . . who always 
agreed in their Opinions and Sentiments of public  affair^."^' 
Deane had impressed Adams so much that he wrote a glowing 
testimonial for him on November 5 ,  1775: "There is scarcely a 
more active, industrious, enterprising and capable Man, than 
Mr. Deane . . . Men of such great daring active Spirits are much 
Wanted. " 2 2  Arthur Lee had spent the pre-independence years in 
London where he served as Massachusetts Bay's auxiliary agent. 
Though Adams was a close ally in Congress of Arthur's brothers 
Richard Henry and Francis Lightfoot Lee, he had never met 
Arthur, knowing him only through his correspondence with 
Massachusetts political leaders, correspondence that, in his opin- 
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ion, breathed the "most inflexible attachment and the most ar- 
dent zeal in the cause of his country. "2j  
Temperamentally, Adams was closer to Arthur Lee than to 
Franklin, who was affecting in Paris the urbanity and detach- 
ment of the venerable philosopher, or to Deane, whose head was 
usually swimming with commercial ventures. Like Adams, Lee 
was a man of passion-his temper "would raise Quarrells in the 
Elisian Field," Adams once ~ r o t e ~ ~ - a n d  of jealousy. According 
to William Carmichael, Lee was "excessively jealous and suspi- 
cious," a charge that, when repeated to Adams by an official of 
the French Foreign Ministry, he agreed was corre~t.~' Lee, in fact, 
believed that there could never be too much jealousy, that it was 
"a spirit we ought to respect, even in its excesses." Lee's friends 
defended his hypersuspiciousness as a commendable example of 
"Republican Jealousy." Enemies like Deane believed that his 
"head was affected," that his "jealous disposition" made him 
the victim of delusions, led him to "apprehend designs injurious 
to him in every one he dealt with." A former British patron, 
Lord Shelburne, considered him "a Madman whenever his Pas- 
sions are inflamed. "26 Modern writers have called him, as they 
have called Adarns, "pa ran~ id . "~~  Although Adams thought 
Lee's suspicions were frequently exaggerated and often found 
him abrasive, he recognized him as a kindred spirit and treated 
him with respect. Being well disposed, then, to Franklin, 
Deane, and Lee, Adams found it easy, during the first months of 
his mission, to adopt a policy of benevolent neutrality toward 
them, to cut through the clouds of calumnies surrounding them, 
and to pronounce them "honest Men, and devoted friends to 
their Country. "28 
By deed as well as by word Adarns hoped to calm the passions 
and conciliate the dispositions of his colleagues. Izard's fulmina- 
tions against Franklin, for example, had so overcome the Doc- 
tor's philosophy that he refused to invite him to social events at 
the American "embassy." Adams, therefore, invited both men 
to dinner in hopes of promoting a reconciliation. But after this 
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and other efforts failed, he recognized that the quarrels among 
his countrymen had become too inveterate to compose and 
ceased his attempts at pea~emaking.~~ 
The final disagreeable surprise awaiting Adams was one that 
he did not attempt-indeed did not know how-to remedy. He 
had not been in Paris long before he learned that Deane, who 
departed just before he arrived, had complained of "ill treat- 
ment" in being recalled by Congress. The construction that 
Adams put upon Deane's complaints was not that, upon return- 
ing to America, he would seek justice from those who had re- 
called him; rather, Adams feared that Deane would retaliate 
against him personally, even though he was in Massachusetts, 
hundreds of miles from Congress, when the decision to replace 
Deane was made. "How soon attempts may be made to displace 
me I know not," Adams wrote James Love11 on July 26, 1778, 
"but one thing I beg of my Friends, and one only that if any At- 
tempt of that kind should be made, they would give me up. "30 
During the same month Bancroft showed Adams a letter from 
Deane's brother and business partner, Barnabas, in which John 
Hancock was mentioned "as being extremly sorry Mr. D. was re- 
called-that Congress did not do it-that it was done after the 
Members were withdrawn and Congress very thin." Adams's in- 
terpretation of this letter was that Hancock was maligning him, 
accusing him of contriving Deane's demise for his own benefit. 
"The whole Letter," he commented, "was the Effect of a miser- 
able Jealousy and Envy of me. I felt no little Indignation, at the 
ill Will, which had instigated this Persecution against me across 
the Atlantic."3' 
In September Adams saw, in a London evening newspaper, 
what purported to be an intercepted letter to Silas Deane from 
another brother, Simeon, which stated "that the two Adams are 
strongly against you," that he, Simeon, could not predict "to 
what lengths the two A's intend to push their 'Factions.' " To 
which accusations Adams responded: "I never in my Life knew a 
Man displaced from a Trust, but he and his Friends were angry 
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with his successor. I therefore expected this, and am not disap- 
pointed. " 
Meanwhile, on September 14, 17 78, Congress put its affairs in 
France on a more sensible footing by abolishing the three-mem- 
ber commission and appointing Benjamin Franklin sole minister 
to the court to Louis XVI. Word of Franklin's appointment 
reached Adams at the end of November, not from Congress but 
from a private letter of Deane to Franklin, September 15, whose 
contents were noised around Paris. Adams, it was rumored, 
would be sent to Vienna or recalled, both "disagreeable" pros- 
pects for 
Weeks passed in "total Suspense and Uncertainty, " as Adams 
awaited official word of his fate.34 It came on February 12, 1779, 
in dispatches from Congress, carried by Lafayette's aide-de- 
camp. Deane's report was confirmed. The commission was dis- 
solved and Franklin was appointed sole minister to France. Lee 
retained his old post as commissioner to Spain. And Adams? 
Nothing for Adams. No reassignment, not even a letter of recall. 
Adams was hurt, humiliated, angry. "The Scaffold is cutt 
away," he wrote his wife on February 28, "and I am left kicking 
and sprawling in the Mire. . . . It is hardly a state of Disgrace 
that I am in but rather of total Neglect and Contempt. . . . If I 
had committed any Crime which deserved to hang me up in a 
Gibet in the Face of all Europe, I ought to have been told what it 
is."35 
When the reports about the alteration in the American com- 
mission began circulating in Paris at the end of November 1778, 
Adams speculated that conspirators had produced the change, 
that he had been the victim of the intrigues of a coterie of "fine 
gentlemenu-Deane, Hancock, and their mercantile associates. 
"I expect," he wrote his wife on December 3 ,  "by some Letters I 
have seen from the Weathersfield Family [Deane's home was 
Wethersfield, Connecticut], that a certain fine Gentleman will 
join another fine Gentleman, and these some other fine Gentle- 
men, to obtain some Arrangement that shall dishonnour me. 
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And by Hints that are given out here, I should not wonder if I 
shall be recalled, or sent to Vienna which would be worse. "3' 
But was Deane capable of conspiring to dishonor him? In 
December 1778 Adams was struggling to keep an open mind on 
the question. His suspicions of Deane, it is true, were deepen- 
ing. Such a man needed "always to be carefully watched and 
controlled, " he wrote James Warren on December 5. 37 Hardly 
reassuring, moreover, were the accusations against Arthur Lee 
which had been coming from Deane's friends; Lee, the French 
ministry was being told, was betraying allied secrets to the Brit- 
ish, a "cruel Calumny" in Adams's view, and an indication, ap- 
parently, that no man's reputation was safe in the poisonous at- 
mosphere of the American community in Paris. Adams, how- 
ever, was reluctant to ascribe these insinuations directly to 
Deane.38 But there were limits to his forbearance toward his fel- 
low New Englander and these were breached by the appearance 
in Europe early in 1779 of Deane's "Address to the Free and Vir- 
tuous Citizens of America. " 
Published in the Pennsylvania Packet on December 5 ,  the 
"Address" was reprinted in London in the January 26-28 issue 
of the St. James Chronicle and in Paris in the February 2 issue of 
the Courier de /'Europe, where Adams read it. The "Address" 
was a broadside against the Lee family, charging its members 
with committing treason against the United States in both 
Europe and America. Adams was infuriated. "One of the most 
wicked and abominable Productions that ever sprung from an 
Human Heart," he declared. Deane was nothing less than "a 
wild boar, that ought to be hunted down for the Benefit of Man- 
kind," a miscreant who ought to be given up to "Satan to be 
buffeted. "j9 And on and on Adams raged. 
The intemperance of his response to the "Address" was pro- 
duced by the belief that it demonstrated that Deane had, in 
fact, contrived to remove him from the embassy to France. The 
Adamses and Lees had collaborated in the struggle for inde- 
pendence so closely that some historians have suggested, only 
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half facetiously, that the Revolution was a product of a tempo- 
rary alliance between the two families. Adams, therefore, took 
the assault against the Lees personally. If the Lee family grew 
"unpopular among their fellow Citizens," he did not know 
"what Family or what Person, will stand the Test.040 In light of 
the "Accusation against Mr. L" he would not, he wrote his wife 
on February 20, "be at all surprised" to see "an Accusation 
against me for something or other."41 That his name was not 
mentioned in the "Address" did not reassure him. 
With "proof' now at hand that Deane and his cronies were 
out to get him, Adams began planning countermeasures. "I will 
not always see the Honour and Interest of my Country intrigued 
away and her most solid Characters immolated at the Shrine of 
Molock and be silent," he wrote Edmund Jenings in June.42 
After returning to America in August, Adams picked up the re- 
frain, lamenting to James Lovell on September 10, that "so 
many Characters as meritorious as any that ever served this Con- 
tinent, should be immolated not to Divinities but to a Gang of 
Peddlers." Adams was not intimidated by the peddlers, how- 
ever, for he informed Lovell, "I don't dread . . . for myself nor 
much for the publick, taking Mr. D[eane] in his own Way but I 
should go a little deeper than Mr. Paine did";43 this meant that 
Adams was not reluctant to attack Deane in the newspapers (as 
Deane had attacked the Lees in his "Address") and that he be- 
lieved he could draw a more damaging indictment against him 
than could Thomas Paine, who, stepping forward as an avenger 
of the Lees, had previously assailed Deane in the public prints. 
But vindication in the newspapers was not enough for Adams. 
On September 10 he wrote Congress, stating "a Claim upon the 
Justice of my Country, that my Reputation may not be permit- 
ted to be stained unless I deserve it. " Explaining that he was ab- 
sent when Deane was recalled, he asked for "Copies of those 
Complaints and Evidences, and the Names of my Accusers and 
Witnesses against me, that I may take such Measures as may be 
in my Power to justify myself before Congress. "44 
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Congress did not supply Adams with the names of his accusers 
and adverse witnesses because there were none; they existed only 
in his imagination, which is to say, that the conviction which we 
have been watching develop in Adams's mind that he had been 
"immolated" by a confederacy of malefactors was something ap- 
proximating a delusion of persecution.*' Only one link in the 
chain of "evidence" which convinced him that Deane and his as- 
sociates had sacrificed him was a legitimate indication of hostil- 
ity toward him-the September 1778 intercepted letter from 
Sirneon to Silas Deane-and Adams was not without suspicions 
that it had been forged. All other "evidence" consisted of state- 
ments which did not, on their face, concern Adams at all- 
Deane's complaining of "ill treatmentVin being recalled, Han- 
cock's claiming that Congress had not recalled Deane, Deane's 
attacking the Lees-but from which Adams inferred enmity to- 
ward himself. 
Once the conviction of Deane's evil doing took root in 
Adams's mind, it could not be extirpated. Both Samuel Adams 
and James Lovell tried to reassure him. In letters that accompa- 
nied the official announcement of the dissolution of the Amer- 
ican commission, Lovell declared, "Your Honor and Happiness 
are dear to me and to many others. The Delay of Republican As- 
semblies is the only thing against you. Your Character is 
esteemed"; Samuel Adams wrote in the same strain, telling his 
cousin, "Congress entertain great Expectation from your Ser- 
vices." But these letters were simply swept aside as Adams's sus- 
picions of Deane mounted. Lovell continued to try to put him at 
ease. On June 13 he wrote that there appeared to be "no Plot 
concealed under the Professions in your Favor which have fallen 
from Men lately whose general Conduct is of a Kind to make me 
cry times Danaos vel dona ferentes." And on August 20 he in- 
formed Adams, "You have not an Enemy amongst us." As sec- 
retary of Congress's Committee of Foreign Affairs and an Argus- 
eyed defender of Adams's interests, Lovell should have been 
able to dispel his apprehensions about Deane. But Adams dis- 
- - 
France 
missed his testimony out of hand, advising him on September 
10, "to reconsider your Opinions concerning my Friends and 
Enemies in C ~ n g r e s s . " ~ ~  His suspicions about Deane had 
reached the stage where they would brook no contradiction, 
however authoritative. 
The humiliation of being discharged from diplomatic service 
produced suspicions, not only about Deane but about Franklin 
as well. The dissolution of the commission to France meant more 
than Adams's abasement; it also meant Franklin's elevation. 
That Adams was envious of Franklin's success in becoming sole 
minister to France is certain. One need not document it by anec- 
dotes like that of Dr. James Smith, who alleged that at a dinner 
party given by Madame Bertin "the portrait of Franklin was in- 
troduced on the stage . . . an universal burst of applause en- 
sued, which wounded the feelings of Adams to such a degree, 
that he feigned sickness and left the performance. "47 One need 
not even rely on the observations of Turgot, a frequent visitor at 
Passy, who noted, on March 18, that Adams was "cankered with 
excessive envy" of Franklin.48 One need only look at Adams's 
writings. 
Until reports of Franklin's elevation began circulating in Paris 
at the end of November 1778, Adams treated the Doctor with 
unfailing kindness. This cannot have been easy, for Adams was 
growing increasingly irritated by the adulation Parisians were 
showering on Franklin, while he himself was being treated as a 
"perfect Cypher. "49 For Adams, insignificance was "as severe a 
pain as the gout or the stone" and, therefore, he complained to 
Luzerne, the French minister-designate with whom he sailed to 
America in the summer of 1779, how he had "seen . . . with 
displeasure the attention which the Parisians have lavished on 
M. Franklin, while he was hardly known at all. "'O Adams, how- 
ever, suppressed his resentment of Franklin until word got out 
that he would be sole minister at Versailles. Then the disparage- 
ment of envy began to fill Adams's letters. Was Franklin's repu- 
tation in Paris unprecedented? It was a fraud, produced by puff- 
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ery. "A man must be his own Trumpeter," Adams wrote James 
Warren on December 2 ,  1778; "He must ostentatiously publish 
to the World his own Writings with his Name, and must write 
even some Panegyrics on them, he must get his Picture drawn, 
his Statue made, and must hire all the Artists in his Turn, to set 
about Works to spread his Name, make the Mob stare and gape, 
and perpetuate his Fame. I would undertake, if I could bring my 
Feelings to bear it, to become one of the most trumpeted, ad- 
mired, courted, worship'd Idols in the whole World in four or 
five Years."" Was Franklin able to manage as sole minister? 
Very doubtful. His mind, Adams wrote Samuel Adams on De- 
cember 5, was "in such a constant State of Dissipation that if he 
is left here alone, the public Business will suffer in a degree be- 
yond description." Congress must "take out of his hands the 
public Treasury, and the Direction of the Frigates and continen- 
tal Vessells that are sent here, and all Commercial affairs"; 
otherwise, "France and America will both have reason to repent 
it. " 5 2  After the confirmation of Franklin's appointment arrived 
in Paris on February 12,  Adams became more strident, criticiz- 
ing the Doctor's "Indolence, " "Dissipation, " and "Indiscre- 
tion," warning that if "mercantile and maritime matters and the 
Disposition of all Money but his own Salary is not taken from the 
Minister, America will be ruined in Reputation as well as 
Credit," and asserting that he was "not a sufficient Statesman 
for all the Business he is in. He knows too little of American Af- 
fairs and of the Politicks of Europe and takes too little Pains to 
inform himself of either."l3 The evidence is clear; Adams was 
consumed with an envy of Franklin, which he never overcame.14 
Adams was envious of Franklin because he considered himself 
his competitor for the position of minister to France. How could 
a colonial lawyer, with a provincial reputation only, regard him- 
self as a competitor with one of the most famous men of the age? 
The answer was Adams's celebrated vanity. "Vanity," he wrote 
at age twenty-one, "is my cardinal Vice and cardinal Folly"" and 
neither friends nor enemies ever disputed this point with him. 
Sometimes Adams's vanity was no more than the boasting of an 
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unguarded moment; as, for example, when he informed his wife 
on April 11, 1783, that he had performed such services as "were 
never rendered by any other Minister in Europe."j6 At other 
times, however, his self-esteem soared to the stratosphere. Those 
effusive Parisians who called him "le Washington de la Negotia- 
tion" were only stating an obvious fact." So was the Abbe Ray- 
nal when he said that "John Adams est un des plus grandes 
Hommes D'Etat de cette Siecle. "'* And so, for that matter, was 
James Otis, when he declared, "John Adams would one day be 
the greatest man in North Ameri~a."'~ As Adams saw it, 
Thomas Jefferson was not the principal figure in the declaration 
of American Independence. He was, for it was he who had pro- 
posed the impeachment of Massachusetts Chief Justice Andrew 
Oliver in February 1774. Was the relationship between the two 
events obscure? Not to Adams-he "was the author of the im- 
peachment, and consequently the author of independence." 
The convention that met in Philadelphia in 1787 was not the 
principal architect of the United States Constitution. John 
Adams was-his Defense of the Constitutions of Government of 
the United States, written in London the same year, had pro- 
duced it. Adams's old friend Mercy Warren caustically, but ac- 
curately, described the role Adams conceived that he had played 
in American public affairs: "His writings suppressed rebellion 
[Shays'], quelled the insurgents, established the State and Fed- 
eral Constitutions, and gave the United States all the liberty, re- 
publicanism, and independence they enjoy . . . nothing had 
been done, nothing could be done, neither in Europe nor Amer- 
ica, without his sketching and drafting the business, from the 
first opposition to British measures in 1764 to signing the treaty 
of peace with England in the year 1783."60 SO what, then, if 
Benjamin Franklin was, by Adams's own admission, more re- 
nowned than "Leibnits or Newton, Frederick or V~ltaire?"~'  Did 
one of the "greatest statesmen of the century" not have the right 
to compete with him for the post at Versailles and the excuse to 
be envious, if he failed to receive it? 
Adams's vanity extended to his private as well as his public 
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life. Of nothing was he prouder, nothing did he estimate more 
highly, than his moral character. He simply believed that he was 
the incarnation of Moral Good. I will not, he wrote his wife on 
July 1, 1774, "see Blockheads . . . elevated above me . . . nor 
shall Knavery . . . get the better of Honesty, nor Ignorance of 
Knowledge, nor Folly of Wisdom, nor Vice of Virtue." His 
"Character," he wrote some years later, was "fortified with a 
Shield of Innocence and honour ten thousandfold stronger than 
brass or Iron." Although he was embarrassed to admit it, he had 
even been compared, he told Mercy Warren, to Jesus Christ.62 
One of the problems with such an exalted self-image (which 
recalls the old Puritan concept of sanctification) was that Adams 
had difficulty accepting the passions and emotions that fre- 
quently welled up within him. Take vanity. Adams would not 
permit it. "I am extremely unhappy to see such symptoms 
of . . . Vanity and Ambition as manifest themselves in Various 
Quarters. . . . I will neither indulge these Passions myself, nor 
be made the Instrument of them in others." Or suspicion. 
When charged with it, Adams scoffed. It was impossible-he 
"the most open, unsuspicious man alive, is accused of excessive 
suspicion." Or envy. Adams would not permit it, either. "I cer- 
tainly do not abound with Envy," he told Edmund Jenings on 
June 8, 1779. "It is a distemper that I hope will never seize me," 
he repeated to James Warren on March 18, 1780.63 But seize 
him it did in the wake of Franklin's elevation to sole minister. 
How did he handle it? By resorting to the familiar mental device 
of projection-the attributing of one's unacceptable feelings 
and ideas to others.64 
Adams handled his envy of Franklin and his hostility toward 
him-the handmaiden of envy-by ascribing them to the Doc- 
tor, by concluding that Franklin was envious of and inimical to 
him, not he to Franklin. But he did not do this immediately 
after the fateful news of the dissolution of his commission ar- 
rived in Paris on February 12. During the spring and summer of 
1779 he tried out various suspicions about Franklin's machina- 
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tions until he came up with a theory of the Doctor's malevolence 
that seemed to fit the facts as he knew them. 
Adams did not linger in Paris. He "was not able," he told 
Luzerne, "to endure the total oblivion in which I was left by the 
naming of Franklin minister plenipotentiary." "Nothing in the 
world," he continued, "could force me into contemptibility 
(bassesse) or to playing the role of a nullity to which I had been 
condemned. "65 Having settled his affairs, he withdrew his son 
from school and stalked off for Nantes, where he intended to 
embark for America. Arriving there on March 12 ,  he discovered 
that the Alliance, on which he expected to sail, was at Brest, 
" 'embarrassed' with forty unruly British pr i~oners ."~~ On
March 22 he went to Brest, composed the difficulty, and re- 
turned to Nantes. On April 2 2  he was aboard the Alliance, ready 
to depart for America, when he received a letter from Franklin, 
covering one from Sartine, the French minister of the marine, 
informing him that the Allhnce's departure had been cancelled. 
Adams and his baggage were deposited forthwith on the dock at 
Nantes. Frustrated-in wandering up and down the French coast 
he felt "like a ghost on the banks of the StyxV--and angry, 
Adams had also begun to experience "some anxiety" about Con- 
gress's reaction to his departing France without leave.67 Frusua- 
tion, anger, and anxiety-than which there are fewer more po- 
tent emotional mixes-now hastened the germination of his sus- 
picions about Franklin. 
The Allhnce had been kept at Nantes because she was to form 
part of an expeditionary force under the joint command of John 
Paul Jones and Lafayette which was to ravage the west coast of 
England.68 To protect this venture, its existence was held in 
secrecy so tight that even an ex-commissioner like Adams was 
not told of it. In his distress and ignorance he began to supply 
reasons of his own for the Alliance's cancellation. To his diary on 
May 12 he confided: "I am jealous that my Disappointment is 
owing to an Intrigue ofJones's. Jones, Chaumont, Franklin con- 
certed the Scheme. Chaumont applied to Mr. De S[artine]. He 
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wrote the letter . . . this Device was hit upon by Franklin and 
Chaumont to prevent me from going home, lest I should tell 
some dangerous Truths. . . . Does the old Conjurer dread my 
Voice in Congress? He has some Reason for he has often heard it 
there, a Terror to evil doers." Adams was quick to concede that 
he was experimenting with these suspicions: "1 may be mistaken 
in these Conjectures, they may be injurious to J[ones] and to 
F[ranklin] . . . but I am determined to put down my Thoughts 
and see what turns out. " 6 9  A month later after seeing the Sensi- 
ble, the French warship on which he was to sail to America, 
Adams began to suspect that Franklin's putative plot had more 
ominous dimensions. The Sensible appeared to be "a dull 
Sailor" and since she had "but 28 Gunsv-the Alliance had 
thirty-two-Adams thought she had "at least a fair Chance of 
rencountering an English Frigate of Superior Force, taking a 
share in a Sublime Battle, and being carried Captive to Hallifax 
or N. York, which would put it out of my Power to do good or 
harm for some years . . . these suppositions would give Pleasure 
to many, and pain to very few. "'O 
With these gloomy suspicions of Franklin and his friends prey- 
ing on his mind, Adams boarded the Sensibfe on June 17 and set 
sail for America. A mission that had started with high hopes and 
expectations had ended in jealousy and bitterness. 
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The Sensible crossed the Atlantic without incident and put in at 
Boston on August 2 ,  1779. A sea voyage did not improve 
Adams's disposition, for a friend who visited him at Braintree 
shortly after his arrival found him "disgusted" and "mortified" 
at the termination of his commission, full of "disappointment, 
chagrin, and vexation. "I The people of Braintree temporarily di- 
verted him from his problems by electing him to represent them 
at a convention, called for Cambridge, September 1, to prepare 
a constitution for Massachusetts. The convention availed itself of 
Adams's talents as a political theorist and made him the drafts- 
man, the "principal Engineer," of the new constituti~n.~ To one 
who charged that he was in a "retired and mortified" situation 
after returning from Europe, he responded characteristically: "I 
was in public forming a Constitution of Government for my 
country. . . . If Solon and Lycurgus were retired when they did 
the same for theirs, I may be said to have been retired. Instead of 
being mortified, it was the proudest period of my whole life. I 
made a Constitution for Massachusetts which finally made the 
Constitution of the United States."3 
Toward the middle of October Adams learned, to his com- 
plete surprise, that on September 27 Congress had elected him 
minister plenipotentiary to negotiate treaties of peace and com- 
merce with Great Britain. The appointment had been produced 
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by an almost forgotten offer of Spain, September 29, 1778, to 
mediate the war between France and Britain.* On February 15, 
1779, the French minister, Conrad Alexandre GErard, informed 
Congress of the proffered Spanish mediation and urged it "to 
lose no time in appointing a proper person to take a part in the 
expected negotiation."' Congress, however, spent five months 
haggling over peace terms and by the time it formulated them, 
August 14, the prospect for a mediation had vanished and 
Spain, allied with France, was at war with Britain. Congress 
knew of Spain's belligerency by the end of A u g u ~ t . ~  With the 
war now widened and being waged with renewed fury it made 
no sense to appoint a peace negotiator. But in what seemed to 
many an abdication of good judgment, Congress appointed 
Adams on September 27 .' 
In urging Adams to accept the new appointment, Elbridge 
Gerry called it "the highest office of Honor and Trust, under the 
United States. " Adams, however, did not need Gerry's assis- 
tance in putting a proper value on the oflice. He considered it 
"the most important Commission" Congress had ever issued. 
"The Commission to General Washington as Commander-in- 
Chief of the army was far inferior," he be l ie~ed.~  Refusing such 
an honor was out of the question; of course he would return to 
France. But there he would be within range of Franklin again. 
How would the "old Conjurer" react to his returning to Europe 
in such an exalted state? Without even considering that in war- 
time, in an age of sail, it might take months for Franklin to learn 
of his appointment, Adams instantly assumed that Franklin 
would be envious of him. This conclusion, the product of 
Adams's projecting his own envy on the Doctor during his first 
mission, was reinforced by his appointment as peace commis- 
sioner, for it seemed to Adams that no man, no matter how 
much philosophy he was master of, could be eclipsed in the pub- 
lic service, as Franklin would be, without becoming envious of 
his successful rival. "I shall be envied more than any other," 
Adams wrote Arthur Lee on March 3 1, 1780. "To be minister at 
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the Court of St. James is an object that will tempt numbers who 
would not care about any other. Nothing less than this is the 
Amount of my present Commission . . . the Idea of my residing 
in London and approaching the exalted Steps of the British 
Throne, I know can never be patiently born by some People." 
My "situation," Adams continued on April 2 ,  "is and will be 
envyed. "9 
Would Franklin, consumed with envy, acquiesce in Adams's 
appointment? Adams feared that he would not, that he would 
try to "starve him out" of Europe by refusing to pay his salary 
and expenses. To prevent this, Adams wrote Lovell on October 
25, 1779, requesting that Congress officially order Franklin to 
honor his requests for funds. (In the same letter Adams asked 
that Congress authorize him to require captains of American 
warships to provide him passage to the United States on de- 
mand. Never again would Franklin detain him in a dismal 
French seaport!) Adams repeated his demand that Congress 
compel Franklin to fund him in letters to Gerry of November 4 
and to Lovell of November 7.1° On February 16, 1780, he wrote 
his wife from Paris that if "Mr. Lovell does not procure me the 
Resolution of Congress I mentioned to him that of drawing on a 
certain Gentleman or his Banker I shall soon be starved out." A 
week later he predicted that there was "no Improbability at all 
that I may be obliged to come home again, for want of means to 
stay here." And on March 16 he wrote Lovell that he needed of- 
ficial authorization to draw funds because of those who could 
not "bear a Brother near the Throne, and so fair, so just, so eco- 
nomical a Method would not escape Minds of so much Penetra- 
tion as a Refusal to lend Money without orders."'l Adams's im- 
portunity was rewarded-and his apprehensions were accommo- 
dated-when Congress resolved, May 31: "that the establish- 
ment of the salaries of the honourable John Adams, and his sec- 
retary Mr. Dana, be transmitted to the minister plenipotentiary 
of these states at the Court of Versailles, and that he be directed 
to pay their drafts to the amount of their respective salaries. " l2  
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Adams seems to have borrowed the fear of being starved out 
from Arthur Lee and Ralph Izard. Shortly after he arrived in 
Paris in April 1778, Adams received a visit from Izard, who vili- 
fied Franklin, Deane, and their "French Satellites" and "repre- 
sented the whole Group of them as in a Conspiracy to persecute 
him and the two Lees. " I 3  An episode that appeared to give some 
substance to this charge occurred a few weeks before Adams left 
Paris. Izard, whose commission to the Grand Duke of Tuscany 
was useless because the duke refused to receive him, and Wil- 
liam Lee, commissioner to Berlin and Vienna but persona non 
grata at both places, whiled away their time in Paris, venting 
their f r~strat ic~n~ .i  Franklin, who refused to consult them and 
scorned their gratuitous advice (Izard proposed a minatory style 
in dealing with the French, urging Franklin to exaggerate the 
plight of America and "perpetually without fatigue" to threaten 
the French with a rapprochement with Britain).14 The commis- 
sioners at Paris paid the expenses of Izard and William Lee. Fed 
up with them at last, Franklin refused on January 13, 1779, to 
approve a disbursement to Lee of 34,000 livres and to Izard of 
500 louis d'ors.15 Arthur Lee put the following construction on 
his actions: '~ealous and irritable he easily takes offence, and 
pursues with secret but implacable vengeance the destruction of 
those who have so offended him . . . it was in this temper that 
he conceived an enmity against Mr. Izard, my brother and my- 
self . . . he endeavoured to starve the two former."16 It was to 
Lee, then, that Adams was evidently indebted for the suspicion 
that Franklin meant to starve him out. 
Aside from sating his alleged malice, what would Franklin 
gain by removing Adams? Adams had no doubts about how the 
Doctor would benefit. During his first mission to France, he had 
discovered that, because of Franklin's transcendent reputation, 
"nine tenths of the public letters" were addressed to him and 
that he was invariably the person approached by those who 
wanted to discuss American affairs. Nor had the war prevented 
the Doctor from entertaining a stream of visitors from England, 
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which had given Adams "Occasion of Jealousy, however inno- 
cent the intentions were."'? He even suspected that one of 
Franklin's British callers, David Hartley, had come "with the 
secret privity if not at the express request of Lord North," pre- 
sumably to discuss the possibility of peace.ls In the absence of a 
duly delegated peace commission, Adams believed that Franklin 
could find authorization for conducting peace negotiations in 
the powers of the old three-member commission to Paris. If he 
were "attacked or undermined," Adams wrote Love11 on March 
16, 1780, Congress ought "to revoke the former powers of treat- 
ing with all the courts of Europe which were given to the com- 
missioners at Passy: for under these authority will be claimed of 
treating with the English if my powers are revoked." '9 Franklin's 
motives, then, were clear: he would starve Adams out to engross 
the peace negotiations to himself. "It was," Adams later as- 
serted, "Franklin's heart's desire to . . . strike Mr. Adams out of 
existence as a public minister and get himself into his place." To 
return to France, therefore, was to step into a fiery furnace. But 
Adams accepted the challenge with the resolution of an early 
Puritan. "I determined to go," he said, paraphrasing Martin 
Luther, "though there were as many devils in the way, as there 
were tiles on the houses of London. " * O  
Adams embarked for France at Boston on November 13, 
1779. In crossing the Atlantic, his ship sprang a leak and was 
forced to put in at the Spanish port of Ferrol (December 8). 
From there, he struck out for France overland. After a "journey 
of near five hundred leagues, in the dead of winter, through bad 
roads and worse accom~datons,"~~ he arrived at Paris on Feb- 
ruary 9. Lodgings he procured at the Hotel Valois on the Rue de 
Richelieu and there he remained for the duration of his sojourn 
in Paris; nothing could have persuaded him to stay with Franklin 
at Passy as he had done during his first mission. During his 
travels in Spain Adams had remained "on the reserve" about his 
business in Europe and he maintained his silence when he ar- 
rived in Paris.22 Franklin, in particular, must be kept ignorant of 
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his mission, lest he sabotage it at the start. On March 31 the 
Doctor wrote a friend that Adams "had never communicated 
anything of his business to me . . . so that I am in utter igno- 
rance" and as late as June 13 he still was not fully informed 
about what Adams was up Had Adarns reflected that Frank- 
lin, ignorant of his mission, could not have been driven by envy 
to abort it, he could have spared himself many anxious hours, 
but this line of reasoning escaped him. 
Keeping Franklin in the dark about his business produced 
some awkward moments. On February 11, for example, Adams 
and Franklin called on Vergennes, who must have found 
Adams's reticence in the presence of the Doctor mystifying. A 
diplomat making his first appearance at Versailles after a year's 
absence was expected, after all, to say something about why he 
was there. Adams confined himself, however, to asking the 
count's permission to write him about his mission. Vergennes, 
of course, consented. The next day Adams wrote the count, "I 
have now the honor co acquaint you, that on the 29th day of 
September last the Congress . . . did me the honor to elect me 
their plenipotentiary to negotiate a peace with Great Britain, 
and also to negotiate a treaty of commerce with that king- 
d0n-1."~~ Vergennes now knew, but Franklin did not. 
Having divulged his business in France, Adams went on in his 
letter to commit a fatal error. In an effort to anticipate Franklin's 
expected machinations, he asked Vergennes if he could commu- 
nicate his powers to the British ministry. "I am the only person," 
he cautioned the count, "who has authority to treat of peace. " 
"If any propositions on the part of Great Britain should be made 
to his Majesty's ministers," he insisted "that they be communi- 
cated to me." Adams realized how bad his eagerness to inform 
the British that an American peace commissioner had arrived in 
Europe would look. It would create the impression that the 
United States, despairing of success, was seeking a separate 
peace, in violation of the terms of its alliance with France, thus 
giving "just cause of jealousy to our ally."25 He was, in fact, one 
of those who doubted Congress's wisdom in voting a peace mis- 
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sion in the fall of 1779. Though "extremely honourable" to me, 
the commission, he wrote on February 7,  1781, was "totally use- 
less to the publick. It has done no good whatsoever. It has been 
considered as a proof of Weakness and distress and an earnest af- 
fection for Great Britain, and an ardent Wish to be restored to 
Friendship with them. "26 
Had Adams been privy to Vergennes's correspondence, he 
would have realized the magnitude of the disaster he was flirting 
with in proposing to communicate with the British ministry. 
During the spring and summer of 1779 Conrad Alexandre 
Gerard, the first French minister to the United States, filled his 
dispatches to Vergennes with the fantastic information that 
Samuel Adams and Richard Henry Lee were at the head of a pro- 
British party in Congress which sought to betray France by com- 
posing the quarrel with Britain and concluding an alliance with 
her. Among the members of the putative pro-British party, 
Gerard numbered John Adams2' Vergennes accepted these tales 
at face value, writing Luzerne on July 18, 1779, for example, of a 
party in Congress which "if it is not sold to England, at least 
favors the views of that power," a party that was trying to effect 
"a rapprochement between the United States and England in 
order to establish a separate negotiation with the court of Lon- 
don and to effect an alliance with that court." It was "indubi- 
table," the count added, "that one can reckon among them Mr. 
John ad am^."^^ Against this background, Adams's desire to 
communicate with the British threatened to confirm erroneous 
suspicion of Vergennes that he was a partisan of Britain and, 
potentially, a traitor to the Franco-American alliance. But there 
was more. On November 6 Vergennes had received from Gerard 
a "perfectly accurate"' summary of Adams's instructions from 
which he learned that the American had been charged to act "in 
concert" with France "in the spirit of the treatie~."~' By an- 
nouncing a desire to contact the British, Adams appeared to be 
flouting his instructions directly in Vergennes's face and inform- 
ing him in advance of his intended treachery. 
How did Vergennes react to Adams's action? It has been the 
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contention of many historians that he was so disgusted by the 
letter of February 12 that he dashed off an insulting reply and set 
to work immediately to have Adams's "commission to negotiate 
a commercial treaty with Britain canceled and Adams himself 
neutralized by the addition of other  minister^."^^ The count is 
supposed to have insulted Adams by forbidding him to commu- 
nicate with the British and by declining to advise him further, 
until "the arrival of M. Gerard, because he is probably the 
bearer of your instructions, and will certainly be able to make me 
better acquainted with the nature and extent of your commis- 
sion,"3l the implication being, apparently, that Adams was too 
stupid to understand his own instructions. But this is false. Ver- 
gennes honestly believed that Adams did not have his instruc- 
tions. He could have put two interpretations on the letter of Feb- 
ruary 12: one, consistent with Gerard's summary of Adams's in- 
structions, was that it represented an unbelievably brazen dis- 
play of bad faith; the other, that Adams appeared to be propos- 
ing separate peace negotiations out of ignorance, not malice. 
Vergennes chose the kinder interpretation. When Adams at- 
tempted to tell him on February 19  that he did, in fact, have his 
instructions, the count, though now "a little . . . puzzled," as 
Adams's secretary admitted,32 assumed that Adams was being 
disingenuous in an attempt to cover his embarrassment at not 
having the instructions. Adams, the count wrote Luzerne on 
March 5 ,  "has given me occasion to judge that he does not know 
the whole nature and whole object of his commission. . . . I 
hope that M. Gerard is the bearer of his instructions and I hope 
that they will convince him that his commission is merely even- 
tual and that it has for its essential foundation our treaty of alli- 
ance. " 33 
Had Adarns been able to restrain his eagerness to communi- 
cate with the British, his mission would have had a much differ- 
ent issue. Vergennes was willing to give him the benefit of the 
doubt. The able Luzerne, having settled in Philadelphia, was 
soon supplying the count with more accurate information about 
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Adams's role in the Revolution, correcting Gerard's gross distor- 
tions. Far from being a partisan of Britain, Adams had, Luzerne 
reported, by his early and decided role in the Revolution ten- 
dered himself "particularly odious to the English . . . and they 
will find it repugnant to treat with him."34 Had Adams simply 
bided his time in France, he might have won Vergennes's confi- 
dence and worked smoothly with him. But the fear of Franklin 
was upon him and he must inform the British of his peace com- 
mission to prevent a power grab by the Doctor. He wished, he 
wrote Congress on March 30, to communicate "to Lord George 
Germain my full powers to treat both of peace and commerce." 
But he would be even bolder; he would go to London in person, 
as Vergennes reported to Luzerne on June 3, 1780. This last pro- 
posal Adams evidently made about the time GErard arrived in 
Paris from America on March 12.35 To Vergennes, Gerard re- 
vealed that he did not have Adams's instructions. It immediate- 
ly dawned on the count that he had badly misjudged Adams. 
The American, it now appeared, had been in possession of his 
instructions from the moment of his arrival and had deliberately 
ignored them in his haste to violate the treaty of alliance by con- 
cluding a separate peace with Great Britain.36 Here, truly, was a 
wicked and dangerous man, a man whose enmity to France and 
partiality toward Britain were so strong that the most solemn 
commands of his sovereign meant nothing to him. Such a man 
must be controlled or, better still, removed from office. 
But how could this be done? Vergennes could not ask Con- 
gress to recall Adams for violating his instructions because such a 
request was likely to infuriate the Americans. The instructions of 
a sovereign to its servants were supposed to be confidential and, 
by charging Adams with uansgressing them, Vergennes would, 
in effect, be admitting that France had not scrupled to gain ac- 
cess to American secrets. What was needed was concrete evi- 
dence, preferably provided by Adams himself, of his insubordi- 
nation. In the middle of June Adams supplied Vergennes with 
precisely what he wanted. 
John Adams 
On March 18 Congress passed a resolution pegging the value 
of its depreciating paper money at forty dollars paper to one dol- 
lar silver. The vigilant Luzerne informed Vergennes, April l, 
that the action boded ill for France's merchants trading to the 
United States. Many, he declared, had already been ruined by 
the depreciation of American currency, for they had been com- 
pelled by a consistent inability to find return cargoes to leave the 
money from the sale of their merchandise in the hands of Amer- 
ican agents, who stood by helplessly while its value evaporated in 
their pockets. Peace or an improvement in American military 
fortunes might save the French by restoring the value of their 
money, but Luzerne believed that the resolution of March 18 de- 
molished these hopes and, as far as he could see, sealed the ruin 
of his countrymen.3' 
Luzerne's dispatch reached Paris on May 19. Whether it con- 
veyed the first intelligence of the resolution of March 18 or 
whether the news of it simultaneously arrived through other 
channels, France's American traders were scandalized by what 
Congress had done and set up what Franklin on May 31 called a 
"great Clamour. "38 Representing their plight in terms that con- 
firmed Luzerne's account of it, they put immediate pressure on 
Vergennes for relief. The count responded with an indignant let- 
ter to Luzerne of June 3, denouncing Congress for plundering 
the French merchants and ordering the ambassador to see that 
they were indemnified for their losses. 39 
Among the aggrieved French merchants was Le Ray Chau- 
mont. On June IS, with another entrepreneur, Monthieu, in 
tow, he called upon Adams and complained about the injustice 
that he and his associates had suffered at the hands of Con- 
gres~.~O Chaumont told Adams that the French court sympa- 
thized with the merchants and suggested that he might calm the 
waters by using his influence with Congress to have the French 
excepted from the resolution of devaluation. A business associ- 
ate of Deane and the friend and landlord of Franklin at Passy, 
Chaumont had been suspected by Adams in the spring of 1779 
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of intriguing with the Doctor to arrange his capture at sea. Mon- 
thieu had also done business with Deane, especially in negotiat- 
ing in 1776 the famous contract to supply the Continental Army 
with firearms; the muskets that he sent to America were so rav- 
aged with rust that even those in working order were more dan- 
gerous to their operators than to the enemy. Chaumont and 
Monthieu's association with Deane had, in fact, enrolled them 
in the conclave of malicious merchants which Adams believed 
was persecuting him and on September 10, 1779, he wrote 
James Love11 that he suspected that the two men were the au- 
thors of an anonymous letter, attacking him for attaching him- 
self to "L[ee] the Madman."41 He believed, therefore, that the 
two men who appeared in his office were supplicants with stilet- 
tos. They could be up to no good, of course; obviously they were 
concocting tales about the distress of innocent Frenchmen to en- 
rich them~elves.~~ He, apparently, was to be made a dupe to per- 
suade Congress to line the pockets of a "Gang of Peddlars." In- 
censed that the Frenchmen would attempt to make him the in- 
strument of their villainy, Adams fell on them with fury. 
The resolution of March 18, he told them, was "wise, very 
wise, just, very just" and anyone who protested against it must 
be a British emissary or spy. Why, moreover, should the United 
States give France a special exemption from the resolution? She 
had "less to complain about" than any other country; she should 
be grateful to the United States whatever its actions "because 
without America to whom France does not know how to have too 
much obligation, Enghnd would be too powerful for the House 
of Bourbon. "43 Under no condition, Adams asserted, would the 
United States compensate or indemnify Frenchmen alleged to 
have been injured by the resolution of March 18, 1780. 
Stung to the quick by this interview, Chaumont stalked off to 
Versailles and related Adams's diatribe to Vergennes. The count 
perceived that his opportunity to rid himself of the American 
was at hand. By refusing to accommodate the merchants of 
France, Adams had, in the count's view, put himself in direct 
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opposition to "the sentiments of Congress relative to the French 
and to the alliance."44 Vergennes liked to flatter himself that 
Congress was brimming with gratitude for French assistance and 
was disposed to do whatever favors it could for its ally, granting 
it, if need be, privileges that other nations and even its own citi- 
zens did not enjoy. In the matter of devaluation, for instance, 
the count expected Congress to press a 2 . 5  cent dollar on its own 
citizens and on the citizens of other nations but to give a French- 
man one hundred cents for his dollar. By refusing to counte- 
nance special privileges, Adams convinced Vergennes that his 
sentiments were contrary to those of Congress. If, he believed, 
he could obtain concrete evidence of Adams's perverse views, he 
could use it to convince Congress that Adams was misrepresent- 
ing its sentiments. Then, he hoped, the American legislature 
would recall its irresponsible servant. 
Vergennes's problem was a nice one. How could he obtain 
evidence of Adams's sentiments? How could he "assure" him- 
self "of the thinking of M. Adams?" He ordered Chaumont to 
write up an account of his interview with Adams but since this 
was only a secondhand report, it was not suitable for his pur- 
poses. Nor would an interview help. The count already knew 
Adams's sentiments; what he wanted was to get them on paper 
in his own hand. Fortunately for Vergennes, Adams himselfvol- 
unteered his views by uansmitting several letters "which spoke 
of the devaluation of the paper money. "*' Vergennes welcomed 
these letters because they gave him an opportunity to open a cor- 
respondence with the American minister about the morality of 
de~aluation.~~ 
On June 21  the count wrote Adams. He repeated his 
argument that the French merchants had been "plundered" by 
the resolution of March 18, told Adams that Luzerne had been 
instructed to protest against it, and appealed to him to use all his 
"endeavors to engage it [Congress] to retrace its steps, and do 
justice to the subjects of the King."47 Vergennes did not have 
the slightest expectations that Adams would accede to this re- 
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quest. Chaumont had told him of the American's adamant op- 
position to his own entreaties and on June 19, only two days be- 
fore the count composed the foregoing letter, Adams had waited 
on him at Versailles and had had "a long conversation" with 
him in which he had tried "to convince him of the rectitude" of 
the resolution of March 18.@ Vergennes wrote Adams with the 
single intention of receiving a refusal, in his own hand, which he 
could use as proof that Adams's principles were opposed to the 
principles of the alliance as he conceived them and as he pre- 
sumed Congress conceived them. 
Adams fell into the count's uap because he had been eagerly 
seeking an opportunity to correspond with him. During his first 
mission he had frequently remarked upon Franklin's "indo- 
lence. " Convinced that the lackadaisical Doctor was not promot- 
ing his country's interest with anything like the necessary zeal, 
Adams claimed, when he returned to America in the summer of 
1779, that "there ought to be somebody there [in France], who 
knows somewhat of the affairs of America, as well as Europe, 
and who will take the Pains to think, and to advise the Cabinet, 
with all proper Delicacy, in certain Circum~tances."~9 The 
United States had fortunately sent just such a man to France in 
the winter of 1780 and Adams fairly jumped at the chance to 
correspond with Vergennes and "to supply," as Franklin re- 
marked later, "what he may suppose my negotiations defective 
in. " '0  
On June 22 Adarns wrote Vergennes not one, but two letters, 
and in both of them he praised the resolution of March 18 and 
steadfastly refused to assist in its emasculation. In his first letter 
of the day, he asked Vergennes to hold his instructions to 
Luzerne in abeyance "until his Excellency Mr. Franklin may have 
the opportunity to make his representations to his Majesty's 
ministers." Luzerne's instructions should be withheld "to the 
end that, if it should appear that those orders were issued in con- 
sequence of misinformation, they may be revoked; otherwise 
sent on."" In his second letter of the day, a production of some 
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ten pages, Adams attempted to show Vergennes that he had, in 
fact, been misinformed in ordering Luzerne to protest against 
the devaluation resolution. The burden of his case was that no 
injustice had been done to the French because their American 
factors had manipulated the depreciating currency so cleverly 
that they had made huge profits for their employers. It was 
pointless, therefore, for Vergennes or his agent at Philadelphia 
to try to right a wrong that had never been.'2 
Adarns was not certain that his letters would of themselves 
persuade Vergennes to revoke his orders to Luzerne and, there- 
fore, in his first letter of June 2 2  he had asked the count to stay 
his orders until Franklin, whose opinion the French would re- 
spect, wrote him. But Adams was not at all sure that the Doctor 
would write. His letters of June 2 2  had dealt with matters that 
fell clearly within the Doctor's ministerial domain and Adams 
feared that if he showed them to him, Franklin would be so an- 
noyed by Adams's encroachments that he would decline to act. 
Adams decided, therefore, that in order to obtain the Doctor's 
support for his letters of June 2 2 ,  he would have to deceive him 
about their existence. Accordingly, on June 23 he informed 
Franklin that he had received a letter from Vergennes (that of 
June 2 1 )  "on the subject of the resolution of congress of the 18th 
March . . . in which his Excellency informs me that the Chev- 
alier de la Luzerne has orders to make the strongest representa- 
tions upon the subject." Would Franklin "request that those 
orders may be stopped, until proper representations can be 
made at C ~ u r t ? " ' ~  But what was the ten-page memorial of June 
2 2  if not a proper representation? This little trick worked per- 
fectly because on June 2 4  Franklin wrote Vergennes and re- 
quested him to withhold Luzerne's orders. Adams had contrived 
to obtain the Doctor's support for a memorial of whose very exis- 
tence he was ignorant. 
By telling Franklin in his letter of June 2 3  that he "firmly be- 
lieved" that he could convince Vergennes of his errors in issuing 
Luzerne's instructions, Adams effectively prevented Franklin 
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from writing a representation; the Doctor would obviously not 
write until he saw the result of Adams's efforts. This was exactly 
as Adams planned it because he wanted to prevent Franklin 
from lifting his pen. On June 29 he clinched his scheme to force 
inactivity upon the Doctor by showing him copies of his letters 
of June 22. These were, of course, so thorough that anything 
Franklin could have added would have been superfluous. 
The reason Adams wanted to prevent Franklin from writing a 
representation to the French court can be gleaned from his let- 
ters to Congress of June 26 and June 29. On June 26 he treated 
that body to a summary of his activities during the devaluation 
controversy. He began by recounting his conversation of June 15 
with Chaumont, who had, he claimed, been sent to him by Ver- 
gennes to consult him about the resolution of March 18; this, of 
course, conveyed the impression that the count considered him, 
and not Franklin, the man to see about American affairs.'4 Then 
Adams described the long conversation he had had with Ver- 
gennes on June 19. Finally, he enclosed a copy of the count's let- 
ter of June 2 1 and his replies of June 22. He made no mention of 
Franklin in the June 26 letter because he had written it to show 
that in the devaluation controversy he had done everything and 
Franklin had done nothing. 
The letter of June 29 was a kind of commentary upon that of 
June 26. Adams informed Congress that the business of the 
American minister to France was "to negotiate with the Court, 
to propose and consult upon plans for the conduct of the war 
[and] to collect and transmit intelligence." There was "much 
reason to believe," he continued, "that if our affairs here had 
been urged with as much skill and industry as they might" have 
been, the United States "should at this moment have been 
blessed with peace.">> Franklin, obviously, was not doing his 
job. Congress should recall him and replace him with someone 
more diligent, someone like John Adams, who was already on 
location, aggressively protecting American interests. 
There was considerable irony in the devaluation controversy. 
John Adam 
Vergennes had provoked it to destroy Adams and Adams had 
tried to use it to destroy Franklin, the count's favorite American. 
What sharpens the irony is that Vergennes tried to make Frank- 
lin act as Adams's executioner. On June 30 the count gave the 
Doctor copies of all the letters that Adams and he had ex- 
changed during the past two weeks, including his most recent 
one of June 30 in which he had affected anger and acridly in- 
formed Adams that "all further discussion between us on this 
subject [devaluation] will be needless. " 56 Vergennes requested 
Franklin to uansmit this correspondence to Congress so that that 
body could see how much Adams's distorted ideas about the al- 
liance had offended the powers that be in France. This, the 
count hoped, would be sufficient to secure the American's re- 
call, but in case it was not, he asked Franklin to write Congress 
and to support the French position. Had Franklin acceded to this 
request he would have had to refute his younger colleague and 
this was exactly what Vergennes wanted him to do, hoping no 
doubt that the weight of the Doctor's opinion would insure 
Adams's recall. Franklin refused to play the count's game and 
notified him on July 10 that he would do no more than transmit 
his correspondence with Adams to Congress.'' Thus, the count's 
subtle scheme to dispose of Adams was, in a manner, thwarted. 
But in the month of July Adams made himself so obnoxious at 
Versailles that Vergennes threw subtlety to the winds and in 
August ordered his representative at Philadelphia to press Con- 
gress to have him recalled. 
On July 2 Adams went to Versailles and broached the subject 
of a trip to the Netherlands. He had wanted to visit the Low 
Countries during his first mission and had learned, upon return- 
ing to America, that Congress had considered sending him 
there. Upon the eve of his departure from Boston in November 
1779, he was informed, moreover, that Congress was still think- 
ing of sending him to Holland, that he had been nominated, 
along with Henry Laurens, to go there to negotiate a loan.58 
Since March he had been seeking Vergennes's permission to 
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travel to Holland-French passports were necessary to leave the 
king's dominions-but the count had put him off with one ex- 
cuse after another, so that by July Adams had, by his reckoning, 
been detained in Paris for four months "wholly against my will, 
by the Count de Vergennes himself. "'9 This time, however, Ver- 
gennes told him that he could go to Holland but asked him to 
wait a while because he expected in a few days to have something 
of importance to tell him. The count was as good as his word, 
summoning Adams to Versailles on July 16 to inform him that 
the British had sent an envoy to Madrid with whom the Span- 
iards had refused to confer until he obtained instructions from 
his government about its sentiments toward the United States; 
since it would take at least two months for the emissary to get in- 
formation from London, Vergennes assured Adams that he 
would have plenty of time to take a trip to the Low Countries. 
The count thought that he had done the American a big favor by 
telling him about Sir Richard Cumberland's mission to Spain. 
But all he got for his "candor and loyalty" were two testy letters, 
one on July 13 and another on July 17 .60 
Adams's letter of July 13, described by M. Doniol as "a kind 
of second mim~i re , "~ '  was a brief on behalf of his diplomatic 
hobbyhorse, the establishment of French naval superiority along 
the coastline of North A m e r i ~ a . ~ ~  Should France concentrate her 
naval power in American waters, the war, Adams explained to 
Vergennes, could be brought to a quick and triumphant conclu- 
sion. If the count refused to adopt this suategy, Adams threat- 
ened him with a "melancholy" reaction in America. There were, 
he explained, many people in the United States who wished to 
return "to the domination" of Great Britain and their numbers 
were being constantly augmented by British claims that France 
did not "mean to give any effectual aid to America, but only to 
play off her strength against that of Britain, and thus exhaust 
both." If France suffered these opinions to gain ground by de- 
clining to act, Adams warned that his countrymen might give up 
and make peace with Great Britain.63 
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Vergennes found Adarns's advice gratuitous and annoying, 
for the strategy Adams advocated was exactly the one the count 
had been promoting from the beginning of the war, handi- 
capped though he was by a smaller fleet than Britain's and op- 
posed though he was by his ally Spain, which wanted to concen- 
trate the naval war in Europe.64 Convinced that Adams coveted a 
separate peace, Vergennes suspected that he was trying to make 
France's performance of an impossible task (she was incapable of 
maintaining naval superiority over Britain in American waters 
for an extended period) a test of good faith so that he might 
have an excuse for treating with the British. It was most unfortu- 
nate, then, that Adams should have chosen, on July 17, to press 
Vergennes for permission to communicate his commercial 
powers to the British ministry, for this simply reinforced the 
count's erroneous convictions. Vergennes's dander was now up 
and on July 25 he wrote the American minister a blistering re- 
buke. He began by requiring him "in the name of the 
King . . . to suspend . . . all steps relating to the English min- 
istry'' until Congress should have a chance to consider his pro- 
posals. Then he lit into Adams: his ideas showed "much weak- 
ness" and "much simpleness"; they were "chimerical" and 
would make the United States "the laughing-stock of all na- 
tions" ; and they were-and this really stung-unworthy of "any 
thinking being. "6' 
Adams should have ground his teeth and borne this abuse in 
silence, but he did not. He decided to repay the count in kind 
and on July 26 wrote him a long ill-tempered letter, rebutting 
him point by point, and telling him that his own reasoning fell 
considerably short of that of a "thinking being. "66 The next day, 
as if to pour salt on the wounds, Adams exhumed a letter Ver- 
gennes had written him on July 20-a letter in which the count 
had condescended to tell him that Louis XVI had decided to 
send certain naval units to America-and dissected it merci- 
le~sly.~' This was, as Edward S. Corwin has remarked, "the straw 
that broke the camel's back."68 The count, obsessed by the hob- 
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goblin of a separate peace, believed that Adams had resorted to 
polemics to blow up a quarrel, to create "a Difference . . . with 
a view of reconciling" the United States and Great Britain and 
on July 29 he washed his hands of the American by brusquely in- 
forming him that he would correspond with him no longer.@ 
"Mr. Franklin," he wrote, "being the sole person who has letters 
of credence to the King from the United States, it is with him 
only that I ought and can treat of matters which concern 
them."70 As he had done after the devaluation controversy, 
Vergennes sent Adams's letters to Franklin and asked the Doctor 
to transmit them to Congress. But now he went much further 
than he had in June and on August 7 sent Luzerne a rtsumt of 
Adams's offenses to enable "the ambassador to have him re- 
called. " 71 
The dispute with Vergennes caused the crystallization in 
Adams's mind of suspicions about French policy which had been 
taking shape for months, suspicions that reflected not only the 
Revolutionary mentality's fear of malign conspiracies but also 
the New Englander's hereditary fear of French designs to domi- 
nate his country. "Keep us poor. Depress us. Keep us weak."72 
Above all, keep America dependent on France. This was the ob- 
jective Adams believed Vergennes was pursuing. The seeds of 
this suspicion were evidently sown by reports from London in the 
spring of 1780, spread to split the Franco-American alliance, 
that France's policy was to encourage the continuation of the war 
"in hopes of . . . depressing the rising power of Ameri~a."~j 
The charge was preposterous-in 1780 France was on the verge 
of bankruptcy and could so little afford another campaign that 
peace overtures to Lord North were made by First Minister 
Maurepas and, somewhat later, by Director General of Finances 
Ne~ker.~* Adams's first inclination, upon confronting the 
rumor, was to dismiss it out of hand, but he soon reversed him- 
self and decided that it deserved "to be considered with all the 
attention that Americans can give it. "75 
There was, to begin with, Vergennes's apparent indifference 
John Adams 
to his pleas for the establishment of French naval superiority in 
American waters. Why was this "short, easy, infallible method 
of humbling the English" rejected, if not to spin out the war and 
weaken A m e r i ~ a ? ~ ~  Then there were the count's rebuffs of his ef- 
forts to communicate his commercial powers to the British. In 
addition to his apprehensions about Franklin, Adams was gov- 
erned by political considerations in wanting to communicate the 
commercial powers. A few weeks into his second mission, he be- 
came aware that "a good part of Europe, as well as the people of 
England" had been persuaded by the North ministry that "there 
is some secret treaty between France and the United States, by 
which the former have secured to themselves exclusive privileges 
in . . . American C ~ m m e r c e . " ~ ~  This was a lie, for the Conti- 
nental Congress, guided by the Model Treaty of 1776, had in- 
sisted that the United States discriminate in favor of no trading 
nation, that it grant free and equal trade to all who reciprocated. 
Adams believed that if he could get this information out to the 
British public, he could convert it to the cause of peace, for once 
Britain realized that by making a treaty with the United States 
she would have a chance to recover much of her prewar com- 
merce, profits, and power (as Adams was certain she would), she 
would have no more incentive to continue the war. In thwarting 
the communication of Adams's commercial powers, Vergennes 
surely was attempting to continue the war to America's disad- 
vantage. And what about French loans to America? Her 
"monied assistance," in Adams's view, had been "'pitiful," 
barely enough to keep America's chin above water.78 Finally, 
there were Vergennes's efforts to keep him from going to Hol- 
land (because Cumberland's mission to Spain might produce 
peace feelers at Paris). Impeding a trip to the Netherlands, 
where alternative means of support for the United States might 
be found, indicated only too clearly the count's desire to keep 
America in leading strings to France. 
The manner in which Vergennes conducted diplomacy with 
the United States was also a signal to Adams that he meant to 
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keep America in a condition of dependency. Vergennes's con- 
stant endeavor was to convince the Americans that benevolence 
and altruism motivated France's assistance to them. Let them 
understand, he wrote G6rard on April 22, 1778, "that we are 
making war only for them, that it is only because of them that 
we are in it."'9 In return, the count expected that Americans 
would treat France and her servants with effusive gratitude. 
Franklin was quick to see what Vergennes wanted and artfully 
played the role expected of him, making the expression of grati- 
tude the touchstone of his diplomacy. It was "not only our 
Duty, but our Interest" to massage French egos, the Doctor 
wrote Congress. 
Adams found it impossible to imitate Franklin. He was deeply 
suspicious of Vergennes's efforts to "Make us feel our Obliga- 
tions [to] Impress our Minds with a Sense of Gratitude." Never 
in his life, he wrote his wife on December 18, 1780, had he "ob- 
served any one endeavouring to lay me under particular obliga- 
tions to him, but I suspected he had a design to make me his de- 
pendant, and to have claims upon my gratitude. So, beneath 
Vergennes's diplomatic style, there appeared to lurk a sinister 
design to reduce Adams-and America-to a demeaning de- 
pendency. 
In dealing with Vergennes, Adams adopted a diplomatic style 
to accommodate these apprehensions. His objective was to ban- 
ish gratitude from the diplomatic dialogue between France and 
the United States because of the danger "that too much will be 
demanded of us" if Americans assumed the role of obsequious 
beneficiaries which Vergennes had picked for them. Interest, 
which Adams believed "alone" governed the councils of men, 
must supplant gratitude as the guiding principle of Franco- 
American diplomacy.82 To Adams, it was indisputable that 
France was supporting the United States purely from motives of 
self-interest: it was "because England is the natural Enemy of 
France, that America in her present Situation is her natural 
Friend," he wrote in 1779. Therefore, he believed that self- 
John Adams 
interest should be stressed in dealing with Vergennes: "State the 
interest France had in supporting us . . . and not make it a mat- 
ter of mere grace." In applying for French naval support, for ex- 
ample, he emphasized to the count that upon "principles of 
French interest and policy alone" a fleet should be "constantly 
kept in North America. "83 If putting Franco-American relations 
on the foundation of self-interest was an effective way to 
forestall French claims on American gratitude, it was also a 
rebuke to Vergennes, whose emphasis on French benevolence 
was made to appear hypocritical. The count, naturally enough, 
resented Adams's diplomatic style. 
Adams's ideas about the obligations between the two partners 
in the alliance also annoyed Vergennes. His belief in America's 
decisive role in the European balance of power gave offense here, 
for the French foreign minister did not relish being told that the 
power of a united British Empire would have been "fatal" to his 
country. By breaking with Britain and allying themselves with 
France, the Americans had delivered France from the heel of an 
"imperious master," had raised her from the "Contempt, Mis- 
ery, and Debasement in which Louis 15 left it, to a Pitch of 
Reputation, opulence, and Power." It followed, then, that 
France did "not know how to have too much obligation" to the 
United States, that she was "more oblig'd to us than we to her." 
According to Silas Deane (who returned to France in the summer 
of 1780), Adams asserted "not only in private but in his letters 
to the Minister" that "America is not obliged to France, but the 
contrary." As a result, he believed that the United States need 
not approach France with the trembling gratitude of a client but 
was justified in treating her as an equal. Therefore, when Ver- 
gennes abused him in July, he replied in kind, answering the 
count "huff for huff. "84 
But huffing, Adams perceived, was not the best way to defeat 
Vergennes's putative designs. Other sources of support must be 
enlisted and, with this in mind, he left Paris on July 27, 1780, 
for the Netherlands "to try," as he told Franklin, "whether 
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something might not be done to render us less dependent on 
France. Franklin, who had been on the sidelines while the 
Adams-Vergennes battle raged, was nevertheless one of its cas- 
ualties. The Doctor had always preached against Congress's 
flooding Europe with unwelcome diplomats. He had "constant- 
ly declared," within Adams's hearing, "that congress was wrong 
in sending a minister to Berlin, Vienna, Tuscany, Spain, 
Holland and Petersburg . " "A Virgin State, " he believed, should 
"preserve its Virgin Character and not go about Suitoring for Al- 
liances. "86 At first, these sentiments seemed innocent enough to 
Adams; in fact, he agreed with them, advising Love11 from Paris 
on January 3, 1779, "to recall, every Commissioner, you have in 
the World, excepting one to this Court and to Spain."87 But in 
the summer of 1780, in the context of what Adams took to be 
Franklin's envious machinations against him, the Doctor's rec- 
ommendations looked very different. What psychologists call 
the process of retroactive falsification seems to have come into 
operation, by which "incidents of the past receive a new inter- 
pretation and are fitted into the framework of present persecu- 
tion. Because Franklin had formerly opposed scattering min- 
isters around Europe, Adams now assumed that he was against 
his going to Holland. Why would the Doctor want to obstruct 
him? Envy, of course. He wanted, it appeared, to "sweep 
Europe clean of every Minister but himself, that he might have a 
clear unrivalled Stage," sweep Europe clean lest "someone 
would serve his Country, acquire a Reputation, and begin to be 
thought of by Congress to replace him. 
Both Vergennes and Franklin evidently wanted to keep 
Adams out of Holland. Was this a mere coincidence? Adams was 
sure it was not. The cloying gratitude with which the Doctor 
treated the count-excessive "diffidence" and "servile Complai- 
sance" in Adams's view-and the exaggerated deference that 
Vergennes and his understrappers showed Franklin convinced 
Adams that the two men were confederates in a conspiracy 
against him, that they had, in fact, formed an "Alliance" 
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against him, each wishing, for his own reasons, to defeat his 
Dutch mission.90 Thus, as we follow Adams to Amsterdam, we 
should be aware of the way in which he viewed his errand: he 
"was pursued into Holland by the intrigues of Vergennes and 
Franklin, and was embarrassed and thwarted, both in my negoti- 
ations for a loan and in those of a political nature, by their 
friends, agents, and spies, as much, at least, as I ever had been in 
France. "9l 
CHAPTER 
THE NETHERLANDS 
Adams left Paris on July 27, passed through Brussels, Antwerp, 
Rotterdam, and The Hague and arrived in Amsterdam on 
August 10, 1780, where he lived for the next twenty months. 
The decision to settle in Amsterdam was ill advised. True, as the 
financial capital of Holland, it was the place to negotiate a loan, 
which would lessen American dependence on France. But 
Adams's objective in the Netherlands extended beyond borrow- 
ing money. Always considering his peace commission his pri- 
mary trust, he wanted to do something in Holland to "accel- 
erate" peace negotiations. Therefore, his objective in the 
Netherlands was, in its broadest sense, political, and political 
business was best conducted, not in Amsterdam, but in the na- 
tion's capital, The Hague, "the eye and heart of continental 
politics," as one of Adams's associates called it. ' 
But there was, in Adams's view, an insuperable objection to 
settling at The Hague: it was the residence of the French ambas- 
sador, the Duke de la Vauguyon, the incarnation in Holland, he 
believed, of Vergennes's scheme to reduce America to a de- 
meaning dependency on France. Adams treated Vauguyon pre- 
cisely as he had Franklin in February 1780: he told him nothing 
and stayed as far away from him as possible. Passing through 
The Hague on the morning of August 9, Adams had a "short 
and general" conversation with Va~guyon,~ hurried on to Am- 
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sterdam, and did not see the French ambassador again until the 
following April. American affairs in The Hague Adams left in 
the hands of C. W. F. Dumas, an impecunious Swiss intellec- 
tual-he later took employment as a majordomo in Adams's 
house-whom Franklin had recruited some years earlier as an 
American agent.3 Dumas knew little about the conventions of 
conducting foreign policy in the Netherlands-not until March 
2 1, 178 1, for example, did he discover that memorials of foreign 
ministers were submitted to the grand pensionary of Holland 
(the Dutch equivalent of a secretary of state) as well as to the 
president of the States General-but his amateurishness con- 
cerned Adams far less than James Lovell's warning that he was 
"all-together an Instrument in the hands of Deane and Frank- 
lin."* Thus, rather than being part of the solution Adams 
sought in Holland, Dumas was part of the problem and Adams 
was content to leave him at The Hague.' 
By isolating himself from Vauguyon, Adams forfeited the op- 
portunity of informing himself of the objectives of French diplo- 
macy in the Netherlands. Knowledge of French aims might well 
have lessened his suspicions of their malevolence. In forgoing a 
liaison with the French ambassador, Adams also cut himself off 
from the most likely source of information about Dutch politics, 
for Dutch politicians, especially after relations with Britain took 
a decisive turn for the worst in December 1780, avoided Adams 
"like a pestilence," as he put it.6 As late as January 25,  1781- 
six months into his mission-he apparently had not been able to 
meet a single member of the States General.' The conduct of the 
pensionary of Amsterdam, van Berckel, was typical: "He dared 
not," Adarns said, "have any communications with me. I made 
a visit to his house, but was denied admittance. I wrote him let- 
ters, but received no answer. He was reduced to the necessity of 
writing secretly to Mr. Dumas, to pray to make his apology to 
me, and to say that, though he was very desirous to see me, and 
to answer my letters, he dared to do neither-'because every- 
thing possible was being done to sacrifice me to the Anglo- 
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manes.' The few Dutch politicians who would see Adams 
were outcasts like Baron van der Capellen, a "nervous and vul- 
nerable" man, who spoke darkly of "enemies," of "tyrants," 
who had expelled him from the states of O~erijssel.~ 
Isolated from French and Dutch sources of reliable political 
information, Adams also found no American who could serve as 
a political confidant, no one on whom he could rely to validate 
his conclusions and correct him when he was wrong. The secre- 
tary to the peace commission, Francis Dana, could have filled 
this function, but Adams left him behind in Paris to transact 
whatever business arose there. It is a commonplace observation 
that "isolation and limited communication deprives" a person 
"of reality checks that modify his distorted views. "I0 Being in 
precisely this situation in the Netherlands, Adams's suspicions 
flourished and became almost paranoid in their intensity. His 
conviction, moreover, that he was the object of an unremitting 
French and "Franklinian" conspiracy frequently caused him to 
exaggerate his own importance and to magnify his activities into 
dimensions that were, at times, grotesque. 
Settling in Amsterdam removed Adams from Vauguyon's or- 
bit, but did not, initially, put him at ease. His suspicions height- 
ened by unfamiliar surroundings, he quickly concluded that the 
hotel where he stayed for the first two days in Amsterdam 
(August 10-12) was overrun with enemy agents." In fact, Adams 
spent few days in Europe without voicing the fear that he was be- 
ing observed by spies. "There are Spies upon every Word I utter, 
and every Syllable I write," he informed his wife on February 20, 
1779-"Spies planted by the English-spies planted by Stock- 
jobbers-spies planted by selfish Merchants-and spies planted 
by envious and malicious  politician^."^^ (Spies, indeed, were 
swarming in the capitals of European diplomacy and finance. 
Adams's fears of them, however, were not based on deductions 
from the conduct of individuals, but were curiously generalized 
and indiscriminate. He never suspected, moreover, the duplicity 
of Edward Bancroft, the most remarkable double agent of the 
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era, and there is reason to believe that his own trusted confidant, 
Edmund Jenings, was, unbeknownst to him, a British agent.13) 
To escape the "observation of spies," Adams withdrew from the 
Arms of Amsterdam after two days and took rooms in a private 
house. But even here he was not entirely safe, for it was soon 
noised about that his lodgings were too obscure for an American 
diplomat. These complaints, he believed, were "put into cir- 
culation by English spies. " l4 
In Amsterdam, Adams set about to verify reports which had 
reached him in Paris that the United States could borrow money 
in the Netherlands. To his initial inquiries he received such opti- 
mistic replies that he wrote Congress on August 14 that he was 
sure he could obtain a loan from the Dutch. On September 16 
he received from Congress a commission to borrow money, to be 
effective until minister-designate for the Netherlands, Henry 
Laurens, arrived. He immediately sought out those people who 
had encouraged him earlier, but they changed their tune and 
now informed Adams that a loan would be difficult to negotiate 
until the States General recognized American independence." 
A loan, in other words, was as much a political question as a fi- 
nancial one. Indeed, it was altogether a political question, for, as 
Vauguyon discovered, even if the interest and principal of a loan 
to the United States were guaranteed jointly by the king of 
France and the states of Holland (thus making it absolutely 
safe), the Dutch would not touch it until it was "determined 
what characters are to bear rule and what system is to prevail. "I6 
The political system in the Netherlands in the fall of 1780 was 
in a state of fermentation. The war for American independence 
created friction between the Dutch and the British, allies for 
over a century. Britain objected to the Americans' supplying 
themselves at the Dutch West Indian island of Saint Eustatia 
and, after France entered the war in 1778, to Dutch insistence on 
furnishing her with naval stores, as the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 
1674 gave her the right to do. In the spring of 1780 the British 
denounced the treaty of 1674 and began seizing Dutch ships car- 
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rying contraband (as the British defined it) to France. The Dutch 
sought refuge from the British depredations in the Armed Neu- 
trality, the association for the protection of maritime rights, an- 
nounced by Cathirine I1 of Russia on February 28, 1780.'' In- 
vited by Catherine to join the Armed Neutrality on April 3, the 
Dutch tried for months to exact from Russia a guarantee of their 
colonial possessions as a precondition for accepting the invita- 
tion. Failing to receive the guarantee (September 1 I), the Dutch 
paused, pondered, and moved in the direction of joining the 
new league. The British, unaware, as yet, that the Armed Neu- 
trality would be an "Armed Nullity," as Catherine herself called 
it, sought desperately for a pretext to prevent the Dutch from 
putting their shipping under its protection. On September 3 the 
Royal Navy fished one out of the waters of the North Atlantic. 
Henry Laurens sailed from Philadelphia for his post in the 
Netherlands on August 13, 1780. His ship was taken by H.M.S. 
Vestal on September 3.  Laurens threw his papers into the sea, 
but some, insufficiently weighted, were retrieved by his captors. 
Among them was a "treaty," negotiated between William Lee 
and the Amsterdam merchant Jean de Neufville at Aix-la- 
Chapelle in the summer of 1778. Neither de Neufville, who was 
acting as the representative of van Berckel, pensionary of Am- 
sterdam, nor Lee had any authority to bind their respective 
countries, so that the "treaty" was merely the wishful thinking 
of two dabblers in dipl~macy.'~ The British, however, chose to 
construe it as evidence that the Dutch government was interfer- 
ing with their rebellious colonial subjects. On November 10 the 
king's ambassador at The Hague, Sir Joseph Yorke, delivered an 
indignant ultimatum to the States General, demanding that it 
disavow van Berckel and punish him in an exemplary way; other- 
wise, Yorke threatened, George I11 would "take such measures 
as he shall think the dignity and essential interests of his people 
require. "'9 Yorke's ultimatum destroyed whatever hopes Adams 
still had of borrowing money, for as he told James Warren on 
December 9 ,  no Dutchman would deal with him "lest England 
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should declare war against them for aiding, abetting and com- 
forting Rebellion. " * O  
The States General promptly disavowed van Berckel's conduct 
but refused to punish him. On November 20 it voted to accede 
unconditionally to the Armed Neutrality. On December 14 
Yorke presented a second memorial, insisting on the punish- 
ment of van Berckel. The States General went into special ses- 
sion and on December 22 referred the pensionary's problem to 
the Supreme Court of Holland. In the meantime, the British 
ministry got word of the Dutch accession to the Armed Neutrali- 
ty (December 18) and on December 20 it issued, at Saint James, 
a manifesto, reciting its grievances against the Dutch, announc- 
ing the withdrawal of Yorke from The Hague, and stating its in- 
tention "to pursue such vigorous measures as the occasion fully 
justifies." Simultaneously, an order-in-council was issued 
"authorizing reprisals against Dutch shipping and property." 
Although the manifesto of December 20 was not, technically, a 
declaration of war, the distinction was lost on Dutch shippers 
who were treated by the British as open enemie~.~ '  
The manifesto of December 20 produced what Adams de- 
scribed as a "violent shock" in the Netherlands, causing even the 
best men to "shudder with fear." "Every party, and every man 
almost," he wrote Francis Dana on January 18, 1781, "is afraid 
to do the least thing that England can complain of and make a 
noise about, lest the blame of involving the country in a war 
should be thrown upon them." In these circumstances a loan 
was out of the question, a fact that Adams stressed to Congress: 
"I have no hopes at present of obtaining money" (January 4); 
"There is as yet no possibility of borrowing any money" (Janu- 
ary 14).22 A loan would fail-that was certain; yet in February 
Adams opened one for the United States. The only person who 
would manage it was de Neufiille, already a pariah because of 
his "treaty" with Lee. De Neufville was an imprudent mer- 
chant-financier, whose affairs in 1781 already displayed the 
symptoms of distress which forced him to flee to the Duchy of 
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Cleves in 1782. A Dutch financier, one Bicker, warned Adams 
about him when he first arrived in Holland; so bad, in fact, was 
his reputation that Vergennes forbade Vauguyon to have any 
dealings with him.23 A desperate man enlisting in a desperate 
cause, de Neufville was characteristic of the handful of Dutch- 
men who associated with Adams during the period when he was 
being shunned like a "pestilence. " 
On February 19 de Neufville opened a loan for one million 
guilders. It failed abysmally; six months later three people had 
pledged three thousand guilders. What impelled Adams to try 
an experiment he knew would be futile? Apparently it was the 
Argus-eyed spies whom he believed were surrounding him. "I 
had spies enough upon me from England, France, and America 
too, very ready to impute blame to me. Congress were constantly 
drawing upon me and there was the utmost danger that their 
bills would be protested. If this event should happen, I knew 
that representations in private letters would go to America and 
to France, that this fatal calamity was wholly owing to my negli- 
gence and obstinacy in refusing to open a loan in M. de Neuf- 
ville's house." Fear of persecution, therefore, drove Adams to 
open a loan that was so clearly foredoomed that Dutch observers 
questioned his good sense. Why would anyone approve an en- 
terprise so "useless," so "extremely foolish"?24 
The British commencement of hostilities against the Nether- 
lands prompted the Dutch to appeal to Russia (January 12, 
1781), which had pledged to defend any nation attacked as a re- 
sult of its accession to the Armed Neutrality. Like most people in 
the Netherlands, Adams believed that Catherine and her allies 
would assist the Dutch. At any moment he expected to see 
"Russia, Sweden, Holland, France, Spain and America all at war 
against England at once." If he could persuade the Armed 
Neutrals, now become belligerents, to acknowledge the inde- 
pendence of the United States, not only would its dependence 
on France be lessened, but a peace negotiation might result, for 
would Britain not see the futility of continuing to repress a peo- 
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ple whose independence had been so widely re~ognized?~' 
That Adams had no powers to treat with the Armed Neutrals 
did not daunt him; he believed that his powers to negotiate a 
loan could be stretched to conduct a negotiation as promising as 
one that would enlist the Armed Neutrality on America's side. 
Accordingly, on February 2 he informed Dumas at The Hague 
that, in his opinion, the time had come to employ article 10 of 
the Franco-American alliance, which stipulated that France and 
the United States could invite other nations "who may have re- 
ceived injuries from England to make common cause with 
them." On February 5 Dumas replied that such an action would 
"embarrass" the States General; it would be better, he contin- 
ued, to suspend any overtures until the political situation be- 
came clearer. The French ambassador, Dumas added, endorsed 
his opinion. Just what Adams expected! France would oppose 
any maneuver that could lessen America's dependence on it 
and, playing Franklin's game, would attempt to deprive him of 
the opportunity, in the Netherlands as well as in France, of play- 
ing a political role. Dutch recognition of American indepen- 
dence-or, better still, the Armed Neutrality's recognition, "the 
End and Aim" of Adams's existence-would have to be gained, 
it appeared, over unyielding French o p p o s i t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Had Adams not estranged himself from Vauguyon, he would 
have known that France favored Dutch recognition of American 
independence as being in her own as well as in the United 
States' interest. Vergennes, it is true, received the news of 
Laurens's appointment to negotiate a treaty with the Dutch (No- 
vember 1, 1779) with disdain. Were the Dutch, at peace in 1779 
and 1780, to treat with Laurens, they would invite a war with 
Britain which they wished at all costs to avoid; in the count's 
eyes, therefore, Congress was foolish and irresponsible to give 
Laurens a commission for the Netherlands. But after Britain ini- 
tiated hostilities against the Dutch, Vergennes instructed 
Luzerne at Philadelphia, January 9, 1781, to recommend that 
Congress send an emissary "with full powers" to The Hague; on 
The Netherlands 
February 19 he ordered his minister to urge Congress "to prepare 
without loss of time the way for a coalition" with the Dutch and 
empowered him to say that "the King authorizes you, Monsieur, 
to offer to Congress his good offices to effect that end. "27 
Franco-American objectives in Holland were not to be accom- 
plished by high-pressure public diplomacy. This Vergennes re- 
peatedly made clear to Vauguyon. The complexities of the 
Dutch political system made The Hague a difficult assignment 
for any minister, but it was especially difficult for a minister of 
France, whose power had been in eclipse for so long in the Low 
Countries. Sent to The Hague in 1776, Vauguyon assiduously 
cultivated politicians in the so-called Patriot party, which op- 
posed the pro-British stadtholder. In time, Vauguyon acquired 
an extraordinary ascendancy over the Patriots-Bemis called him 
their "whipw-on which all observers of the Dutch scene com- 
mented. Vergennes congratulated his ambassador on "the 
popularity which you enjoy in Holland"; a British agent re- 
marked that Vauguyon held the "key to the cabinet" of Dutch 
politics; a Dutch opponent complained that Vauguyon "played 
with" his countrymen "like children." Perhaps Frederick the 
Great paid Vauguyon the highest compliment; wishing to check 
the inroads of the Patriots against the prerogatives of his 
nephew, the stadtholder, Frederick instructed his ambassador, 
Thulemeyer, to ask Vauguyon to intercede with them and re- 
strain them. 29 
Vauguyon was obliged to develop an impressive network of 
personal relationships to implement the policy of finesse and 
manipulation which Vergennes prescribed for him. French pol- 
icy in the Netherlands, Vergennes continuously stressed, was to 
be one of "circumspection."30 He meant that France was to 
make no public demands on the Dutch for their cooperation; 
rather they were to be managed so that, of their own initiative, 
they would propose policies that France wanted them to follow. 
Vauguyon was to refrain from making demands on the Dutch 
for two reasons: they would make unacceptable counterdemands 
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and they were pro-British. Having depended for so many years 
on British military protection, the Dutch, by 1778, had allowed 
their armed forces to fall into complete de~ay .~ '  This meant that 
they had no way to protect their rich colonial empire, which an 
opponent could capture as he pleased. Were France to invite the 
Dutch to become allies or to make any other move (like recog- 
nizing American independence) which would incite Britain to 
hostilities, the Dutch would require that France, in return, pro- 
tect their colonial possessions (as they insisted that Russia do as a 
precondition of their participation in the Armed Neutrality). 
Not wishing to assume such a burden, Vergennes abstained from 
requesting anything from the Dutch. 
Dutch bias toward Britain also influenced the count. The tes- 
timony on this point is overwhelming. The correspondence of 
both Adams and Vergennes is full of fears that the Dutch, as a 
result of ingrained affection for Britain, would make a humili- 
ating peace with her.32 "The utmost expectation," Adams wrote 
Robert Livingston on February 20, 1782, "that many of the well- 
intentioned have entertained, has been to prevent the govern- 
ment from joining England." Admiration for Britain produced 
suspicion of France. Wrote Benjamin Waterhouse, a member of 
the Adams household in 1781: the "character of the French poli- 
ticians was so firmly Reviled in Holland that when . . . they [the 
Dutch] were at war with England, and at peace with France their 
jealousy and dislike were stronger towards France than toward 
England."33 Attuned to the feelings of the Dutch, Vergennes 
feared that any heavy-handed pressure on them to take France's 
side against Britain would be counterproductive, would drive 
them into the arms of the British. Thus, he wrote Vauguyon on 
January 9, 1781, it was necessary to "redouble our circumspec- 
tion" lest British partisans among the Dutch "envisage our in- 
sinuations as the result of a project to engage the Republic in our 
quarrel and to aid us with its resources for the success of our 
views and thus furnish a motive to alter the confidence which 
our moderate system could not fail to inspire. "34 
The Netherfands 
Vergennes believed that American diplomacy in the Neth- 
erlands must fit into the system of circumspection. The Dutch- 
and all Europe, for that matter-regarded the United States as a 
French client, whose every move was dictated by Versailles. The 
Prussian ambassador, for example, alluding in April 1781 to 
Adams's diplomatic activities, concluded that "the minister of 
France had resumed his project to tie the Republic to the Amer- 
ican confederacy." Vauguyon knew that the United States was 
regarded as a French stalking-horse, that the Dutch would con- 
sider American diplomatic initiatives as being "excited in an un- 
derhanded way" by the French. Therefore, he believed it his 
duty, as well as in the joint interest of France and America, to 
discourage any public diplomacy by Adams which was inconsis- 
tent with his own; were Adams to flout his advice and go public, 
Vauguyon believed himself obliged to inform the Dutch that his 
conduct was repudiated by France.3' To Adams, who had delib- 
erately chosen to be uninformed about the motives of Vaugu- 
yon's diplomacy, French circumspection appeared to be anti- 
American, appeared as a refusal to support his own and his 
country's aspirations, and as confirmation, therefore, of his con- 
victions that France wished to keep America dependent by ob- 
structing a recognition of her independence by the Dutch and 
the Armed Neutrals. 
Two days after being discouraged from employing article 10 of 
the Franco-American alliance, Adams received, from Dana in 
Paris, dispatches from Congress. Among them was a letter from 
James Love11 of December 12, 1780, enclosing a resolution which 
Congress had taken that day, thanking Adams for his "indus- 
trious attention to the interest and honor of the United States" 
in his correspondence with Vergennes over the devaluation of 
American paper money. Since Adams was "prepared in my own 
mind to receive from Congress resolutions of a different na- 
ture"-"resolutions of recal or at least censure," he added later, 
"upon the petulant and groundless complaint of Vergennes," 
the commendation of December 12 was a tonic to his spirits. It 
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convinced him that, in dealing with the French foreign minister, 
he had been "possessed of the true principles of Congress" (he 
did not know that on its way from Congress was a rebuke, 
January 10, for disagreeing with Vergennes about communicat- 
ing his peace powers to the British) and enabled him to assume 
that he had congressional carte blanche to flout French advice. 
Immediately, he began to conduct a more aggressive diplo- 
macy. 36 
Among the dispatches received from Dana on February 7 ,  
1781, was a journal of Congress, containing a resolution of Octo- 
ber 5 ,  directing the American navy, in its treatment of neutral 
shipping, to adhere to the principles of the Armed Neutrality 
and authorizing American ministers abroad to subscribe to these 
principles if invited. Hoping to attract the attention of the 
Armed Neutrals, Adams immediately published the resolution 
in Cerisier's Amsterdam Gazette. From The Hague, Dumas pro- 
tested his precipitation, admonishing him that "the Ambassa- 
dor of our Ally thinks as I do. " More evidence that France meant 
to obstruct the American cause! Confirmation of Adams's con- 
victions on this point kept coming to him. The refusal of Spain 
to recognize American independence was constantly cited by the 
Dutch to justify their own reserve toward the United States. 
"The constant cry is, 'why is Spain silent? We must wait for 
Spain.' "37 Adams believed that Vergennes controlled Spanish 
diplomacy-as egregious a misconception as he ever enter- 
tained38-and that the count was restraining Spain from recog- 
nizing American independence. "I know the reason" for Span- 
ish reluctance "very well," he informed a correspondent on Feb- 
ruary 9, "but I cannot tell it." Commenting later on this letter, 
Adams remarked, "I then believed, and I still believe, that the 
policy of the Count de Vergennes, which exerted all its resources 
through the duke de la Vauguyon at the Hague, to embarrass 
me . . . was employed at Madrid through the count Montmorin 
to retard Mr. Jay, for his fundamental and universal principle 
appeared to be to keep us entirely dependent on France. "39  
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On February 25 Adams received from Congress a commission 
to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce with the Dutch gov- 
ernment and an authenticated copy of the resolution of October 
5 .  He lost no time in putting the new powers into effect. On 
March 8 he sent to Dumas at The Hague a memorial for presen- 
tation to the States General, announcing that he was the Amer- 
ican minister plenipotentiary, communicating the resolution of 
October 5 and requesting that he be allowed to subscribe to the 
Armed Neutrality. To the ministers of Russia, Sweden, and 
Denmark-Norway he sent similar communications. Finally, he 
wrote Vauguyon, asking his 
Adams chose an inopportune time for his demarche. In re- 
sponse to the Dutch request for assistance of January 12, 1781, 
Russia on March 1, offered to mediate their dispute with the 
British. It was a foregone conclusion that the Dutch, who, 
Adams observed on March 12, were "furious for peace," would 
accept the mediation, which they did on March 14.41 But would 
Great Britain also accept? The surest means to dissuade her was 
to arouse her ire by bringing to her attention another example of 
Dutch dealings with her rebellious American subjects. Yet here 
came Adams, as Britain balanced the question of whether to ac- 
cept the mediation, with a proposal at least as embarrassing to 
the Dutch as the Lee-de Neufville "treaty" of 1778. Their re- 
sponse was to suppress the memorial. Dumas, who presented it 
on March 10, warned Adams "that such could well be the case, 
when England has still not given a response to the overtures of 
Russia. " Dumas, in fact, could not discover what had become of 
the memorial until the middle of April, when he was told that it 
was "laid aside subject to a new order. "42 
To Adams's request that he support his memorial, Vauguyon 
replied on March 14 by letter (the two men still had not met 
since the preceding August) that he was "persuaded, Monsieur, 
that you will perfectly feel the impossibility of seconding it with- 
out an express order of the king. "43 Vauguyon opposed Adams's 
action not only because it would embarrass the Dutch but also 
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because it threatened to jeopardize France's relations with Rus- 
sia, one of the keystones of her diplomatic system. In March 
1781 Russia was offering to mediate on two fronts: separately, 
between Britain and the Netherlands and, jointly, with Austria, 
between France and Spain on one side and Britain on the other. 
France expected Catherine I1 to favor her in the mediation with 
Britain and therefore made it a cardinal rule throughout 1781 
and 1782 not "to do anything against the views of Russia."44 
Were Adams's demarche to inflame the British and sabotage the 
Dutch mediation, Vauguyon feared that Russia would blame 
France, as patron of the Americans, and might, in a pique, re- 
fuse to support the Franco-American position in the mediation 
with the British. Therefore, Vauguyon tried to undo the damage 
of Adams's demarche, undertaking, among other things, to in- 
form Dutch officials, "I had no knowledge of it and that 
M. Adams had told me about it only after having done it. "45 
Vauguyon's opposition did not, of course, surprise Adams; 
"knowing the game of the Count de Vergennes and his ambassa- 
dor, it was," he said later, "precisely what I e ~ p e c t e d . " ~ ~  But an- 
ticipation of the rebuff did not mitigate it. By March 1781, in 
fact, Adams began to feel that the continued opposition of, 
first, Vergennes and then of Vergennes and Vauguyon in 
tandem to his efforts to play a public role was relentless and un- 
bearable. The forces arrayed against him seemed to grow satanic. 
No longer did he fear only the machinations of spies. By the 
spring of 1781 he felt that he was in danger of being "torn to 
pieces by an enraged populace," of being "hanged" by a "mob" 
manipulated by  malefactor^.^^ He even began to imagine that he 
was being "menaced" by Franklin for wishing to deploy his 
plenipotentiary powers, although the Doctor did not know that 
he had them.48 The constant frustration he had experienced 
acted, moreover, like a bellows on his anger, blowing it up to 
towering heights. A member of his household at the time mar- 
veled how he "waxed wroth" and declared that he should never 
"forget his paroxysms of patriotic rage."49 By the spring of 1781 
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Adams can best be compared to a man enduring the medieval 
English ordeal ofpezne dwe et forte, in which heavy rocks were 
piled upon a victim's chest until he confessed a crime or died. 
The pressure of the accumulated French and Franklinian enmity 
(no matter that it was delusive) had become so insufferable that 
Adams must either overcome it with an act of heroic self-asset- 
tion or be destroyed. 
Adams's assertion took the form of a second memorial to the 
States General, announcing once again that he was minister 
plenipotentiary to the Netherlands and requesting that the 
Dutch negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce with him. 
Adams worked up the new memorial with care-three drafts 
exist in his papers-because he proposed to give it the widest 
possible circulation. Having satisfied himself with it, he gave it 
to Dumas who on April 13 completed a French translation for 
presentation to the appropriate Dutch officials. Adams intended 
to go to The Hague to present the memorial in person and evi- 
dently contemplated ignoring Vauguyon, fearing that it would 
set a bad precedent to consult him. Dumas, however, urged him 
at least to acquaint Vauguyon verbally of what he proposed to 
do. Instead, Adams wrote the duke on April 16, informing him 
that he had received commissions and letters of credence to the 
Dutch but saying nothing more. Vauguyon responded the next 
day, professing ignorance of whether Adams intended to make a 
public demarche but requesting a conference with him if he 
did.50 On April 19, the anniversary of Lexington and Concord, 
Adams signed the memorial and went to the French embassy at 
The Hague, where for two hours Vauguyon attempted to talk 
him out of presenting it. At eight o'clock the next morning, the 
duke appeared at Adams's hotel and for four more hours rea- 
soned, cajoled, and pleaded with him to reconsider his plans." 
But to no avail. In the spirit of the Massaschusetts militia at Lex- 
ington, Adams was determined to conquer or die. 
What did the two men say on April 19-20? For the most part, 
they seemed to have talked past each other. Believing that his 
90 
John Adams 
"whole system in Holland, and even my residence in it, was dis- 
agreeable" to the French, supposing, moreover, that Vauguyon 
"had instructions from the Count [de Vergennes] to counteract 
me," Adarns regarded Vauguyon's learned disquisitions on the 
diplomatic realities as "mere pretexts" to cover French hostility 
to him and did not heed them.'2 
For his part, Adam did not divulge to Vauguyon his reasons 
for presenting the memorial. "I saw myself ill-treated and perse- 
cuted by a set," he explained confidentially to Lovell. "I own I 
seized with pleasure, so fair, so great an opportunity, of giving 
to my own character a reputation and publicity, which should 
place it out of the reach of all the little shafts of malice, envy, 
and revenge." Nor did Adams mention the hostile mobs from 
whose aggressions he believed the memorial would protect him. 
He should, he assured Robert Livingston in February 1782, have 
"met with many disagreeable scenes, if not public affronts" had 
he not acted. His "openness" had protected him. "No one 
would dare offer any insult to her [America's] minister, as soon 
as he should be known." Refusing to reveal these, his real mo- 
tives, what Adams told Vauguyon to justify his actions struck the 
duke as "very vague reasonings which do not appear to have any 
foundation. "I3 
Trying as the interviews with Vauguyon were, Adam kept his 
temper. And no matter how hard the duke pressed him, his 
resolution never flagged. The conclusion of the interview was 
dramatic: 
At last, when he [Vauguyon] found I was not convinced, 
he desired me to postpone my visit to the president of 
their High Mightinesses, until he could write to the 
Count de Vergennes, and have his opinion. I answered, 
by no means. Why? Because I know beforehand the 
Count's opinion will be point blank against me; and 
I had rather proceed against his judgement, without 
officially knowing his opinion, than with it, as I am 
determined in all events to go. The Duke had one re- 
source still left. It was, to persuade me to join him in 
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writing, or let him alone write a request to the King of 
France, that he would order his ambassadors to unite 
with me in my endeavors to obtain an acknowledgment 
of my public character. I answered again, by no means. 
"Why?" "Because, Monsieur le Duc, if I must speak out 
in plain English or plain French, I know the decision of 
the King's council will be directly and decidedly against 
me; and I am decidedly determined to go to the presi- 
dent, though I had a resolution of the King in council 
against me and before my eyes. . . ." "Are you willing 
to be responsible, then?" "Indeed, I am; and upon my 
head may all the consequences of it rest." "Are you 
then determined?" "Determined, and unalterably 
determined I am. "54 
Adams had not planned to present his memorial immediately 
after consulting Vauguyon. He intended to wait until May 4, 
1781, the date on which the assembly of the most influential 
Dutch province, Holland, met, concurrently with the States 
General, at The Hague. In the fortnight between April 20 and 
May 4 the emotional strain of the confrontation with Vauguyon 
began to tell on Adams. He evidently began to have second 
thoughts about the rectitude of the action he proposed to take. 
Vauguyon's arguments against it kept recurring, especially his 
statement, backed by the weight of his wide connections in the 
Netherlands, that those "patriots whose zeal for the American 
cause ought to be known to him [Adams] . . . have strongly as- 
sured him [Vauguyon] that they were unanimously of the same 
opinion as I." Adams later told Robert Livingston that he had 
"the Secret advice of our best friends in the republic" to present 
the memorial, but he must have realized that his advisers were 
hardly more than a conventicle of the radical fringe in Dutch 
politics. Consequently, the Adams who presented the memorial 
on May 4, 1781, was a picture, not of intrepid energy but of 
emotional turmoil. The American physician Benjamin Water- 
house, who lived in his household at the time. described how 
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Adams "had hardly spoken to us for days before-such was his 
inexpressible solicitude," that leaving the house "with protuber- 
ant eyes and holding his memorial in his hands," he "said to us, 
in a solemn tone-Young men! remember this day-for this day 
I go to the Hague to put seed in the ground that may produce 
Good or Evil-God knows which-and putting the paper in- 
to his side-pocket, he stepped into his coach, and drove off 
alone. " " 
At The Hague Adams attempted to present his memorial to 
the grand pensionary of Holland, van Bleiswyck, to the presi- 
dent of the States General, Linden de Hemmen, and to the sec- 
retary of the Prince of Orange, Baron de Ray. None of these wor- 
thies would receive it, although the president of the States 
promised to communicate the nature of his visit to his col- 
leagues. Adams then turned to the printing presses. Thousands 
of copies of the memorial were issued in English, French, and 
Dutch. One was sent to "every member of the constitutional 
sovereignty in all the Provinces-a total of between four and five 
thousand persons. "16 Copies were lavished on Dutch newspaper- 
men as well. 
What was the impact of the memorial? Adams took two some- 
what contradictory views. On the one hand, he argued that the 
fervor of Vauguyon's opposition to it proved its significance. 
"The earnest opposition made by the Duc de la Vauguyon," he 
wrote some months later, "only served to give me a more full 
and ample persuasion and assurance of the utility and necessity 
of the measure," i.e., of presenting the memorial. Thus, he ar- 
gued, it was altogether possible that his memorial had produced 
the Dutch naval victory over the British at the Doggersbank in 
the North Sea in August 1781, that it had encouraged Emperor 
Joseph I1 of Austria to declare religious liberty in his dominions, 
and that it had insured the success ofJohn Laurens's special mis- 
sion to France in the spring of 1781. "I shall forever believe that 
it contributed to second and accelerate Colonel Laurens' 
negotiation," he wrote.17 The fact was that the loan "obtained" 
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by Laurens had been promised to Franklin by Vergennes well 
before the colonel arrived in France in March 178 1 two months 
before Adams presented his memorial. His other claims on the 
memorial's behalf were even more farfetched. 
At other times, however, Adams took a more modest view of 
the memorial. During his Dutch mission and for some time 
thereafter he adopted the view that no American diplomatic 
demarche could injure the country's interest, since it could never 
be worse off than it was-unrecognized and unsupported by all 
save France. His motto was: try the experiment, we have nothing 
to lose. As he expressed it when opening the futile loan in Feb- 
ruary 1781: "I thought it my duty, therefore, to try the experi- 
ment, It could do no harm; for we certainly had at that moment 
no credit to lose." Adams, therefore, could claim that if the me- 
morial of May 4 had done no good-and this was the opinion of 
Dumas-it had, nevertheless, "certainly done no harm. "'"ut 
here, because of his ignorance of the Dutch political scene, he 
was mistaken. His memorial was profoundly mischievous. It was 
because the experienced Vauguyon immediately perceived this 
that he made such extraordinary exertions to talk Adams out of 
presenting it. 
The times were even less propitious for the presentation of the 
May 4 memorial than they had been for the March 8 memorial. 
Britain had refused the Russian offer to mediate her dispute with 
the Dutch, presenting Catherine with the choice of defending 
the Dutch or abandoning them. Since the empress had never in- 
tended to permit the Armed Neutrality to drag her into a war 
with Britain, she decided, March 30, to let the Dutch shift for 
themselves. Of this decision neither the Dutch nor the British 
were informed until mid-May, but by late April Dutch officials 
began to sense that their cause was in trouble at Saint Peters- 
The last thing they wanted, therefore, was an episode 
that would give Catherine a pretext for abandoning them. But 
this was precisely what Adams's memorial would furnish the 
czarina. It would make the Dutch appear, not as innocent neu- 
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trals pillaged by Britain but as determined enemies of George 
111, unable to refrain from treating with his rebel subjects. 
Adams's memorial, in other words, would lend a color of truth 
to the British claim that they had attacked the Dutch because of 
their settled hostility toward them. Consequently, it might allow 
Russia to elude her obligations to the Dutch under the Armed 
Neutrality. 
But the memorial would do more. It would incense the Brit- 
ish, who had never looked kindly on the sojourns of Adams and 
other Americans in the Netherlands. The Dutch, in their view, 
were giving aid and comfort to traitors; consequently, they peri- 
odically demanded that they cease harboring "the rebel subjects 
of his Majesty. "61 Therefore, the appearance of Adams in May at 
the seat of the Dutch government in the posture of a negotiator 
from a sovereign power was certain to inflame the British and 
make them implacable against the Dutch. 
Adams's memorial, Vauguyon and Vergennes reasoned, would 
alienate the potential protector of the Dutch, Russia, while kin- 
dling the fury of Britain against them. For protection, they 
would have to turn to Louis XVI. Far from welcoming such a 
prospect, the French feared that the Dutch would conclude that, 
using Adams as their catspaw, they had intended to contrive just 
such a development. Would the Dutch, then, not recoil from 
such manipulation and let their inclinations lead them into the 
British camp? "If Holland should join England in the war, it will 
be unfortunate," Vauguyon warned Adams in the interviews of 
April 19 and 20.62 TO prevent a development so damaging to the 
interests of France and America, Vauguyon felt obliged to dis- 
avow Adams's actions, to convince the Dutch that he had not 
artfully inspired it. "I have thought," he reported to Vergennes 
on May 11, "to convince the preponderant members of the Re- 
public that it had not been concerted with the ministers of the 
King and I have left no doubt in that regard. "63 
Vauguyon realized that his disavowal of Adams's memorial 
would hurt allied interests in the Netherlands. Word of his ac- 
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tion soon leaked out. A Dutch informant of the British minisuy 
reported on May 11, for example, that "the Ambassador of 
France disavows having had any notion of Adams's demarche 
and that he regards it as premature"; ten days later the same 
source reported that Vauguyon was declining to support the me- 
morial "almost with affe~tation."~~ The impact of Vauguyon's 
repudiation of Adams was damaging because it appeared to con- 
firm reports reaching Dutch officials from their ambassador in 
Paris that in the proposed Austrian-Russian mediation France 
had decided to forsake its commitment to the recognition of 
American independen~e.~' Vauguyon's action, in other words, 
seemed to indicate that France was preparing to sacrifice the 
United States and end the war. Amsterdam, the center of pro- 
French, pro-American sentiment in the Netherlands, was dis- 
mayed by the turn of events: "The insurgents at Amsterdam," 
wrote a British sympathizer, "are intensely discouraged and 
pained."" Abandoned by Russia and concluding that France 
was in the process of disencumbering herself of the United States 
to make peace, the Dutch in the summer of 1781, at the initia- 
tive of Joachirn Rendorp, burgomaster of Amsterdam, and 
other hitherto pro-French Amsterdam officials, opened negotia- 
tions with the British, through secret service agent Paul Went- 
worth and the Sardinian ambassador, for a separate peace. Of 
these negotiations and of his role in encouraging them Adams 
was never aware. On the contrary, he congratulated himself that 
"nothing but the memorial of April 19, 178 1 . . . could ever 
have prevented this republic from making a separate peace with 
England. "67 
There were two more damaging consequences of Adams's me- 
morial. In the interviews of April 19-20 Vauguyon had warned 
Adams of the harm the memorial would do to a loan France was 
trying to negotiate for the United States.68 The ten million livres 
that the French had promised Franklin-and confirmed to 
Laurens in the spring of 1781-they proposed to obtain by bor- 
rowing in Holland. The loan was to be opened, Vergennes in- 
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suucted Vauguyon on April 13, 178 1, in the name of the United 
States, with Louis XVI guaranteeing the principal and intere~t.~' 
But who would subscribe to a loan if the guarantor repudiated 
the minister of the borrower? No one, of course. France was fi- 
nally obliged to change the plan of the loan and borrow in her 
own name with the guarantee of the States General. The money 
was not obtained until December 1781.j0 Finally, Vauguyon's 
disavowal of Adams was duly reported to Britain and undoubt- 
edly encouraged the ministry and stiffened its opposition to the 
United States, now that it appeared, in Holland at least, to be in 
the way of being abandoned by its ally. 
The Austrian-Russian mediation, which during the first half 
of 1781 had occupied the attention and speculation of all 
Europe, began to look as though it might at last materialize in 
May 178 1. Accordingly, on May 3 1 Vergennes wrote the French 
charge d'affaires at The Hague, Berenger (Vauguyon being on 
leave), instructing him to inform Adams "that the interests of 
the United States demand his presence here [at Paris]." Berenger 
sent the message to Adams at Amsterdam, but Adams refused to 
leave until the French gave him more inf~rmat ion .~~ Toward the 
end of June, Vauguyon returned to The Hague, summoned 
Adams from Amsterdam, and told him that Vergennes wanted 
to speak to him about peace negotiations. Straightaway Adams 
left for Paris, arriving there on July 6. 
On July 11 Vergennes revealed to him the propositions of the 
mediators, as they related to the United States: the gist of their 
proposals was that the United States and Britain negotiate sep- 
arately at the mediation without any preconditions about their 
respective status. In the exchanges with Vergennes and with 
Congress which followed the disclosure of the mediators' posi- 
tion, Richard Morris has noted a "strange inconsistency" in 
Adams's conduct.j2 In fact, he conducted himself erratically, 
suggesting that the tension of dealing with Vergennes, the strain 
of the confrontation with Vauguyon, and the relentless pressure 
of the persecution he had been experiencing had begun to tell 
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on him. Adams first took the position that the mediators must 
recognize American independence but that Britain need not. 
Then he shifted his ground and informed Vergennes (July 16) 
that neither the mediators nor Great Britain need recognize 
American independence in advance of a conference. Then he 
shifted again (July 19) and insisted that both Britain and the 
mediators recognize American independence in advance.'3 
Evidently perplexed, Vergennes was circumspect in answering 
Adams's contradictory communications. As a result, Adams as- 
sumed that the count was affecting an air of "impenetrable mys- 
tery," which lessened his confidence in him even more, if that 
were p~ssible.'~ Confessing that the correspondence with Ver- 
gennes over the proposed mediation gave him "many anxious 
hours," Adams departed Paris on July 23 and returned to Am- 
sterdam, where he was once more out of the count's reach." In a 
characteristic sally, Adams later claimed that his exchanges with 
Vergennes had "defeated the profound and magnificent project 
of a congress at Vienna for the purpose of chicaning the United 
States out of their independence." As Bemis has pointed out, 
however, it was the obstinacy of George I11 which defeated the 
mediation, the British having rejected the mediators' terms on 
June 14, 1781, three weeks before Adams arrived in Paris to con- 
fer with Vergennes. 76 
Back in Amsterdam, Adams's world began to collapse. In the 
middle of August, he received a letter from Franklin at Paris, 
dated August 6, informing him, "I do not think we can depend 
on receiving any more Money here applicable to the Support of 
Congress Ministers." Franklin meant that he suspected that 
France was about to change her disbursing procedures and send 
her assistance directly to the Continental Congress at Philadel- 
phia rather than funnel it through the American minister at 
Paris. Adams, however, jumped to the conclusion that the long- 
dreaded plot to starve him out had begun. On August 16 Frank- 
lin sent him dispatches from Congress containing the news that 
on June 13 and 14, he, Jay, Jefferson, and Laurens had been 
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joined with him as peace  negotiator^.^' The full dimensions of 
the plot were now clear! Having insinuated himself into the new 
commission, Franklin would starve him out of it and make the 
peace himself. Adams received Franklin's letter on the evening 
of August 24. The jaws of a vice, it appeared, were closing on 
him. The next day Adams answered the letter and then suffered 
what a recent biographer has called "the most severe breakdown 
of his life. " 7 8  
Eighteenth-century medical terminology does not translate 
exactly into twentieth-century language. That Adams repeatedly 
described his illness as a "nervous Fever" does not mean that it 
was a psychological affliction. But since he himself attributed it 
to anxiety and since its precipitant was clearly psychogenic-the 
apparent crystallization of the "plot" to oust him from the peace 
commission-it seems safe to conclude that in August 1781 he 
did suffer a major nervous breakdown, accompanied by consid- 
erable somatic distress. Of the severity of the illness there can be 
no doubt. Adams claimed that it brought him to the "Gate of 
Death," that for "five or six days I was lost, and so insensible to 
the Operations of the Physicians and surgeons, as to have lost the 
memory of them." He was "still feeble" a year later, he com- 
plained. '9 
Because Adams's illness put a stop to his correspondence, we 
do not know when he learned the identity of those in Congress 
who had been responsible for the revision of his peace commis- 
sion. By October 15 he knew that Congress had dropped the 
other shoe, by revoking (July 12) his commission to negotiate a 
commercial treaty with Britain, but precisely how or when he 
discovered this is not clear. The revision of Adams's peace com- 
mission came about in this manner. After his epistolatory slug- 
fest with Vergennes in July 1780, the count sent Luzerne, 
August 7, a r6umE of Adams's "offenses" to enable "the am- 
bassador to have him recalled. " Not until March 1781, however, 
did Vergennes learn that his dispatches had miscarried and by 
that time he had concluded that Congress would not, in any 
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case, recall Adams. Accordingly, Vergennes changed his strat- 
egy, instructing Luzerne on February 19, 1781, to persuade Con- 
gress to give him "a colleague capable of containing him" and 
on March 9 and April 19 to have Congress give Adams insuuc- 
tions which would "render us the masters of his conduct."80 
Having gained an exuaordinary ascendancy over Congress, 
Luzerne produced the results that Vergennes required: on June 
13-14 Congress expanded the peace commission to five and on 
June 15 it drafted the famous instructions ordering the commis- 
sioners to consult with the French ministry and "ultimately to 
govern" themselves by its advice.81 
Adams's friends promptly wrote him of the French initiative 
in altering the peace commission. Vergennes, Love11 wrote on 
June 21, "suongly pressed" for the change.82 Franklin's role in 
the proceedings was also reported to him. On July 3 1, 1780, Ver- 
gennes had turned his correspondence with Adams over to 
Franklin and requested the Doctor, in an official letter, to trans- 
mit it to Congress, so that it could judge whether Adams was 
"endowed . . . with that conciliatory spirit which is necessary 
for the important and delicate business with which he is in- 
trusted."83 Franklin complied with Vergennes' request and on 
August 9 wrote Congress a commentary on Adams's difficulties 
with the count. He felt obliged to do so because Vergennes ap- 
peared "much offended" with Adams and, as American repre- 
sentative to France, it was his duty to interpret the count's indig- 
nation for Congress. For a man whose ministerial domain Adams 
had repeatedly invaded, Franklin managed to be objective, stat- 
ing dispassionately the difference between his and Adams's dip- 
lomatic styles-"It is my Intention . . . to procure what Ad- 
vantages I can for our Country, by endeavouring to please this 
Court"; "Mr. Adams . . . seems to think a little apparent Stout- 
ness, and a greater air of Independence and Boldness in our De- 
mands, will procure us more ample Assistancew-and defending 
Adams as a man "who means our Welfare and Interests as much 
as I, or any Man, can do." Indeed, Franklin was quite solicitous 
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about Adams, informing him, in October 1780, that he had, at 
Vergennes's request, transmitted his offending letters to Con- 
gress and inviting him "to write something for effacing the Im- 
pression made by them," an invitation that Adams ignored.$* 
In the course of the congressional debate about restructuring 
the peace commission, Vergennes's letter to Franklin of July 31 
and Franklin's to Congress of August 9 became objects of con- 
sideration. Copies of the letters were transmitted to Adarns, who 
received Franklin's at least by December 2 ,  1781, probably 
much earlier.$' The interpretation that Adams gave Franklin's 
letter was predictable: it was an "assassination upon my Charac- 
ter," produced by "base Jealousy" and "sordid Envy." "Jealousy 
and envy," Adams asserted, "engender[ed] malice and re- 
venge," which would only cease when Franklin obtained his 
long standing goal of driving him out of Europe.86 If the revision 
of the peace commission had a positive aspect for Adams, it was 
this: he now had what he considered to be incontestable 
"proof," in the form of copies of Franklin's and Vergennes's let- 
ters, that the two were conspiring to persecute him. 
As Adarns pulled out of the depths of his breakdown, he 
began to confront some of the problems that had overtaken him. 
Writing Franklin on October 4,  1781, he declared, "If you re- 
fuse to pay my subsistence, I shall have no recourse but to return 
to America." "The moment you take the resolution to refuse 
payment of my salary" would you "apply to his excellency the 
Marquis De Castries and ask the favor of a passage for me, on 
board the first king's ship to America?" Otherwise, Adams must 
take his chances aboard a merchantman. "It would be a gloomy 
lot to me," he continued, "to be taken prisoner by the English. 
They would treat me with a contempt and insolence, beyond any 
which they have yet marked to any of their prisoners. They have 
ancient as well as modern grudges against me, which every body 
in the world does not know or suspect as yet. " But, Adams con- 
cluded, "I had infinitely rather suffer the consequences of their 
malice and revenge and lie in the Tower or in Newgate, weak, 
- --- 
The NetherLana5 
infirm or sick as I am" than go around Holland begging for sub- 
sistence. A bit more reflection convinced Adams that he should 
ask Congress for his recall, which he did on October 15 But he 
finally decided to put the best face he could on affairs and stay 
on a while in the Netherlands, reduced though he was "to a mis- 
erable state of health by anxiety of mind . . . menaced with an 
axe and hurdle in London, threatened with starvation from 
Passy; and having frequently suggested to my recollection, the 
butcher's knife, with which the De Witts had been cut up at the 
Hague. "as 
C H A P T E R  5 
D U T C H  R E C O G N I T I O N  
In the fall of 1781 changes occurred in Dutch politics. On Sep- 
tember 7 ,  1781, the British cabinet accepted a new Russian offer 
to mediate the conflict with the Netherlands. Galitzin, the Rus- 
sian ambassador at The Hague, announced the British decision 
to the States General on November 9. "A new order of things 
had developed," Vauguyon declared, for whether by accident or 
design the alteration in British policy coincided with a signif- 
icant realignment of Dutch political forces. From the beginning 
of Anglo-Dutch hostilities Amsterdam had been the soul of the 
struggle against Great Britain. But in the fall of 1781 what Vau- 
guyon described as a "great number" of Amsterdam magis- 
trates, led by the burgomaster Rendorp, who had conducted the 
secret peace negotiations with Britain in July and August, sought 
a reconciliation with the stadtholder and his party.' The rap- 
prochement of "Messers d'Amsterdam" with the passionately 
pro-British stadtholder, at the moment Britain accepted the Rus- 
sian mediation, alarmed Vergennes. Were the Dutch about to 
conclude a dishonorable peace with Britain at France's e~pense?~  
Even if they refused to appease the British, the Dutch, by con- 
cluding a precipitate peace, would damage France. The arrival in 
Europe at the end of November 1781 of the news of the decisive 
Franco-American victory at Yorktown opened the prospect that 
Britain might be compelled to sue for peace. It was in France's 
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interest that a peace negotiation be general-that all the en- 
emies of Britain negotiate with her concurrently. Vergennes 
feared that the British might try for quick settlements with the 
Netherlands and the United States-North and Fox explored 
these avenues in March and April 17823-in order to intensify 
the war against France to obtain better terms from her. There- 
fore, he ordered Vauguyon to exert himself to prevent the Dutch 
from concluding a separate peace with the British; "the French 
Ambassador," reported a British emissary in Holland, "was 
sedulous to retard the negotiation of Peace. "4 
Also opposed to composing the quarrel with Britain were the 
former associates of Amsterdam in the anti-British opposition; 
led by the magistrates of Dort, they found their strength in the 
smaller cities of Holland such as Leyden, Haerlem, and Alcmaer, 
and in the province of Frie~land.~ These men wanted to reform 
the Dutch government by increasing the power of the people at 
the expense of the power of the stadtholder. Their cause flour- 
ished as long as the high-handed hostility of Britain discredited 
the stadtholder and his supporters. They feared, however, that if 
the stadtholder and his new allies at Amsterdam succeeded in 
negotiating an honorable peace with Britain, the old oligarchy 
would regain its credit and the possibility of democratic reform 
would di~appear.~ Therefore, the "zealous patriots," as Vaugu- 
yon called them, shared the interest of France in preventing a 
Dutch-British rapprochement and joined with Vauguyon to ob- 
suuct it. 
What was the best means to keep the Dutch and British apart? 
An offensive and defensive alliance with France would do it, but 
although many zealous pauiots urged the conclusion of such a 
compact, the majority preferred something short of binding ties 
to Louis XW. France, moreover, did not want to be bound by an 
alliance with the Dutch. But what if the Dutch recognized 
American independence? Such an act would bind no one in an 
unwanted alliance, yet it would exasperate Britain to a degree 
that would destroy any possibility of an accommodation with the 
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Netherlands. It would "have the essential effect in their [the 
zealous patriots'] eyes of rendering impossible the rapproche- 
ment of the Republic and England." It would, declared Vaugu- 
yon, be "the surest means of breaking forever the ties between 
the Republic and England."' Therefore, in the aftermath of 
British acceptance of Russian mediation, Vauguyon and the 
Dutch patriot faction, for reasons having nothing to do with 
Adams's efforts in the Netherlands, vigorously pursued the goal 
of procuring a Dutch recognition of American independence. 
In the middle of December 1781, for example, the "most 
zealous members of several provinces came to explain them- 
selves" to Vauguyon "in a manner the most energetic on the ne- 
cessity of a union with the 13 United States of America." Per- 
plexed about how to bring the American question into the pub- 
lic eye, Vauguyon's visitors accepted his suggestion that the 
corpse of Adams's memorial of May 4, 1781, lying lifeless in a 
clerk's office at The Hague, be revived. Adams, the duke ad- 
vised, should be encouraged to go to the States General and 
"demand of the president of the week if the mimoire which he 
had previously submitted . . . had been the object of their de- 
liberations and to press them to give him a response. w s  The zeal- 
ous patriots agreed, invited Adams to The Hague, and urged 
him to take the step. Vauguyon went to Amsterdam, where he 
pressed the same action on Adams. "He thinks," Adams re- 
ported to Congress, "that I may now assume a higher tone, 
which the late Cornwallizatzon will well warrant." Accordingly, 
on January 9,1782, Adams went to the president and demanded 
a categorical answer about the fate of his memorial of May 4, 
1781.' What, he asked, had the States General done about his 
request that it conclude a treaty of amity and commerce with the 
United States? The president reported Adams's inquiry to the 
States General, thus bringing the question of relations with the 
United States before that body and enabling members from in- 
dividual provinces to refer it back to their constituents. In this 
way was the possibility of recognizing American independence, 
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at the beginning of 1782, made a subject of political debate in 
the public forums of the Netherlands. 
British peace initiatives soon prompted the proponents of 
American independence to redouble their efforts. In response to 
the "earnest sollicitation" of Rendorp and his Amsterdam col- 
leagues in December 1781 and pursuant to Britain's own desires 
for a "cordial Reconciliation" with the Dutch, the British min- 
istry in January 1782 dispatched Paul Wentworth, who had con- 
ferred confidentially with Rendorp in the summer of 1781, to 
the Netherlands to conduct another secret negotiation. Went- 
worth's "ostensible commissionn-his cover, as Lord Stormont 
called it-was to negotiate an exchange of prisoners. His real 
mission was "to endeavor to preparer les Voies by settling such 
Preliminaries as may form the Basis of a Definitive Treaty, to be 
concluded . . . under the Mediation of the Empress of Russia." 
Wentworth arrived at The Hague on February 1, 1782, and im- 
mediately began negotiations with van der Hoop, an official of 
the Amsterdam Admiralty, who had been selected to conduct 
the secret talks by the stadtholder, the grand pensionary of Hol- 
land, and Rendorp, by the leaders, in other words, of the 
Orangist-Amsterdam coalition. Vauguyon, who returned to the 
Netherlands on February 6 after a seven-week stay in France, was 
immediately informed of Wentworth's mission and mobilized 
his resources to counteract it.1° 
In the diplomatic duel that followed, conducted largely out of 
the public eye, Vauguyon held all the cards. When Britain com- 
menced hostilities against the Dutch in December 1780, the de- 
crepitude of the Dutch military establishment forced the Dutch 
East India Company to seek French protection. In the spring of 
1781 France began convoying the company's ships. By the time 
Wentworth arrived in Holland France had, moreover, sent 2,000 
men to protect the East India Company's valuable colony at the 
Cape of Good Hope and 1,200 men to Ceylon. These arrange- 
ments, Rendorp remarked to Wentworth, made the East India 
Company "more dependent on France than on Holland." But 
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Dutch obligations to France did not stop here. Between Novem- 
ber 1781 and January 1782 France captured from the British the 
Dutch colonies of Saint Eustatia, Demarara, and Essequibo; she 
would restore them, it was presumed, at the end of the war if the 
Dutch continued to act in a friendly manner. Finally, the Dutch 
land forces, which had not escaped the decay of the country's 
military establishment, could offer no resistance to an invading 
French army. "They are in bodily fear of a hundred thousand 
men from France," Adams declared. France had, Vauguyon 
boasted to Vergennes, "the means on all sides to annihilate the 
republic" and, although the duke did not try to arouse Dutch 
fears, everyone in the Netherlands was aware of his country's 
vulnerability. We are "at the Mercy of France," van der Hoop 
confessed to Wentworth." 
Having accurately assessed their situation, the Dutch, as van 
der Hoop admitted to Wentworth, knew that "it was out of their 
Power to make a peace which should not have . . . the approba- 
tion of France." On February 18 van der Hoop sought Vaugu- 
yon's blessing for negotiations with the British, assuming, he 
informed the duke, that France "would see without pain the Re- 
public terminate the war by obtaining recognition the most un- 
limited of their neutral rights. " l2 
By insisting on "unlimited" rights, the Dutch assured the fail- 
ure of the negotiation with Wentworth, for he had been in- 
structed to insist, as a sine qua non, on a revision of the treaty of 
1674 to prevent future Dutch carriage of naval stores to France in 
wartime. Not being privy to Wentworth's instructions, Vaugu- 
yon did not know that there were irreconcilable differences over 
what Stormont called the "perpetual stumbling Block" of the 
carriage of naval stores in wartime. Rather, Vauguyon feared 
that Britain might make peace by capitulating to Dutch de- 
mands.13 The duke, therefore, sought to prevent an accommo- 
dation-by precipitating, if possible, a Dutch recognition of 
American independence. To this end, Vauguyon and his allies, 
the zealous patriots, bent their efforts in February 1782. 
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Vauguyon had extended his relations in the Netherlands as 
widely as possible, he reported to Vergennes on December 11, 
1781; he had "intimate liaisons with several magistrates of the 
different cities of Holland as well as with several members of the 
provinces. " He now mobilized his supporters across the country, 
causing van der Hoop to complain to Wentworth, February 23, 
1782, about the "Spirit of the People" having "become turbu- 
lent by the Machinations of the French Ambassador and adher- 
ents of the French Interest." The fitstfruits of these " machina- 
tions" were in Friesland, long a hotbed of French influence. On 
February 26 Friesland became, as Adams put it, "the second sov- 
ereign state in Europe" to acknowledge American indepen- 
dence.'* At the same time the province of Holland began moving 
toward a recognition of American independence. On February 
22 it considered Adams's demand ofJanuary 9 and the next day 
adjourned until March 6, charging its members to examine 
Adams's demand and "to return . . . with their opinions on the 
subject. "'j To rally public opinion and put pressure on the pro- 
vincial delegates, the zealous patriots in the various cities of Hol- 
land prepared petitions in support of American independence 
and encouraged merchants to sign them. Throughout the prov- 
ince and in Amsterdam itself merchants presented themselves 
"in crowds" to subscribe their names. l6 
The warming of Amsterdam to American independence was 
the result of an impasse in negotiations with Wentworth. By 
mid-March it was apparent to Rendorp and his associates that an 
agreement was impossible; on March 12, therefore, van 
Bleiswyck, the grand pensionary of Holland, presented Went- 
worth an ultimatum, demanding that he accede to Dutch terms 
or return to England. Wentworth attempted to spin negotiations 
out, but on March 18, at a secret, "extraordinary Town Council" 
meeting in Amsterdam, a resolution was passed, recognizing 
American independence. Wentworth's presence in the Nether- 
lands was now untenable and he left the country on March 21, 
signaling the victory of France and her Dutch adherents over 
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those of their countrymen who wanted a reconciliation with 
Britain. l7  
Since the other cities in Holland were ardently pro-French, 
pro-American independence, the decision of Amsterdam to join 
them meant that recognition of the United States by the prov- 
ince was assured. On March 28 Holland voted without dissent 
for recognition. "The unanimous desire of the province of Hol- 
land so energetically pronounced," Vauguyon wrote Vergennes 
on March 29, "has entirely established the national senti- 
ment."I8 The duke was correct, for the remaining provinces of 
the confederation quickly fell in behind Holland and Friesland, 
to whom they had agreed to defer, as being the leading mari- 
time provinces and, hence, as Guelderland put it, "the most in- 
terested in the decision in that affair. " ' 9  During the first part of 
April the provinces recognized American independence one 
after another. On April 19 the States General officially declared 
that, since all seven provinces had consented, the United States 
of America was acknowledged to be a sovereign nation and that 
Adams was admitted as minister plenipotentiary. Vauguyon, re- 
ported a Dutch observer, gave "a great ministerial dinner to 
celebrate the said admission, for which he had worked with zeal 
and much eagerness (beaucoup d'empressement) . ' I z0  
What was Adams's role in the rush of events leading to. the 
recognition of American independence? He can best be com- 
pared to a man on a raft, being borne toward his objective by 
powerful but imperceptible currents. Adams was deeply igno- 
rant about what was happening in Holland in the winter of 
1782. His illness was partly to blame. He was weak and lame, he 
reported on December 26, 178 1 ; his health was "precarious," he 
wrote on February 14, 1782; he was "so feeble that it fatigues me 
more to write one letter than it did ten when we were together at 
Paris, " he wrote Dana on March 15. 21 The result was that he did 
not have the energy to get around and inform himself about 
what was happening. His debility deepened the information gap 
caused by his isolation from mainstream Dutch politicians, 
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who, in the winter of 1782, were still avoiding him like a 
"pestilence. " Having shifted to a pro-British orientation, the 
Amsterdam politicians, in fact, put more distance between 
themselves and Adams than ever before. Consequently, on 
January 14, 1782, Adams made the remarkable confession that 
having lived in Amsterdam for eighteen months, he was "a 
stranger to the great city and the characters that govern it. "22 
How little Adams knew about what was going on in Holland 
in the winter of 1782 can be demonstrated by his virtual igno- 
rance of the crucial Wentworth negotiations. He knew that Am- 
sterdam had "visibly altered its sentiments" and he knew that 
some sort of "secret intrigues" were going on. Rendorp, he sus- 
pected, was involved and Dumas wrote from The Hague that 
"1'Emissaire Wentworth" was up to something. But Adams 
seems to have known nothing about Wentworth's real business, 
his only statement about him being the characteristic one that he 
had "come over to watch" him.23 
Adams knew as little about Vauguyon's activities as he did of 
Wentworth's. His estrangement from the duke continued until 
he moved to The Hague in May 1782. Some communication oc- 
curred during the crucial months of 1782, but it was minimal. 
Adams, therefore, could judge Vauguyon's activities only by 
what he saw of them in public. In 1782, however, the duke was 
deliberately keeping the lowest possible public profile, for at 
Vergennes's repeated directions he was still pursuing the policy 
of "circumspection" which he had followed since Adams had 
been in Holland. This was especially true with respect to his 
strenuous efforts to produce a Dutch acknowledgment of Amer- 
ican independence, a step fraught with danger for the Dutch 
and one that France, therefore, did not want "to impose upon 
ourselves the obligation of guaranteeing the consequences." Ac- 
cordingly, Vauguyon scrupulously refrained from publicly pres- 
suring the Dutch into supporting American independence. "I 
am so dedicated to the circumspection and reserve which you 
have recommended to me," he wrote Vergennes on March 20 
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"that whatever may be the fate of that great event the Dutch 
will never be able to attribute it to our entreat ie~."~~ Adams, 
certainly, did not attribute any Dutch actions to Vauguyon's 
entreaties. In the recognition of American independence, he 
wrote Franklin on March 26, Vauguyon had not been visible, 
had not done "any ministerial act," and therefore, concluded 
Adams, he had not done anything at 
Adarns, in fact, persisted in believing that French diplomacy 
was the principal obstacle to the American cause in the Nether- 
lands. To William Gordon on April 15, 1783, he wrote: "The 
finesse and subtilty of the 2 ministers [Vergennes and Vaugu- 
yon] were exhausted to defeat me, by disgusting and discourag- 
ing me, by Neglects, Slights, Contempts, Attacks & Maneuvers, 
& every thing but an avowed open opp~si t ion ."~~ Repeating the 
charge later, Adams claimed that "in proportion as the 
probability of my obtaining the object [recognition] so long pur- 
sued increased my disguised enemies redoubled their secret in- 
trigues . . . the comte Vergennes was certainly mortified at my 
prospects of success."27 In fact, on April 27, 1782, Vergennes 
congratulated Vauguyon on the realization of France's long- 
standing goal of a "coalition between the two republics," as he 
had described it on February 19, 1781.28 Adams's admission as 
minister plenipotentiary "could not be more important in the 
actual conjunction," Vergennes wrote, for "it is an invincible 
obstacle to the actual reconciliation of England and Holland. 
Adams's conviction of French malevolence made it easier for 
him to exaggerate the importance of his own activities, for had 
he known, or even suspected, the nature of Vauguyon's efforts 
on behalf of American independence, he would not have as- 
sumed, as he did, that Dutch recognition was entirely owing to 
his own exertions. As it was, Adams talked of "my success in 
Holland as the happiest Event, and the greatest Action of my 
Life past or future. "3O His assessment of his "success" was gener- 
ous indeed. The Dutch negotiation, he declared, "accelerated 
the peace, more than the capture of Cornwallis and his whole ar- 
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my"; it was more decisive "than any battle or siege, by land or 
Sea, during the entire war"; it "produced" the British acknowl- 
edgment of American independence and the handsome peace 
terms won at Paris in the fall of 1782. 31 
Is there any substance to these claims? No historian supports 
them. In fact, the relation of the British and Dutch recognition 
of American independence appears to be exactly the reverse of 
that described by Adams. Dutch recognition was expedited by 
the resolution passed by the British Parliament, reeling from 
Yorktown, on February 27, 1782, declaring advocates of "offen- 
sive war in America" enemies of their country and authorizing 
the king to make peace with the "revolted colonies of North 
Ameri~a."3~ Wrote Vauguyon to Vergennes on March 5: "The 
important scene which the British Parliament has offered the 
27th of last month . . . could contribute, M le Comte, to hasten 
the resolution of the States General on the recognition of Ameri- 
can independence. In effect, it has appeared to them probably 
dangerous to elude the advances of Congress in a moment when 
it seems to be regarded as independent by England itself." 
Wrote Wentworth to Stormont two days later: "The measures 
proposed by the opposition in Parliament hasten the Idea of 
American independence and induce proposals here, untho't of 
before-it may precipitate Mr. Adams' reception. " Finally, there 
is the testimony of Rendorp to Wentworth on March 22: "We 
ought always to listen to Adams to know what he proposes: your 
parliament sets us the example. "33 Dutch recognition of Ameri- 
can independence, far from precipitating a similar action by the 
British, was, in fact, produced by events in Parliament. 
Immediately after being received as minister plenipotentiary, 
Adams presented Dutch officials a project of a ueaty of amity 
and commerce. Although it soon became apparent that the 
Dutch and he agreed on the principal points of the ueaty, the 
complexities of the Dutch government, which required that pro- 
posals be filtered through several layers of officials and, in the 
case of a marine ueaty, through different boards of admiralty, 
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and the captiousness of some Dutch negotiators delayed the con- 
clusion of a treaty until October 8.34 It would not have been 
completed then had it not been for Vauguyon. "The perfection 
of that work," wrote a well-informed Dutchman "ought to be 
attributed to the care of the Duke de la Vauguyon, who in his 
daily conferences with the ministers much insisted on it. "3' 
Adams was less interested in concluding the commercial treaty 
than he was in discharging a commission that Congress had 
given him on August 16, 1781. A resolution that accompanied 
the commission explained that in response to an offer from 
France-to "the tender of [Louis XVI's] endeavors to accomplish 
a coalition between the United Provinces of the Netherlands and 
these StatesM-Adams was instructed to propose a triple alliance 
between France, the Netherlands, and the United States, includ- 
ing Spain as a fourth partner, if she wanted to j0in.3~ Since he 
believed that "a quadruple alliance for the duration of the war 
would probably soon bring it to a conclusion," Adams assigned 
top priority to negotiating it. 
The commission of August 16 demonstrates how badly Adams 
and his colleagues were often served by Congress in foreign af- 
fairs. Adams assumed that he had inspired the French demarche 
at Philadelphia which produced the commission. To Robert Liv- 
ingston on February 2 1, 1782, he explained that he had written 
Vauguyon on May 1, 1781, proposing an alliance between 
France, the Netherlands, and the United States. "The Duke," 
he continued, "transmitted the letter to the Count de Vergen- 
nes, which produced the offer to Congress from the King, to 
assist us in forming a connection with the republic."3' In fact, 
the offer of French good offices to Congress was conveyed by 
Vergennes to Luzerne in a dispatch of February 19, 1781. 38 On 
July 20 Luzerne informed a committee of Congress of France's 
willingness to promote a Dutch-American coalition. The com- 
mittee reported the minister's offer to the full Congress on July 
23, in terms which showed that it had not misunderstood its 
limits: Congress should prepare "the means of uniting the inter- 
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est of the two republicks by making proper advances to the 
States General. The minister added that he was authorized by 
the king to offer Congress his interposition for this purpose. "39 
In drafting instructions for Adams on August 16, Congress uni- 
laterally transformed France's offer of good ofices into orders to 
Adams to propose a triple alliance between France, the Nether- 
lands, and the United States. A more irresponsible mandate can 
scarcely be imagined. Nations simply do not order their repre- 
sentatives to propose alliances between other nations who have 
expressed no interest in them. 
In transmitting an account of the August 16 instructions to 
Vergennes, Luzerne admitted that he had not superintended 
their drafting with his customary vigilance: "I had no manner of 
influence on that resolution," he wrote the count. Nor did he 
deny that the instructions were "far from the overtures I had 
made to Congress." When Vergennes received the instructions, 
he was incensed by Congress's presumption in ordering Adams 
to propose an alliance between France and the Netherlands. 
Congress had been "careless," he complained; its instructions 
were, in fact, a "RCsolution dEfiante." Accordingly, he ordered 
Vauguyon to oppose any attempt Adams made to negotiate a 
triple alliance, counsel that Vauguyon, who was astonished that 
a third party would presume to "propose to the States General a 
coalition with his Majesty," did not need.*O The effect on Adams 
can easily be imagined. Each time he attempted to obey his in- 
structions (November 1781, March 1782), drawn apparently at 
France's instigation, he was rebuffed by France. Nothing could 
have been better calculated to reinforce his conviction of French 
malevolence toward the United States and toward him per- 
sonally. 
Adams's bitterness toward France revealed itself in the spring 
of 1782 by the manner in which he negotiated a loan with the 
Dutch, the States General's recognition of American indepen- 
dence having finally made overtures to the Amsterdam financial 
community feasible. Franklin and Vergennes recommended that 
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Adams open a loan with the French government's bankers in the 
Netherlands, Fizeau and Grand, one of whose partners, George 
Grand, was a close friend of Vergennes. Adams refused because 
he feared that Fizeau and Grand "would furnish Versailles and 
Passy with information of every guilder I might from time to 
time obtain; and I had seen enough of the intrigues and waste 
from that quarter, to be determined at all risques not to open a 
loan in that house singly." As if to spite the French, Adams 
opened his loan on May 1 with John Hodshon and Son, well- 
known partisans of England. That this move was ill advised 
Adams himself later admitted, for a "clamour arouse upon 
change in the city and pretty extensively in various parts of the 
republic" against Hodshon because of his rabid "Anglomania." 
Adams, it was incredulously charged, had selected a banker who 
was "an enemy to America." Consequently, on May 3 he was 
forced to suspend the loan.41 He reopened it successfully at a 
later date with a consortium of Dutch bankers. 
In the middle of June Adams again pressed Vauguyon to sup- 
port him in implementing the August 16 commission. Adams 
believed, wrote Vauguyon to Vergennes on June 17,  1782, "that 
when the treaty of commerce which he had proposed shall be 
concluded, it would be useful and even necessary for him to 
make a new demarche to the States General and invite them to 
adhere to the treaty of alliance between His Majesty and the 
United States." Rein Adams in, Vergennes instructed Vauguyon 
on June 23; let him "limit himself, for the present, to his treaty 
of commerce. "42 
Adarns approached Vauguyon again in the middle of July. 
The province of Holland was about to approve the commercial 
treaty, he declared. Therefore he concluded that the time had 
come to propose the triple alliance; since Vauguyon was "not 
positively charged to forbid him to execute his project he 
believed himself obliged to persist in it. " Vergennes now took a 
higher tone and ordered Adams, through Vauguyon, to commu- 
nicate his project to France and not proceed with it "without 
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having the sentiments of the King beforehand." On August 16 
Vauguyon reported that he believed that he had talked Adams 
out of proposing the triple alliance. A decisive interview took 
place on August 18, at which Adams agreed to submit the triple 
alliance project to Vergennes and renounce it, if the count disap- 
proved. That Vergennes would disapprove Vauguyon left 
Adams little 
August 18 was a bad day for Adams. Not only was he thwar- 
ted by the French but the shadow of Franklin fell across his 
path. On the eighteenth Adams obtained a copy of the commis- 
sion of Alleyne Fitzherbert, the British diplomat who had been 
sent to Paris to negotiate with the French. Fitzherbert's commis- 
sion contained an equivocal reference to the United States, 
which aroused Adams's fury against Franklin. Adams had 
picked up rumors of a trip to London by one of the Doctor's 
cronies, William Alexander, in which Alexander was alleged to 
have informed the British ministry that an acknowledgment of 
American independence was not a sine qua non in the peace 
negotiations which were under way in the summer of 1782. Fitz- 
herbert's commission was, in Adams's mind, the result of Alex- 
ander's trip, for which Franklin was obviously responsible. 
Far from sanctioning Alexander's mission, Franklin was barely 
aware of it.44 But Adam considered the mission as evidence that 
the Doctor was monopolizing and mismanaging the peace nego- 
tiations. He had not, he wrote Congress on April 18, "refused to 
act in the commission with him [Franklin], because I thought it 
possible that I might perhaps do some little good in it and pre- 
vent some evil. "4' But evil, evidently, was going to prevail and, 
as Adams reflected on being impeded by Vergennes and over- 
reached by Franklin, his prospects at the peace table appeared 
dim indeed. "Knowing that I should have the Count and the 
Doctor to combat almost in every step of the negotiation for 
peace," he wrote, "I thought I should be useless and my situa- 
tion very unpleasant. This prospect staggered my fortitude for a 
moment and I thought of re~igning ."~~ And, in fact, Adams did 
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offer his resignation in his letter of August 18, but, as on earlier 
occasions, he retracted it and resolved to stay on in Europe for a 
while longer. On September 28 John Jay wrote him that Britain 
had at last acknowledged American independence, by agreeing 
to treat with "the Commissioners of the United States of Amer- 
ica."*' Come to Paris and join the negotiations, Jay urged him. 
Jay's invitation was too pressing to refuse. In mid-October 
Adarns left The Hague and set off for Paris, resolved to endure 
whatever trials awaited him in the French capital. 
C H A P T E R  6 
PEACE N E G O T I A T I O N S  
Adams arrived in Paris on October 26, 1782, and prepared for 
the peace negotiations by outfitting himself, from wig to shoes, 
in French fashions and by taking a bath in the Seine. The waters 
cleansed the outer man only, however; they did not wash away 
Adams's apprehensions about Franklin and Vergennes. 
The revocation of his commission as sole peace negotiator had, 
he wrote Dana on December 14, 1781, "removed the cause of 
envy, I had like to have said, but I fear I must retract since JA 
still stands before BF in the commission." Throughout 1782 he 
was convinced that Franklin's envy was doing its dirty work. He 
assumed, he wrote Robert Livingston on February 2 1, 1782, that 
the Doctor was writing Congress, charging him with excessive 
vanity. Nor did he doubt that Franklin was deprecating his 
Dutch mission. His success in Holland would be represented as a 
"Thing of Course, and of little Consequence," he wrote his wife 
on May 14. '~ealousy is as cruel as the Grave, and Envy as spight- 
full as Hell." "The Malice with which those whom he [Franklin] 
dislikes are pursued" is incredible, Adams wrote Edmund Jen- 
ings on August 12. ' 
"Contempt and Abhorrence" for Franklin was the attitude 
Adams brought to Paris and it produced the following scene a 
few days after his arrival. Matthew Ridley, deputed by Maryland 
to borrow money in Europe, visited Adams on October 29 and 
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reminded him that courtesy required that he call on Franklin. 
"There was no necessity ," Adams exploded. "After the usage he 
had received from him he could not bear to go near him. 
. . . He said the D[octor] might come to him. I [Ridley] told 
him that . . . the last comer always paid the first visit. He re- 
plied the Dr. was to come to him. he was first in the Com- 
m[issio]n. I ask[ed] him how the D was to know he was here un- 
less he went to him. He replied that was true, he did not think of 
that and would go. Afterwards when pulling on his Coat he said 
he would not, he could not bear to go where the D. was. With 
much persuasion I got him at length to go. "2 
Adams was no better disposed toward Vergennes, smarting as 
he was from what he believed to be the count's obstructions of 
his efforts in the Netherlands. He had "ten thousand reasons," 
he wrote Livingston on September 6 ,  to believe that Vergennes 
had "not wished that we should form connections with Holland, 
even as soon as we did, or with any other power." Vergennes, 
Adams complained to Jonathan Jackson on November 17, had 
attempted to undermine him in Holland by instructing .Vaugu- 
yon "to prevent if possible our Success. . . . I declare that he did 
every Thing in his Power to prevent me." The angry exchanges 
with Vergennes in the summer of 1780 and the contentious in- 
terviews in the summer of 178 1 were still fresh in Adams's mind. 
If he called on the count, would he hear an "expostulation? a re- 
proof? an admonition? or in plain vulgar English, a Scolding?" 
To spare himself a scene, Adams avoided Vergennes. He was in 
Paris a full two weeks before the count discovered "from the Re- 
turns of the Police" that he was in town.3 
And then there was John Jay, the other principal in the nego- 
tiations with the British. Adams and Jay had been political op- 
ponents in the Continental Congress, disagreeing frequently 
and "with ardour." The two men had been, as Adams put it, 
members of "different sects." Since Jay's fellow communicants 
were Silas Deane and men of his stripe, Adams "concluded that 
Mr. Jay would concur with Dr. Franklin and make a majority 
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against me." On the other hand, Adams had received intima- 
tions in Holland that Jay was at odds with Franklin, intelligence 
that Ridley confirmed on October 2 7 .  Jay had been standing out 
against both Franklin and Vergennes, Ridley reported. "R[idley] 
is full of Js Firmness and Independence," Adams noted in his 
diary.* 
On October 28 Adams met Jay and listened for three hours to 
his "conjectures as to the views of France and Spain."' We can 
be sure that what he heard did no honor to the House of Bour- 
bon. During the summer of 1782 Jay had conducted a desultory 
negotiation with the Spanish ambassador at Versailles, the 
Count de Aranda, about the western boundary between the 
United States and Spain. Aranda had claimed most of the Old 
Northwest and Southwest for Charles 111, while Jay had doggedly 
insisted that the Mississippi River was the western boundary of 
the United States. When the negotiations reached an impasse, 
Aranda appealed to Vergennes for support. The count delegated 
his secretary, Gerard de Rayneval, to confer with Aranda, and 
together the two men concocted a scheme that would have given 
the lands south of the Ohio River to Spain, those north of it to 
Great Britaim6 Rayneval embodied these proposals in a memoir 
and presented it to Jay on September 6, taking care to preserve 
the fiction that the paper contained his personal ideas only. Four 
days later the British handed the American minister a dispatch, 
written by Luzerne's secretary, Barbe-Marbois, which argued 
that France was under no obligation to support American claims 
to fishing rights on the banks of Newfoundland. On October 24 
Rayneval treated Jay to another disquisition against the extrav- 
agance of American land claims, and contested, as had Marbois, 
the "propriety" of American fishing pretentions.' 
Jay suspected that, having found him obdurate, the French 
had carried their case against the United States directly to the 
British. Rayneval had gone off to London immediately after pre- 
senting his memoir of September 6 and Jay persuaded himself 
that he had been sent by Vergennes to tell Shelburne that France 
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did not countenance her ally's demands and that she would wel- 
come British opposition to them. Jay's conjectures about 
France's policy Adams summarized as follows: "Our Allies dont 
play us fair, he told me. They were endeavouring to deprive Us 
of the Fishery, the Western Lands, and the Navigation of the 
Mississippi. They would even bargain with the English to de- 
prive us of them. ' I 8  
Adams agreed with Jay's conclusions-we are in danger of 
being "duped out of the fishery, the Mississippi, much of the 
western lands," he informed Livingston on November 8'- 
because they fit his conviction that France was trying to keep the 
United States weak and dependent upon her. But Adams, as 
usual, misjudged what France was doing. While it was true that 
Spain's claims to the American West contravened the interests of 
the United States, France was supporting them not to injure 
America but to maintain loyalty to her Bourbon neighbor, her 
partner in the Family Compact and therefore her primary ally. 
This, however, was not the way Adams saw it. He assumed that 
France was advocating the Spanish claim "to plant the Seeds of 
Contention for a future War." "Knowing the fine Country in 
the Neighbourhood, and the rapidity with which it would fill 
with Inhabitants," France, Adams conjectured, foresaw that 
Americans would tolerate no restraints from Spain but would 
"force their way down the Mississipi and occasion another 
War . . . in which we should stand in need of France."1° If 
France's policy had actually been based on the motives Adams 
attributed to it, she would have been striving to pit her oldest 
and best ally against her newest and most uncertain one, provok- 
ing a war between the two nations in which she would support 
the United States and alienate (and possibly be at war with) her 
far more valuable friend, Spain. French policy was not, of 
course, so irrational and self-destructive. 
Adams assumed that France, by refusing to support American 
fishing claims, was attempting to embroil the United States in a 
war in another part of North America. France's position on the 
Peace Negotiztions 
fsheries-like her support of Spain's claims in the American 
West-was contrary to American interests, but it was not mali- 
cious. The Treaty of Paris of 1763 had assigned France the right 
to dry fish at Newfoundland, but the British immediately began 
encroaching on the territory reserved for the French. Violence re- 
sulted and in 1775 Britain paid France a large indemnity for as- 
saults on her fishermen. In that and the following year Vergen- 
nes negotiated strenuously with Lords Rochford and Weymouth 
for confirmation of exclusive French fshing and drying rights in 
Newfoundland." When France, therefore, pressed Britain in 
1782 for exclusive fshing rights, secured against both British 
and American encroachments, and at the same time attempted 
to dissuade the Americans from pushing their fshing claims to 
their fullest extent, she was pursuing a policy defined years ear- 
lier, not inventing means to weaken the United States. But 
Adams saw it differently. Britain might fall in with French pro- 
posals to limit American fshing rights in Newfoundland, but 
the New England fshermen, "the boldest Men alive," would 
not relinquish their hereditary haunts. In trying to keep them 
out of Newfoundland waters, the British might, Adams con- 
ceded, sink "now and then a fshing Schooner but this would 
not prevent a repetition of the crime, it would only inflame and 
irritate and inkindle a New War," in which the United States 
would be forced to depend on France.lZ 
Every move France made during the peace negotiations 
Adams interpreted as aspects of the plot to make America de- 
pendent. In a conversation of November 10, 1782, Vergennes 
sympathized with the British demand that the United States 
compensate the Tories. "All the precedents were in their favor," 
the count observed, "there never had been an example of such 
an affair terminated by treaty, but all were restored. " I 3  Why had 
France become "advocates of the Tories"? Adams knew. If rein- 
troduced into American society, the Tories "would contribute to 
perpetual alienation against England" and would be used by 
"French emissaries" to "blow up the flames of Animosity and 
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War" between Britain and America, in which the United States 
would, of course, be forced to depend upon France. 
During the peace negotiations, Britain refused to restore com- 
merce with the United States to its prewar footing. France was 
responsible for British recalcitrance, Adams believed. In causing 
the revocation of his commission to negotiate a commercial 
treaty with Britain-as Adams assumed that Vergennes had- 
the French meant "to dampen the Ardor of returning Friend- 
ship" by embroiling Britain and the United States in a commer- 
cial dispute. To advance the scheme, France had, Adams con- 
cluded, planted emissaries at the Court of St. James's who per- 
suaded the British minisuy to issue the famous order-in-council 
of July 2, 1783, excluding American shipping from British West 
Indian ports. Adams fumly believed that this celebrated mea- 
sure, which pointed a dagger at the heart of American com- 
merce, was adopted upon the "advice and desire" of France. l4 
Adams's conviction that France wanted to keep the United 
States dependent upon her proceeded inexorably from the sum- 
mer of 1780 onward, furnishing the interpretation for every 
French action he encountered. As an interpretation of specific 
actions, whether of France's failure to establish naval superiority 
on the American coastline in 1780, of France's policy toward the 
United States in the Netherlands in 178 1 and 1782, or of French 
"instigation" of the British order-in-council of July 2, 1783, it 
was always wrong. But the paradox is that if the conviction was 
wrong in its parts, it was correct overall. It was as if a column of 
errors had been added together and produced a uuth. France ac- 
tually did want to keep America dependent upon her after the 
war's end. But the means by which she aspired to do this-leav- 
ing Canada in British hands-Adams never suspected.'' 
However reached, Adams's conclusion was valuable because 
French and American interests were in conflict at many points 
during the peace negotiations of 1782 and the United States 
would have suffered had its negotiators assumed undiluted 
French benevolence toward their country. It was Samuel F. 
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Bemis's thesis that the diplomacy of the Revolution demon- 
strated how the United States obtained advantages from 
Europe's distresses. In Adams's case the United States obtained 
advantages from conclusions produced by its own servant's dis- 
tresses. 
Not the least of the advantages of Adams's suspicion of France 
was that it positioned him to join Franklin and Jay in flouting 
Congress's instruction of June 15, 1781, which enjoined the 
peace commissioners "to make the most candid and confidential 
communications upon all subjects to the ministers of our gen- 
erous ally . . . and ultimately to govern yourself by their advice 
and opinion. "I6 Jay had ignored the instruction from the begin- 
ning of the negotiations with the British. Franklin appeared 
more equivocal about disregarding it (although in fact his dis- 
obedience to it preceded Jay's). Adam's contempt for the in- 
struction-he compared it to the Declaratory Act of 1766 in the 
way that the French "had been given Jurisdiction over us in all 
cases whatsoever"-assured that the American negotiators 
would scorn it. On October 30, at the first meeting of the en- 
larged American commission with a reinforced team of British 
negotiators, Franklin pronounced its epitaph by turning to Jay 
and declaring: "I am of your Opinion and will go on with these 
Gentlemen in the Business without consulting this Court."17 
With Adams bolstering his colleagues' defiance, there was no 
chance that the American negotiators would allow themselves to 
be imposed upon by France. 
When the American commissioners met British negotiator 
Richard Oswald and his new colleague, Henry Strachey, on Oc- 
tober 30, the status of the negotiations was as follows: on Octo- 
ber 5 Jay, whom Adams later extolled as the "principal negoti- 
ator" of the peace,18 had persuaded the pliant Oswald to initial a 
set of articles that f ~ e d  the United States' southern boundary at 
"the 31"-St. Mary's River line," its western boundary at the 
Mississippi River, and its northern boundary at the so-called 
Nipissing Line (which included the southern part of the province 
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of Ontario); the boundary between Nova Scotia and Maine was 
to be referred to the adjudication of a joint commission; Ameri- 
cans were to have the "Right to take Fish of every kind on the 
Banks of Newfoundland and other places where the Inhabitants 
of both Countries used formerly . . . also to dry and Cure the 
same at the accustomed Places. " l9 No provisions were made for 
the payment of British debts that Americans had contracted 
before the war, nor were the Tories to be compensated for their 
losses. 
Jay made two concessions in negotiating these preliminaries 
that ultimately cost the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In a 
draft that he handed Oswald on October 5, he contended for the 
Saint John River as the boundary between the United States and 
Nova Scotia. When Oswald objected, Jay expressed a willingness 
"to set that Matter to rights, so as the Massachusetts Govern- 
ment shall have no more of that Coast than they had before the 
War." He had, he admitted, taken his directions from maps 
which were "not distinct" and which did not agree, and, there- 
fore, he consented to include in the preliminaries sent to London 
an article referring the northeast boundary to future adjudica- 
tion. Jay's pliancy on this point evidently encouraged the British 
cabinet to instruct Strachey to try to push the Maine boundary as 
far south as the Sagadahoc (Androscoggin) River or, failing this, 
at least to the Penobscot. It did not, however, make either of 
these lines an ultimatum and would, apparently, have conceded 
the Saint John River boundary. When Adams joined the negoti- 
ations, he tried to insist that the Saint John was the true north- 
eastern boundary.20 Had he, rather than Jay, conducted the 
negotiations leading to the draft of October 5 ,  the United States 
might well have gotten the Saint John River as its northeastern 
boundary and a boundary dispute that festered for half a century 
might have been prevented. 
Jay's second concession concerned fish. He had, in the draft of 
October 5 ,  claimed for his countrymen a right to dry fish on the 
shores of Newfoundland. Franklin had not included this claim 
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in his "necessary" articles of July 10, 1782, which the British 
were using as a guideline in the neg0tiati0n.s.~~ Oswald sus- 
pected, however, that the Doctor's assertion of fshing rights 
comprehended drying rights as well. When he queried Jay about 
the right to dry, the New Yorker allowed that his countrymen 
"might give it up, rather than we [the British] should be dissatis- 
fied about it, believing their People [the Americans] would not 
much value the privelege; and would in general chose to bring 
their Fish to their own Coasts as they used to do. "22 It is difficult 
to judge the impact of this disclaimer on Lord Shelburne, head 
of the British ministry, because it is not clear what his initial 
(pre-October) stance on the drying problem was. By September 
18 he had decided to concede to France the exclusive right to f ~ h  
and to dry along the entire west coast of Newfoundland-Ver- 
gennes had been pressing for even more extravagant conces- 
sions-and it may be that after September 18 nothing could 
have persuaded Shelburne to diminish any further the area of 
British dominion on Newfoundland. On the other hand, in 
August and September both Shelburne and George I11 seem to 
have been reluctantly contemplating the prospect of granting 
the United States some kind of privileges on Newfoundland.23 It 
seems likely that Jay's cavalier attitude toward American drying 
rights reinforced their reluctance on this point and caused them 
to instruct Strachey on October 20 to forbid Americans to dry 
f ~ h  there. 
Jay's draft of October 5 arrived in London on October 11. 
Some days earlier, however, the British ministry learned that Gi- 
braltar, which had been under a close siege and for whose safety 
there had been fears, had been relieved, and this caused Shel- 
burne to take a higher tone.24 On October 17, the cabinet re- 
jected Jay's draft and decided to send the pertinacious Strachey 
to Paris. In addition to giving him tougher instructions on the 
northeastern boundary and on American drying pretensions, it 
ordered him to negotiate vigorously for the payment of prewar 
debts and for the restoration or indemnification of the Tories. 
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Suachey reached Paris on October 28 and engaged the American 
commissioners on October 30. By November 5 an express rider 
was carrying a new set of articles to London. 
Adams was agreeably surprised by Franklin's performance in 
the negotiations. To his diary on October 27 he confided his fear 
that "Fs cunning will be to divide Us Uay and hirnselfl. To this 
End he will provoke, he will insinuate, he will intrigue, he will 
maneuvre. " Throughout the negotiations, however, Franklin 
was the soul of compatibility, wringing from Adams the compli- 
ment, on November 30, that "he has met Us in most of our con- 
ferences and has gone on with Us, in entire Harmony and Una- 
nimity, throughout, and has been able and usefull, both by his 
Sagacity and his Reputati~n."~~ The difficulties at the negoti- 
ations were not between Americans, but with the British. 
Of the problems facing the negotiators two were resolved 
easily enough. When the question of British debts was raised, 
Adams declared that he had "no Notion of Cheating any Body," 
that legitimate debts should be paid. Jay agreed: he had, he told 
Oswald, "at all times jointly with his Colleagues declared that 
all that were Contracted before the War must be duely paid." 
Accordingly, on November 3,  the American ministers stipulated 
that British creditors should "meet with no lawfull Inpedirnents, 
to recovering the full value, or Sterling Amount of such bona 
fide Debts as were contracted before the Year 1775. 
The northern and eastern boundaries between the United 
States and Britain were also settled without acrimony. In deter- 
mining these boundaries, Adam took the lead. Suachey had 
brought with him one Roberts, a clerk in the recently abolished 
Board of Trade, who produced "a huge volume of . . . original 
records" in order to support the British claim to the whole prov- 
ince of Maine. Before embarking for Europe in the fall of 1779, 
Adams had had the foresight to secure from the clerk of the 
Massachusetts General Court an even more impressive sheaf of 
documents proving that the eastern boundary of Maine was the 
Saint Croix River. With these, he easily parried Suachey's efforts 
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to put the boundary of Maine at the Penobscot River and fmed it 
instead at the Saint Croix. Suachey was more successful in get- 
ting the Americans to retract from the "Nipissing line" in the 
north. As alternatives, two lines, one along the forty-frfth paral- 
lel from the Connecticut River due west to the Mississippi and 
the other the river and lake line, which is the present boundary 
of the United States, were offered to him to submit to his supe- 
riors in London. The river and lake line was Adams's brain- 
child. 27 
The right to dry fsh on Newfoundland, which Suachey was 
instructed to deny to the Americans, was hotly contested, with 
Adams leading the resistance to Strachey's efforts. "Since Mr. 
Adams came here," wrote Oswald on November 8, "the Com- 
missioners have taken more notice of the Rcfusal of admitting 
their having the priveledge of Drying on Newfoundland than I 
expected from what they told me at settling the Plan of Treaty 
which was sent to England. But at last after a great deal of con- 
versation . . . it was agreed to be I& out upon Condition of 
their being allowed to dry upon any of the unsettled pans of the 
Coast of Nova Scotia. "28 The right to fsh, as distinguished from 
the right to dry, was expanded from the October 5 preliminaries 
to include the Gulf of Saint Lawrence as well as the Banks of 
Newfoundland. 
The Tories were the thorniest problem of all. The British cab- 
inet had instructed Suachey to make a maximum effort to see 
that the United States either restored their confiscated property 
or compensated them for their losses. Failing this, the record 
must clearly show that the British negotiators had spared no 
pains to obtain satisfaction for them.29 The American negoti- 
ators were unalterably opposed to compensating their "intestine 
enemies." The best that Oswald and Suachey could obtain was a 
provision which would allow the Tories to remain unmolested in 
;he United States for six months after the evacuation of British 
forces for the purpose of settling their affairs and a meaningless 
American recommendation of "such amnesty and clemency to 
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the said refugees as their respective circumstances and the dic- 
tates of humanity may render just and reasonable. "3O 
Strachey carried the new peace terms back to London, where 
he arrived on November 10. After some days' deliberation, the 
cabinet sent him back to Paris to obtain adjustments in Britain's 
favor on the Tories and the fisheries. Negotiations resumed on 
November 25 . 3 '  Despite instructions "to obtain as much satisfac- 
tion as possible" for the Tories, Suachey could not move the 
Americans beyond the trifling concessions and empty formulas 
to which they had previously consented. Rather than let negotia- 
tions break down over the Tories, the British ceased to press their 
claims. 
Strachey had more luck on the fisheries. In view of Adams's 
later accounts of his fanatical stand for fishing rights at the peace 
negotiations, it is surprising that Strachey reported to his supe- 
riors on November 8 that the Americans did not appear to be 
"so positive" about the right to dry fish on the Nova Scotia 
coast, that they would give it up, "if objected to at home. " Ac- 
cordingly, the British cabinet instructed Strachey to deny the 
Americans drying rights on the Nova Scotia coast and, in a dras- 
tic effort to contract their fishing opportunities even more, to 
deny them access to the "onshore fsheries," those within three 
leagues of British shores. Adams made heroic efforts to have 
these prohibitions modified and at last succeeded in obtaining 
from the British not the right but the liberty for Americans to 
participate in the onshore fisheries and to dry on the Nova Scotia 
coast. Without these concessions he would have refused to sign 
the preliminaries, concessions that, nevertheless, by diluting 
right to liberty laid the groundwork for a century of controversy 
between New England fishermen and the British go~ernment .~~ 
The conflicts over the Tories and the fisheries having been ad- 
justed agreeably to both sides, the preliminaries were signed on 
November 30, at Oswald's suite at the Grand Hotel Muscovite. 
Four days later Adams wrote Robert Livingston, resigning all 
his "employments in Europe." He had consistently retracted his 
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previous resignations of his revised peace commission, because 
he wanted to participate in the negotiations and because he did 
not want to gratify his enemies, whom he suspected of contriv- 
ing the additions to the peace commission to disgust him and 
force him to resign. Now Adarns persisted and mailed his resig- 
nation off to the secretary of foreign affairs, indicating, to 
others, that he would wait in Europe a decent interval for the ar- 
rival of official permission to vacate his posts. j3 
To leave Europe was the last thing Adams wanted to do. His 
resignation was a suatagem to force Congress to restore his com- 
mission as minister to Great Britain (for this is how he regarded 
his revoked commission to negotiate a commercial ueaty with 
the British). "If ever a Citizen," he wrote Dumas on March 28, 
1783, "could claim an ofice in equity, I have an incontestible 
Right to be Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of Great 
Britain. Because I have had such a commission in my Portefeuille 
these four years." Adams expected no sinecure at the Court of 
St. James's. "I shall not be loved in London," he informed 
James Warren on April 9, 1783. "I have been as you know too 
old and odious an offender not to have Millions of Enemies 
there." But he would beard the British lion in his den not for his 
own good, of course, but for the good of the American people. 
"If Congress," he wrote his wife on February 26, 1783, "should 
think the Honor, Dignity and most important Interests of the 
United States concerned in an immediate Restoration of that 
Commission to me, I cannot in honor, and I ought not, from Re- 
gard to the Publick, to refuse it." His resignation was intended 
to force the issue. With peace at hand, Congress must appoint 
someone to Britain. Let it restore him to the position or recall 
him.34 
Adams feared that Congress might exercise the latter option 
because of resentment (provoked, he supposed, by Luzerne) at 
the peace commissioners' ignoring the instruction of June 15, 
1781, to put themselves under the control of France. "We poor 
Creatures are trembling here under a fearful looking for of Judg- 
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ment and fiery indignation from Philadelphia," he wrote James 
Warren on April 9, 1783. Even if Congress did not take reprisals 
against him for his defiice of the French, Adams was afraid 
that, under French prodding, it might appoint someone else to 
L~ndon.~' On the other hand, it might do the right thing and 
appoint him. His prospects were painfully uncertain. 
Adams had other worries, too. The peace preliminaries ap- 
peared to be in trouble in the British Parliament in the winter of 
1783 and their reception in Congress seemed to be far from 
promising. Repeatedly, in the spring of 1783, he expressed 
"anxiety" to correspondents about their fate in Philadelphia. In 
the period after the conclusion of the preliminaries, Adams was 
under great, if mainly self-imposed, strain. As he wrote his wife 
on February 18: "The Peace which sets the rest of the World at 
Ease increases, I think my Perplexities and Anxiety. "36 
Idleness compounded his discomfort. David Hartley , the min- 
ister designated by Britain to negotiate the definitive peace 
treaty, arrived in Paris toward the end of April 1783, but until 
then Adams had "nothing to do but think of my Situation." As 
he brooded about the revocation of his commercial commission, 
he grew angry. "Congress had been induced to disgrace me," he 
fumed. It had "stained and soiled me." "I would not bear this 
disgrace if I could help it," he went on. "I would wear no Livery 
with a Spot upon it. The Stain should be taken out or I would 
not wear the Coat." A "further disgrace," he complained, worse 
even than the revocation of the commission, was "waiting in 
Europe with the Air of a Candidate and an Expectant. "3' 
More distressing than anxiety and anger was the ordeal of ex- 
periencing once again Franklin's phenomenal popularity in 
Paris, which had swollen to such proportions that Louis XVI ridi- 
culed it by distributing chamber pots with the Doctor's face on 
the bottom. Adams had been in Paris hardly a week when he be- 
gan to complain about Franklin's "omnipotence of reputation. " 
So powerful was the torrent of adulation that no man, no accom- 
plishment, could stand against it. What good was it to be "le 
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Washington de la Ntgotiation," the persiflage of the salon 
which Adams seriously believed was meant for him, when 
French pundits were predicting Franklin would "after a few Ages 
be considered as a God." The apotheosis of Franklin stoked up 
Adarns's envy and animosity, which he handled in the custom- 
ary way by projecting them upon the Doctor. "The Jealousy, 
Envy, and little Pranks o f .  . . Co Patriots" had been his worst 
obstacle at the peace negotiations, he wrote on December 4. His 
severest suffering in Europe, he wrote Livingston on May 25, 
1783, had been caused by the "ill Disposition of the C. de Ver- 
gennes, aided by the Jealousy, Envy and selfish Servility of Dr. 
Franklin. " 38 
As Adams mulled over the loss of his commercial commission, 
he reached the altogether predictable conclusion that it had 
been taken from him by the machinations of Vergennes and 
Franklin, who in this, as in all other instances, was driven by 
"envy and green-eyed jealou~y."~9 (In fact, the commission was 
revoked at the initiative of James Madison; France's role was 
peripheral; Franklin's n~nexistent.)~~ "Franklin's Motive was to 
get my Commission," Adam was convinced, "and Vergennes' 
Motive was to get it for him."41 Adams had believed for a long 
time that Franklin and Vergennes were leagued together to per- 
secute him, but the term of their "alliance" had never been 
precisely clear to him. With information acquired during the 
preliminary peace negotiations, Adams concluded that he had 
discerned the full dimensions of the compact. It now appeared 
to him that with Vergennes, Franklin had concluded a bargain as 
corrupt as any in American history. 
During the preliminary negotiations Adam learned that 
Franklin had concurred with Vergennes in advising Jay to negoti- 
ate with the British without obtaining, as a precondition, a spe- 
cific acknowledgment of American independence. That Franklin 
agreed with Vergennes on this point did not surprise Adam, 
who had long criticized the Doctor for being too friendly, trust- 
ing, and even "obsequious" to the French. In fact, he consid- 
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ered Franklin to be a mere creature, a mouthpiece, of Ver- 
gennes. "Dr. Franklin is as good an index of that minister's sen- 
timents as I know," Adams wrote Livingston on September 6, 
1782. By Adams's calculations, then, Franklin should have 
obeyed the congressional peace insuuction of June 15, 1781, 
which enjoined obedience to France. When the Doctor joined 
Jay and him in flouting it-conduct in which Adams gloried on 
his own account-he, Adams, abused Franklin for having 
"meanly abandoned the System which he had pursuedw-the 
supposedly indiscriminately pro-French system. Adams also as- 
sumed that in deference to his pro-French system, Franklin had 
favored, at the peace negotiations, Vergennes's efforts to deprive 
the United States of the fisheries and the western lands. This 
supposition contradicted the evidence of Adams's own senses; 
Franklin had told him during the negotiations "that the Fish- 
eries and Mississippi could not be given up." In fact, Franklin 
had defended them so tenaciously that on November 29, in the 
heat of battle, Adams exclaimed that the Doctor had behaved 
"well and Nobly." The supposition also contradicted Jay's testi- 
monial to Franklin on Sept. 11, 1783, of his steadfastness on be- 
half of the f~heries and the West. But Adams's suspicions of 
Franklin had hardened to the point of not being amenable to 
evidence, so that he persisted in believing that the "complai- 
sant" Doctor had acquiesced in Vergennes's sinister objectives. 
"Franklin he [Vergennes] knew would let him do as he pleased, 
and assist him in inventing an Excuse for it," Adams wrote War- 
ren on March 2 1, 1783.42 
What was Vergennes's part of the bargain? Simply this-to 
gratify Franklin's inordinate vanity, for which, Adams wrote 
William Lee on March 15, "The feelings . . . of every American 
Minister in Europe have been wantonly sacrificed." Gratification 
was to be accomplished in two ways: by puffing up Franklin's 
reputation-"He [Vergennes] and his Office of Interpreters have 
filled all the Gazettes of Europe with the most Senseless Flattery 
of him, and by means of the Police set every Spectacle, Society, 
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and every private Club and Circle to clapping him with such Ap- 
plause, as they give to Opera Girlsw-and by sacrificing his com- 
petitors on the altar of the Doctor's envy. Franklin, wrote Adams 
on April 13, "considered every American Minister, who has 
come to Europe, as his natural Enemy. He has been afraid that 
some one would serve his Country, acquire a Reputation, and 
begin to be thought of by Congress to replace him." Therefore, 
the Doctor enlisted Vergennes to traduce and destroy his col- 
leagues. From this "detestable Source came the Insinuations and 
Prejudices against me, the shameless abandoned Attack upon 
me. "43 
The Franklin-Vergennes bargain was, then, as clear as it was 
corrupt. Vergennes would rid Franklin of his rivals and inflate 
his ego in return for the Doctor's acquiescence in his efforts to 
hamstring the United States. "It is," wrote Adams on November 
8 ,  1782, "for the determinate purpose of carrying these points 
[depriving America of the fsheries and western lands] that one 
Man, who is Submission itself, is puffed up to the top of Jacob's 
ladder in the Clouds and every other man depressed to the bot- 
tom of it." Or, as Adams put it on May 2 ,  1783, Franklin "has 
aided Vergennes with all his Weight, and his great Reputation, 
in both Worlds, has supported this ignominious System and 
blasted every Man and every Effort to shake it off. "44 
The bargain with Vergennes appeared to Adams to be the per- 
fection of Franklin's villainy. Enraged, he began pouring broad- 
sides of abuse upon the Doctor. These fusillades have caught the 
attention of historians, who note that they do not "make very 
pleasant reading" and see them as signs of "psychological insta- 
b i l i t~ ."~ '  True enough, but the point is that Adams's outbursts 
in the spring and winter of 1783 do not represent an aberrant 
psychological episode; they are simply a continuation of the envy 
and fear that manifested themselves almost as soon as he arrived 
in Europe in 1778. Adams's tirades in 1783 differ from his ear- 
lier attitudes only in being more conspicuous. As he wrote 
Samuel Osgood on April 12, 1783, he had formerly been more 
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reserved in his correspondence for fear that the British might 
capture it and use it as anti-American propaganda. "The Times 
however are past which required such Cautions." Everyone, he 
said, should write freely now.46 
Adams took his own advice, for his attacks on Franklin were 
nothing if not free. The Doctor was a liar-"I can have no de- 
pendence on his Word. I never know when he speaks the 
Truth"; an imposter, the most egregious "since the Days of 
Mahomet"; an "unintelligble PoliticianM-"If I was in Con- 
gress, and this Gentleman and the Marble Mercury in the Gar- 
den of Versailles were in Nomination for an Embassy, I would 
not hesitate to give my vote for the Statue upon the Principle 
that it would do no harm"; "The Demon of Discord among our 
Ministers and the Curse and Scourge of our foreign affairsm- 
"There is nothing however black and infernal, that this Demon 
and his Imps are not capable of"; and, finally, a traitor-the 
conclusion flowed irresistibly from the conviction that Franklin 
would have tolerated the sacrifice of the West and the f~heries.~' 
Adams made no effort to disguise his views of Franklin and 
Vergennes. He wrote them back to America and aired his griev- 
ances against them in all companies in Paris. "I hear frequently 
of his Ravings against M de Vergennes and me," Franklin wrote 
Henry Laurens on March 20, 1783, "whom he suspects of Plots 
against him which have no Existence but in his troubled Imagi- 
nation. I take no Notice and we are civil when we meet. "48 But 
the Doctor's equanimity at length deserted him and on July 22, 
1783, he wrote Robert Livingston, risking, as he knew, a "Mortal 
Enmity," to caution him "respecting the Insinuations of this 
Gentleman against this Court, and the Instances he supposes of 
their ill will to us, which I take to be as imaginary as I know his 
Fancies to be, that Court de V. and Myself are continually plot- 
ting against him. . . . I am persuaded, however, that he means 
well for his Country, is always an honest Man, often a wise one, 
but sometimes, and in some things, absolutely out of his sen- 
ses. "*9 Adams's friends in Congress sent him copies of this letter, 
which confirmed his blackest suspicions about Franklin.'O 
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With the arrival of Hartley in Paris in April, negotiations for a 
definitive treaty began. By diverting Adams from his problems, 
the negotiations furnished a welcome respite from his anxiety 
and anger. This was true, even after it became apparent-as it 
soon did-that Hartley lacked the confidence of his superiors in 
London and would not be allowed to move the talks onto new 
ground. By mid-June the American ministers were convinced 
that the negotiations would, at best, only confirm the status 
quo. "We had by this time made up our minds," Adams wrote, 
"that the definitive treaty would be no more than a repetition of 
the preliminary articles of the provisional treaty."" And so it 
was. On September 3, 1783, Hartley and the Americans signed 
the definitive treaty that ended the long war between the colo- 
nies and the mother country and officially ushered the United 
States into the family of nations. 
A recent writer has stated that Adams suffered another ner- 
vous breakdown a week after the signature of the definitive 
treaty.52 He was, it is uue, taken with a fever which incapacitated 
him for a month and which he compared to the illness that af- 
flicted him at Amsterdam in the summer of 1781, but the evi- 
dence does not appear to support the inference that he suffered 
another breakdown. The Amsterdam breakdown was produced 
by a psychological trauma-the receipt of news of the alteration 
of his peace commission-but in September 1783 there were no 
traumas. On the contrary, there was good news. The anxieties 
that beset Adams earlier in the year about Congress's reception 
of the peace preliminaries dissipated in June with the arrival of 
the news that it had ratified the document. More importantly, 
on September 7 Adams learned that Congress had restored his 
honor by appointing him to head a commission with Jay and 
Franklin to negotiate a treaty of commerce with Great Britain. 
Adams was profuse in his thanksgiving: Congress, he wrote 
James Warren on September 10, "have tied me again to Europe 
by a new Commission so honourable to me, as to have really 
touched my heart"; the commission "does me infinite honour, 
and ought to silence forever every Complaint on my part for 
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what is past." That a fever soon followed is indisputable, but it 
seems to have been no more than a recurrence of the fever that 
sickened Adams for a week in July. In fact, the "violent fever" 
that Adams suffered in September 1783 seems more likely to 
have been the influenza, which ravaged Paris in 1782 and was 
still abroad in the city in 1783.'3 
The conclusion of the definitive peace treaty ended an era in 
American history, changing the status of the thirteen colonies 
from a rebellious subject people to a sovereign nation. The peace 
did not, however, change the structure or intensity of Adams's 
jealousies or of his fears of conspiracy, which flowed along in 
their old channels. As far as he was concerned, the enormity of 
the corrupt bargain between Franklin and Vergennes had not 
been diminished in the least by the official termination of the 
war. 
Franklin, Adams wrote Warren on September 10, "seems to 
have a positive Spight against every public service, that he does 
not exclusively perform himself. He opposes it and persecutes 
the Agent in it with a Malice and Rancour that is astonishing. I 
could have formed no Idea, that Jealousy, Envy and Vanity 
could have gone such lengths." And, of course, Adams still be- 
lieved, as he wrote Samuel Osgood on June 30, 1784, that the 
Doctor was exercising his "low Cunning and mean Craft" to 
steal the position that was righdully his, the ambassadorship to 
Great Britain. By 1784 Franklin was in a pitiable condition. Ap- 
proaching eighty years of age, his health had deteriorated so 
badly that for long periods he could not get out of bed to walk 
around his room for exercise; when he departed Paris for Amer- 
ica in 1785 he had to be carried to the seacoast on a litter. Adams 
was aware that Franklin had requested Congress to recall him, so 
that he might, as he told a friend, die in Philadelphia with his 
family. Convinced, however, that the Doctor "had secret hopes 
and expectations that he should be appointed to the Court of St. 
James," Adams regarded his resignation as a ruse. London was 
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the old man's object and he would not, Adams believed, forsake 
his "clandestine Projects" to obtain the appointment there.14 
Vergennes, of course, would assist Franklin by undermining 
his chief competitor, John Adams. Informed by correspondents 
in Congress that the United States in 1784 was considering imi- 
tating the Swiss in sending no ministers abroad, Adams was cer- 
tain that the suggestion was the result of "sinister Intrigues" by 
the French to keep him from going to London. Let him be re- 
called, he wrote Osgood, and Congress would hear no more 
about the virtues of the Swiss system. Similarly, when Elbridge 
Gerry informed him in 1785 that his vanity had been attacked in 
Congress, Adams responded that the criticism had the "smell of 
French Politicks" to keep him from going to London. Let Con- 
gress be on guard, Adams warned Gerry, lest the charge of vani- 
ty cause it to exclude "the wisest, the most Virtuous and benevo- 
lent, the ablest and most disinterested the most indefatigble and 
successful Ministers that nature produces for their Choice. "'5 
Adams was convinced that Vergennes's objective remained 
the same: to keep the United States dependent on France. If 
Congress allowed itself to be persuaded by the French to send no 
ministers abroad, it would have no means of composing its diffi- 
culties with other nations, with whom it would be "involved in 
eternal Disputes and Insults" and against whom it would be 
obliged to depend upon France for protection. Adams also be- 
lieved he could see Vergennes's hand in the creation of the 
Society of the Cincinnati, whose formation had created disagree- 
able "Debates and Disputes" in the United States. The Cincin- 
nati, Adams assumed, had been "concerted" in France with the 
purpose of weakening the United States-of overturning, per- 
haps, "the whole edifice of Republican Libertyv-so that a fee- 
ble and distracted nation would have to depend on French pro- 
te~tion. '~ 
The bargain between Franklin and Vergennes revealed itself 
to Adams most clearly in the Doctor's negotiation in 1783-at 
the king of Sweden's desire, it was said-of a commercial ueaty 
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that Adams thought procured fewer advantages to American 
commerce than it should have. Vergennes, Adams believed, had 
"all along discovered . . . a jealousy of American ships, seamen, 
carrying trade and naval power." Therefore, he apparently per- 
suaded the Swedes to negotiate an illiberal treaty with Franklin 
as a step toward keeping the American marine weak, so that the 
United States might remain dependent on France. "This 
method of smuggling treaties into Franklin's hands alone," 
Adams wrote Gerry on September 10, "is contrived by Vergen- 
nes on purpose to throw Slights upon Jay and me, and to cheat 
you out of your carrying trade."" 
The perfection of Vergennes's intrigues, in Adams's view, 
would be the appointment of Franklin to London and the Doc- 
tor's grandson, William Temple Franklin, to Versailles. Frank- 
lin, Adams recorded in his diary on January 11, 1783, had writ- 
ten a "Eulogium" to Congress on young Franklin, recommend- 
ing him as extraordinarily well qualified to serve the United 
States abroad. "This Letter and other Circumstances convince 
me," Adams continued, "that the Plan is laid between the C de 
Vergennes and the Dr. to get Billy made Minister to this Court 
[Versailles] and not improbably the Dr. to London." What Ver- 
gennes would accomplish by this maneuver would be the instal- 
lation of two of his creatures at London and Versailles who would 
give him a free hand in ordering American affairs as he pleased. 
Upon the United States he would impose "Ignorant Boys" and 
"dishonest Dotards in their second Childhood," who, under the 
color of cooperation with France, would betray their co~nt ry . '~  
Adams responded to the continuation of these "plots and per- 
secutions" by fleeing from them. In October 1783 he left France 
for an extended visit to Britain and then, at the beginning of 
1784, without returning to Paris, he took up residence at the 
Hague. "I conclude," he wrote a friend from the Dutch capital 
on May 12, 1784, "to remain here without further Wandering 
and not to go to Paris at all. " 5 9  Toward the end ofJuly Adams re- 
ceived a letter from Thomas Jefferson, informing him that Con- 
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gress had commissioned the two men to negotiate commercial 
treaties with the powers of Europe and that they were expected 
to do their business in Paris, to which Adams repaired in August 
with his wife, who had joined him after a separation of more 
than four years. 
Adams, however, kept his eyes on the appointment to Britain. 
His hopes of receiving it alternated with his fears, for "having 
done enough to make three great Nations my Ennemies," as he 
wrote Jonathan Jackson on June 16, 1784, "it is not to be won- 
dered at, that I have hosts who take fire at my name."60 Finally, 
on February 24, 1785, Congress voted Adams the mission that 
had agitated him so long. He received word of his appointment 
at the end of April and went forthwith to Great Britain, where 
he was received on June 1 by George I11 as the first American 
minister to the mother country. 
In London, Adams obtained some relief from the obsessive 
suspicion that Franklin was persecuting him. Britons regarded 
Franklin with profound resentment. He was "Dr. Doubleface," 
a Judas who had betrayed king and country to produce a rebel- 
lion. Absent, therefore, was the idolatrous adulation lavished on 
Franklin by Parisians, which eclipsed Adams's pretensions to 
fame and reputation and which prevailed in the French capital 
long after Franklin's departure in 1785. Had Adams remained in 
Paris he would have been envious of Franklin in absentia and 
would have handled his envy and hostility by projecting them in 
the form of persecution emanating from Franklin. In London it 
was not necessary for Adams to do this. He would have pre- 
ferred, in fact, to forget about Franklin's malevolence alto- 
gether. "I wish it were possible," he wrote Arthur Lee on Jan- 
uary 31, 1785, "to blot out the Page of History, and the Book of 
Remembrance . . . his [Franklin's] insolent Persecutions of you 
and me and others, and the Motives of them, a sordid Jealousy, 
and insidious selfishness, but it is not. 
Adams remained convinced of Franklin's "persecutions" of 
him for the remainder of his life. In 1800 he wrote of the Doc- 
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tor's and Vergennes's conspiracy "to trip him up as Minister for 
Peace and get Dr. Franklin alone in his room"; in 1809 he de- 
nounced the Doctor's "irreconcilable hatred of me"; and in 
1811 he complained of Franklin's efforts to "strike Mr. Adams 
out of existence as a public minister and get himself into his 
place." During his presidency Adams concluded that the Doc- 
tor's schemes were being revived by his newspaperman grand- 
son, Benjamin Franklin Bache, "from whom he inherited a 
dirty, envious, jealous and revengeful1 Spight against me for no 
other cause under heaven than because I was too honest a Man to 
favour or connive at his selfish schemes of ambition and 
Avarice." More to the point, in Alexander Hamilton, Adams's 
principal enemy during his presidency, he believed himself con- 
fronted with someone very much like a reincarnation of Frank- 
lin. "Hamilton," Adams wrote his wife on January 9, 1797, "I 
know to be a proud spirited, conceited aspiring Mortal always 
pretending to Morality, with as debauched Morals as old Frank- 
lin who is his Model more than any one I know. 
It is remarkable, in fact, how much Adams's presidency re- 
sembled his diplomatic career in France and Holland, with 
Hamilton taking Franklin's place as his conspiring tormentor, 
whose consuming ambition was to supplant him. As president, 
Adams continually expressed his fears of Hamilton's "insidious 
and dark intrigues," of his "Intrigues and Cabals" to "turn him 
out" of office and establish himself as a "perpetual Dictator" in 
imitation of "Caesar, Zingis, Mahomet, Cromwell, [or] Na- 
poleon." "Hamilton and a Party," Adams told Elbridge Gerry 
on March 26, 1799, "were endeavouring to get an Army on foot 
to give Hamilton the command of it and thus to proclaim a 
Regal Government, place Hamilton at the Head of it and pre- 
pare the way for a Province of Great BritaimW63 Hamilton was 
not, of course, an unabashed admirer of Adarns, nor did he scru- 
ple to oppose his policies when he thought them wrong, but 
there is no evidence that he ever entertained the vast and diabol- 
ical designs that Adams ascribed to him. 
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The persistence of Adams's hypersuspiciousness and of his 
tendency to see malevolent conspiracies working against him and 
his country may support those who suggest that he was afflicted, 
in some degree, with a paranoid disorder, the principal symp- 
tom of which is durable, inflexible delusions of persecution. But 
before such a conclusion can be endorsed, the persistence in 
large numbers of Adams's countrymen of the Revolutionary atti- 
tudes of jealousy and fear of conspiracy should be considered. 
Jealousy-suspicion was recommended to Americans in 1788 by 
both Federalists and anti- federalist^.^^ A decade later Thomas 
Jefferson extolled it-"free government is founded in jealousy, 
and not in confidence"-and during his presidency Andrew 
Jackson recommended "jealous anxiety" to his fellow  citizen^.^' 
As for fears of conspiracy, the anti-Federalists, who are estimated 
to have been a majority of Americans, interpreted the move- 
ment for the constitution as a malign conspiracy, while both 
Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans reviled each other as 
pernicious conspirators, scheming to destroy the public liberty.66 
Adams's suspicious, conspiratorial mentality may have been not 
a sign of pathology but simply a reflection of the climate of 
opinion in which he lived, which was, in the United States of the 
1780s and 1790s, a product of the Revolutionary struggle with 
Britain between 1763 and 1776 in which jealousy and fear of 
conspiracy were pervasive. That Adams, during his diplomatic 
career and as president, indulged these attitudes to what often 
seemed an uncommon degree may reflect the uncommonly deep 
impression made upon a mind and a personality by a full fifteen 
years' involvement, from the Writs of Assistance episode in 1761 
until the Declaration of Independence, in the heat of the Revo- 
lutionary conflict. 
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The turbulence of Adams's diplomatic service raises the question 
of how his ideas about American foreign policy withstood the 
periods of stress and turmoil which he experienced abroad. The 
answer is that his ideas survived his diplomatic missions with un- 
diminished coherence. If anything, his commitment to them 
was strengthened by his diplomatic experiences, for the convic- 
tion which, in Europe, he found so unnerving and imperious, 
that a dynamic, malign conspiracy of the powerful was directed 
against him, confirmed the assumption which was central to his 
thinking and to that of his contemporaries, that power was ag- 
gressive and "prop~lsive"~ and that it could, therefore, be best 
dealt with by being balanced and contained by countervailing 
power. For Adams, the theater of European diplomacy was, to 
reverse his admired Bolingbroke's famous aphorism, example 
teaching philosophy, for he believed that he had been the victim 
of power operating in its typically encroaching, insidious fashion 
and that, consequently, the value of the protective system of the 
balance of power was confirmed. 
Bernard Bailyn has demonstrated that English Opposition 
ideology, which shaped the thinking of Adams and his col- 
leagues, contained, as integrated components, both the concep- 
tions of power as infinitely aggressive and of balanced power as 
its antidote. Other writers have recently shown that in eigh- 
teenth-century England these ideas were shared as well by the 
entrenched political establishment, the Court.* Domestically, 
the ideas manifested themselves in the commitment of all En- 
glish parties to the classical ideal of "mixed and balanced" gov- 
ernment. In foreign affairs they comprised what has been called 
the classical theory of the balance of power. 
The situation in America was similar. The concept of the bal- 
ance of power prevailed not only in Revolutionary thinking 
about foreign affairs but, as in England, it dominated domestic 
political speculation as well. Edward S. Corwin, the distin- 
guished student of both American foreign policy and constitu- 
tional law, has argued that notions about balanced power which 
guided the Founding Fathers in conceiving the checks and bal- 
ances of the Federal Constitution entered their thinking through 
the medium of foreign policy. "Thus was the Balance of Power," 
wrote Corwin, "borrowed from the stock teachings of the eigh- 
teenth-century diplomacy . . . projected into the midway field 
of federal government. " 3  A case could be made that the reverse 
of Corwin's statement is true, that American ideas about foreign 
affairs were derivatives of domestic political theorizing. In fact, 
it is fruitless to try to establish priority for either the domestic or 
foreign arena as the source of American ideas about the balance 
of power. Balance of power thinking was pervasive in Revolu- 
tionary America, as pervasive as it was in eighteenth-century 
England, from whence it was derived. 
This fact leads us back to the concern with which this study 
began: how peculiarly American, how revolutionary, was the 
diplomacy of the American Revolution, insofar as it was exem- 
plified by John Adams. Questions about the extent to which the 
American Revolution was revolutionary are not usually asked by 
diplomatic historians. Colonial historians, however, are addicted 
to them. It is of primary importance to the colonial historian to 
know how much change the Revolution wrought. Historiograph- 
ical schools have formed and fought over the question of the ex- 
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tent of revolutionary change, over contending claims that the 
Revolution was conservative or liberal-radical. Insulated from 
this controversy though they usually are, diplomatic historians 
are nevertheless parties to it, for they have come down hard on 
the liberal-radical side of it by picturing the Revolution as pro- 
ducing drastic change in the conception and conduct of Amer- 
ican diplomacy. This view, to which most diplomatic historians 
subscribe, has been shaped principally by two writers: Francis 
Wharton and Felix Gilbert. 
Wharton and Gilbert, and those who agree with them, may 
be said to be advocates of a "progressive" interpretation of 
American Revolutionary diplomacy. By "progressive" I mean 
that paradigm developed by historians in the 1920s and 1930s 
which held that American independence was achieved by a 
group of liberal, even radical, leaders who displaced a conserva- 
tive colonial elite and who sponsored sweeping changes in Amer- 
ican society. These liberal reformers are represented as being 
swept aside in the 1780s by a conservative resurgence that pro- 
duced the Constitution and embodied itself in the Federalist 
party of the 1790s; the original goals and spirit of the Revolution 
are said to have been restored and vindicated by the election of 
Thomas Jefferson to the presidency in 1801. That Wharton and 
Gilbert wrote thirty years before and thirty years after the Pro- 
gressive historians does not vitiate the applicability of the term 
progressive to their interpretation of early American diplomacy. 
Both writers stress that the diplomacy of the new nation was 
controlled by bold, adventuresome men who produced pro- 
found changes in the way diplomacy had hitherto been con- 
ceived and practiced. According to Gilbert, Americans were 
"representatives of a new diplomacy," insisting on "proposals 
which were entirely alien to the spirit of the diplomatic practice 
of the time. " "Traditional diplomacy and power politics seemed 
to be elements of a past epoch," "feeble structures which would 
fall at the first blowing of the trumpets of liberty." Wharton 
agreed. John Adams and his associates, he wrote, were "destruc- 
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tive rather than constructive, looking scornfully at all traditional 
systems of war, of diplomacy, of finance. " Relations with foreign 
nations, they believed, "ought to be freed from the artificial 
shackles which international law had imposed" and be ap- 
proached with "blunt simplicity," the expectation being that 
untutored freshness would carry all before it. Both Gilbert and 
Wharton see Revolutionary diplomatic radicalism yielding, after 
the first few heady years, to a more traditional, "realistic" style, 
in which transformation John Adams is represented as being in 
the f~ref ront .~  A season of radicalism, then a conservative reac- 
tion in the 1780s-this is their thesis. It is nothing less than a 
progressive interpretation of early American diplomacy. 
Since this work rejects the progressive view of Revolutionary 
diplomacy, by stressing its continuity with earlier periods and by 
insisting on its old-fashioned European character, the reasons for 
its disagreement with Gilbert and Wharton should be stated. 
According to Gilbert, what was new, what was radical, about the 
diplomacy of the Revolution was the reverse side of its isolation- 
ism. The desire of American statesmen to avoid entanglement in 
the wars and politics of Europe and to confine their country's re- 
lationship with Europe to commerce, open to all nations, has 
long been considered isolationism and nothing more. But Gil- 
bert contends that these aspirations were also "idealistic and in- 
ternationalistic." His evidence is the alleged influence of the 
philosophes (French political philosophers) on the American 
Revolutionary generation. The foreign policy objects of the phi- 
losophes and the Americans-peace and free trade-were iden- 
tical, Gilbert argues, and, therefore, he believes that Americans 
must have shared the philosophes' desire to bring about, 
through free trade, a "new age of peace" in which "relations be- 
tween nations would become purely commercial contacts, and 
the need for a political diplomacy with alliances and balance of 
power would disappear from the international scene." Amer- 
icans in 1776 must, in other words, have been idealistic and in- 
ternationalistic as well as isolationistic.' 
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I do not find that Gilbert presents any credible evidence that 
American Revolutionary diplomacy was "idealistic and interna- 
tionalistic. " That the philosophes, on whom he builds his case, 
shaped the Revolutionary mentality has never been conceded by 
historians of the Revolution (to most of whom, in fact, the possi- 
bility has never occurred). Gilbert offers no evidence from the 
1770s to document their influence on American statesmen and 
produces only a few statements from the 1780s which even hint 
at a compatibility between their ideas and those of American 
leaders. Thus, his thesis would seem to be suspect on its face. 
Then there is Bailyn's recent authoritative investigation of the 
ideas behind the American Revolution which does not even 
mention the French phi lo sop he^.^ Finally, there is contemporary 
testimony about the absence of the philosophes' influence in 
Revolutionary Amelica. In his Notes on Virginia, written in 
1781- 1782, Thomas Jefferson conceded that French thinkers 
were virtually unknown in America; "We are but just becoming 
acquainted with her [France]," Jefferson wrote.' The smattering 
of information Adams had about the philosophes led him to 
scorn them. Their system, he wrote Benjamin Rush on Decem- 
ber 22, 1806, "I took some pains, more than five and twenty 
years ago, to understand; but could not find one Gentleman 
among the Statesmen, Philosophers, and Men of Letters, who 
pretended to understand it. I procured the Books of Quanay 
[Quesnay] and I could not understand much of them, and much 
of what I understood I did not believe." The utter lack of influ- 
ence of the philosophes on Adams is demonstrated by the reply 
he gave a friend in 1777 who was seeking to inform himself 
about political economy, about commerce and money in par- 
ticular. Read Locke, Postlethwait, and Newton, Adams advised 
him.s 
It seems possible that Gilbert assumed that the American 
Revolutionary leaders were under the influence of the philo- 
sophes because he mistook what the Americans meant by "free 
trade"-the panacea of the philosophes. This nostrum, as the 
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philosophes concocted it, prescribed the complete elimination of 
tariffs, duties, exclusions, and monopolies; trade would be as 
free as air; each nation would specialize in the production of that 
which nature enabled it to do best and would exchange its prod- 
ucts with its neighbors for the benefit of all. The network of 
salutary dependencies that developed would, it was predicted, 
guarantee the peace of all. Such a vision inspired few Americans 
in 1776, for the emancipation of commerce was not a goal of 
their Revolution. Quite the contrary. Americans willingly ac- 
cepted the British mercantilist system under which they had 
prospered and were content to continue living within its con- 
fines. "We cheerfully consent to the operation of such acts [the 
Navigation Acts] of the British parliament," declared the First 
Continental Congress in October 1774, "as are bona fide, re- 
strained to the regulation of our external commerce, for the pur- 
pose of securing the commercial advantages of the whole empire 
to the mother country." "It has been said," the Second Conti- 
nental Congress advised the British people in July 1775, "that 
we refuse to submit to the Restrictions on our Commerce. From 
whence is this Inference drawn? Not from our Words, we have 
repeatedly declared the Contrary; and we again profess our Sub- 
mission to the several Acts of Trade and Navigation passed 
before the Year 1763. " 9  Finally, on June 8, 1776, John Dickin- 
son reminded Congress that "we have repeatedly declared" that 
control over American commerce "was necessarily lodged" in 
Britain.Io When John Adams drafted the Model Treaty in the 
summer of 1776, did he suddenly depart from these sentiments? 
Not at all, although a superficial reading of the Model Treaty 
might create the impression that it was a charter for free trade. l 1  
The Model Treaty proposed commercial reciprocity rather 
than commercial freedom. It stated that, in its ports, the United 
States would treat subjects of a foreign power as it treated its own 
citizens, if the foreign power would do the same for American 
citizens in its ports. A foreigner trading to an American port 
would encounter no restraints at the customs house. American 
John Adams 
leaders, presiding over a predominantly agrarian nation, per- 
ceived it to be contrary to the country's interests to lay import 
duties which would raise prices to the farmer. But just because 
foreign merchants would pay no duties in the United States, 
Americans did not expect to be exempt from duties in foreign 
ports. The objective of the Model Treaty was not to immunize 
American traders against duties but to assure that foreign gov- 
ernments did not discriminate against them in favor of their own 
citizens. In insisting that Americans be treated as Britishers in 
British ports, the Model Treaty, in fact, accepted the Navigation 
Acts, for Americans would be bound by the whole system of 
"enumerated" quantities, prohibitory duties, and all the other 
appurtenances of mercantilism as they would be by the national 
mercantilistic system in French, Spanish, and other European 
ports. What the Model Treaty aimed for was the maintenance of 
the American carrying trade, by protecting it from the exclusions 
of the various national mercantilistic systems of the day. What 
was sought was participation in these systems, not freedom from 
their restraints. 
The philosophes' infatuation with the reforming, redemptive 
character of commerce would have been incomprehensible to 
American leaders of 1776. Raised in a mercantilistic empire, 
they regarded commerce as a source of wealth and power. As 
such, they considered it a potential threat to their experiment in 
free government. Following Gordon Wood, recent writers have 
argued that the principal objective of the American Revolution- 
ary leaders, which both domestic and foreign policies were de- 
signed to serve, was the establishment and preservation of a re- 
public.12 A republic was a concept of eighteenth-century polit- 
ical theorists who believed that there were exact conditions 
which assured its health: existence in a circumscribed area, ab- 
sence of a standing military establishment, and preeminently 
the presence of virtue in the people at large. Virtue was under- 
stood in a civic sense, as a passion for the public good. Its anti- 
thesis, as well as the chief threat to republican government, was 
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luxury, which was believed to breed corruption. Luxury was un- 
derstood as conspicuous consumption to which one became so 
addicted that he fell into the power of, and was corrupted by, 
those who could supply the means to maintain the habit. 
The principal purveyor of luxury in American society, the 
Revolutionary leaders believed, was foreign commerce, and they 
condemned it unsparingly. "Commerce produces money, 
money Luxury and all three are incompatible with Republi- 
canism," wrote Adams, epitomizing American thinking on the 
matter. No less representative was Thomas Paine's statement in 
Common Sense that " 'Commerce diminishes the spirit both of 
patriotism and military defense' and would eventually destroy 
America's soul. " Adams, in fact, declaimed almost nonstop 
against commerce. "The Spirit of Commerce," he wrote Mercy 
Warren on April 16, 1776, "Corrupts the morals of families as 
well as destroys their Happiness, it is much to be feared [it] is 
incompatible with the purity of Heart and Greatness of Soul 
which is necessary for a happy Republic." "We must guard," he 
wrote Mercy's husband, James, on December 15, 1782, against 
"that excessive Influx of Commerce Luxury and Inhabitants 
from abroad, which will soon embarrass Us." "The Intelligent 
advocate of Liberty," Adams informed Elbridge Gerry on April 
25, 1785, is always against "the Commercial Spirit and innumer- 
able other evil Spirits. " '3 
It was not just Adams and men of his type who feared the cor- 
rosive effects of commerce. Merchants themselves were appre- 
hensive about it. Tristram Dalton, for example, agreed with 
those who argued "against an extensive trade, as ruinous to the 
manners of a Republic." And Silas Deane, the tragic symbol of 
the Revolutionary merchant, shared the common sentiments 
about trade: "only by banishing wealth and luxury, and holding 
commerce the parent of both in abhorrence" would it be possi- 
ble to preserve republican government. l4 Curiously enough, the 
very philosophes-Mably, Mirabeau, Raynal-whom Gilbert 
quotes as expecting free trade to produce a regenerate world 
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order were warning Americans in the 1780s about the incompat- 
ibility of commerce and republican government. Mably was par- 
ticularly shrill about the baleful effects of trade, stating, "I can- 
not avoid coinciding with the opinion of Plato, who, in order to 
secure the welfare of a republic, recommended that it should not 
establish itself either near the sea, nor upon the borders of any 
large river. " l5 
What antidotes were available to the poison of unbridled 
commerce? One was proposed by Jefferson, who suggested that 
"it might be better for us to abandon the ocean altogether" and 
wished that "there were an ocean of fire between us and the old 
world." Adams expressed a similar view: "If every ship we have 
were burnt, and the keel of another never to be laid, we might 
still be the happiest people upon earth, and in frfty years the 
most powerful. The Luxuries we import from Europe, instead of 
promoting our prosperity, only enfeeble our race of men & 
retard the increase of population. "16 
But Adams and his colleagues knew that to abolish commerce 
was impossible. It was "theory only," said Jefferson, "and a 
theory which the servants of America are not at liberty to follow. 
Our people have a decided taste for navigation and com- 
merce . . . and their servants are in duty bound to calculate all 
their measures on this datum." Or, as Adams put it, it was vain 
"to amuse ourselves with the thoughts of annihilating Com- 
merce unless as Philosophical Speculations" ; Americans were "as 
aquatic as the Tortoises and Sea Fowls" and "the love of Com- 
merce with its conveniences and pleasures" was a habit in them 
"as unalterable as their Natures. "'7 Therefore, the leaders of the 
new republic never seriously tried to limit commerce. But 
neither did they entertain any illusions about its being an instru- 
ment of regeneration and reform, much less of idealism and in- 
ternationalism. 
Felix Gilbert concentrated on the intellectual substance of 
early American diplomacy. Francis Wharton examined its form. 
Wharton believed that the radicalism of Revolutionary diplo- 
macy consisted in its manners or, more precisely, in its lack of 
manners, for he portrayed Revolutionary diplomats as delib- 
erately and enthusiastically flouting the conventions of Euro- 
pean diplomacy. To their considered contempt of the rules of 
their craft he gave a name which is still current in the writing of 
diplomatic history-"militia diplomacy," borrowing the term 
from Adams who in 1782 wrote from Holland that "militia 
sometimes gain victories over regular troops even by departing 
from the rules. " l8 
The most egregious transgression of the militia diplomats 
Wharton regarded as the vote by Congress, under their pre- 
sumed influence, on December 30, 1776, of missions to a num- 
ber of foreign powers-Austria, Prussia, and Tuscany-without 
its first ascertaining, as the conventions of diplomacy dictated, 
whether those countries were willing to receive American emis- 
saries. What prompted Congress to dispatch this wave of minis- 
ters? Adams, who Wharton described as the "moving power" in 
Congress for the "multiplication of missions, "'9 was not respon- 
sible, because he was in Massachusetts. Who, then, was respon- 
sible? The justification for Congress's action was that its duly ac- 
credited agent abroad, Silas Deane, urged it to send ministers to 
the various powers. 
In a letter of October 1, 1776, which the Committee of Secret 
Correspondence acknowledged receiving on December 21  and 
which evidently produced the vote in favor of the multiple mis- 
sions on December 30, Deane wrote, "It is of importance . . . to 
have someone deputed or empowered to treat with the King of 
Prussia. I am acquainted with his agent here, and have already 
through him received some queries and proposals respecting 
American commerce, to which I am preparing a reply. I have 
also an acquaintance with the agent of the Grand Duke of Tus- 
cany, who proposes fxing a commerce between the United 
States and Leghorn, but has not yet given me his particular 
thoughts." In an earlier letter, that of August 18, Deane con- 
fided that Austria might also be favorably disposed to the Amer- 
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ican cause.20 A passage in Adams's Aiztobiograpby suggests that 
someone else, possibly the Tuscan immigrant to Virginia, Philip 
Mazzei, a friend of Franklin, the Lees, and Jefferson, may also 
have been instrumental in producing the vote of December 
30. Congress, wrote Adams, "had been advised, by Persons 
who knew no better, to send a Minister to the Emperor and to 
the Grand Duke of Tuscany because they were Brothers to the 
Queen of France. In this measure there was less Attention to the 
Political Interests and View of Princes than to Ties of Blood and 
Family  connection^."^' The point is that Congress voted the 
missions on December 30, on the advice of presumably well- 
informed persons who assured it that its emissaries would be wel- 
come in the countries to which they were sent. Far from flouting 
the established rules of diplomacy, it honored them on this 
occasion. 
It is also instructive to note what Congress did not do on 
December 30. It did not cover Europe with ministers, as men in 
the grip of "militia madness" would have done. No ambassadors 
were sent to what were called the northern powers: Russia, 
Sweden, Denmark-Norway. None were sent to Portugal, with 
which the colonies had carried on a lively prewar trade in fish 
and wine. And none were sent to Holland, with which Amer- 
icans felt a strong affinity because of a similar religious and revo- 
lutionary heritage. Explained Adams to the States General in 
1781: "It was not from a failure in respect that they [Congress] 
did not send a minister to your high mightinesses with the first 
whom they sent abroad; but instructed in the nature of the con- 
nexions between Great Britain and the republic, and in the sys- 
tem of peace and neutrality which she had so long pursued, they 
thought proper to respect both so far as not to seek to embroil 
her with her allies, to excite divisions in the nation, or lay embar- 
rassments before it. "22 In July 1777 a proposal was made in Con- 
gress to send a minister to the Dutch, but the same respect for 
diplomatic protocol prevailed and Congress rejected the move: 
as Franklin wrote Dumas on April 10, 1778, because of a "desire 
to have and maintain a good Understanding with their High 
Mightinesses, and a free commerce with their Subjects, the mea- 
sure was respectfully postponed for the present, till their [the 
Dutch] Sentiments on it, could be known, from an Apprehen- 
sion that possibly their connections with England, might make 
the receiving an American Minister, as yet inconvenient, and if 
Holland should have the same good Will towards Us, a little em- 
barrassing." Thus, the Congress in 1776 and in the years imme- 
diately thereafter consistently acted in conformity with diplo- 
matic convention. Explaining its attitude, James Wilson wrote 
Robert Morris on January 14, 1777, "In our Transactions with 
European States, it is certainly of Importance neither to trans- 
gress, nor to fall short of those Maxims, by which they regulate 
their Conduct towards one another."*3 That American states- 
men; flushed with enthusiasm over independence, engaged in, 
or approved, the nihilistic orgy of diplomatic rule-breaking 
which Wharton called militia diplomacy is false. 
Adams, called by Wharton the "principal exponent" of mili- 
tia diplomacy, was a model of diplomatic propriety. During his 
first mission to France he acquired and read a small library of 
books on the diplomatic history and practice of Europe. When 
he returned to America in the summer of 1779 he billed Con- 
gress for the books, since they were "calculated to qualify me for 
Conversation and for Business, especially the Science of Negoti- 
ation-accordingly the Books are a Collection on the public 
Right of Europe and the Letters and Memoirs of Ambassadors 
and public Ministers who had acquired the fairest Fame and had 
done the greatest Service to their Constituents in this Way." In 
other words, Adams wanted to learn how the experts had acted, 
so that he might imitate them. And during his first mission he 
acted every bit the professional. He refused to make an excursion 
into Holland because "there was no hope that Holland would 
then receive a Minister, and I thought Congress ought not to 
send one there as yet." Nor did he want to sally forth uninvited 
to other countries. To be sent to a court, Vienna for example, 
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where he would not be received "would be the most painful1 
Situation imaginable," he wrote his wife on November 27, 
1778.24 
Upon returning to Europe in 1780, Adams continued to mind 
his diplomatic manners. Proceeding to France via Spain in Jan- 
uary 1780, he passed within forty leagues of Madrid, but de- 
cided against visiting the Spanish capital because of "the polit- 
ical Situation that I might be in, my Country not yet being ac- 
knowledged as a Sovereign State, by any formal Act of that 
Court."25 It was only after Adams became convinced that Frank- 
lin and Vergennes were conspiring to persecute him and to re- 
duce his country to a demeaning and dangerous dependency on 
France that he threw away the diplomatic rule book and put on 
the extraordinary performance in Holland, which Wharton re- 
garded as the essence of militia diplomacy and as characteristic of 
American Revolutionary diplomacy as a whole. Wharton, in 
other words, mistook an aberration in Adams's diplomatic con- 
duct for the normal style of American Revolutionary diplomacy. 
When Adams escaped from the orbit of Franklin and Ver- 
gennes and took his post at London in 1785, he renounced dip- 
lomatic iconoclasm and returned to his customary respect for 
diplomatic convention. In the face of Britain's refusal to respond 
to his inquiries and memorials about the frontier posts and a 
commercial ueaty, Adarns was the soul of tact. He specifically 
avoided demanding categorical answers, as he had done in the 
Netherlands. In fact, he was reluctant to put any pressure at all 
on the British. He had "not yet made a formal requisition [for 
the surrender of the posts]," he informed John Jay on October 
16, 1785. "If I had done it I should have compromised my sover- 
eign and should certainly have had no Answer." "It would be 
lessening the United States," he wrote Jay on December 6 ,  1785, 
"if I were to tease Ministers with Applications which would be 
answered only by neglect and silence. "26 
Observing Adams in Britain, Wharton concluded, as Gilbert 
had, that he had changed his approach and, profiting by his ex- 
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perience in Europe, had become a more traditional diplo- 
matist.*' But there is no evidence that, either in conceiving the 
strategy of American foreign policy or in setting its style, Adams 
swung from an initially "radical" posture to a conventional one. 
Except for the Dutch interlude, in which he adopted an unor- 
thodox diplomatic style, Adams, in his thinking about foreign 
policy and in his execution of it, proceeded in a straight line 
from the Declaration of Independence onward, in a line that can 
be described as customary, European, and conservative. Insofar 
as he is representative of the theory and practice of American 
Revolutionary diplomacy, it reflects the same characteristics- 
characteristics that did not disappear until decades after the 
Revolution. 
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A N O T E  O N  S O U R C E S  
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